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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
International business, compared with domestic business, is characterized by 
uncertainty. This is because the international marketplace requires a firm to 
operate in unfamiliar environments made more complex by differences in 
language, culture, and institutional context (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990, 
2009). Information acquisition alleviates uncertainty, making it particularly 
important in international business. Yet, the same reasons that make 
information acquisition particularly important in international business also 
hinder its acquisition (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990, 2009). The large 
multinational corporation can tackle (though not necessarily meet) the 
information acquisition challenge by internalizing transactions across borders 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976, 1986; Hennart, 1982) and by providing a community 
in which to exchange information internationally (Kogut & Zander, 1993). 
However, increasing numbers of small firms are also conducting business 
across national borders and these do not have recourse to such solutions 
(McDougall & Oviatt, 1999; Oviatt & McDougall, 1994, 2005). Yet, information 
acquisition is critical to these firms’ operations because they rely centrally on 
innovation for their competitiveness in the international marketplace (Knight 
& Cavusgil, 2004; McDougall & Oviatt, 1999, 2000; Trott & Hartmann, 2009). 
Understanding how small companies acquire information for 
innovation in the international marketplace is crucial in an age when 
developed economies are increasingly looking to small firms to drive economic 
growth (Audretsch, 2002, 2009; Audretsch & Thurik, 2000). Small firms that 
operate internationally are especially important because they generate the 
lion’s share of all economic growth created by small companies (Autio, 2005, 
2007; Autio & Hoeltzl, 2008). However, the systematic study of how small 
firms acquire information for innovation in the international marketplace is 
only beginning (Fletcher & Harris, 2012; Jones, Coviello, & Tang, 2011), 
although it can build on a wealth of research in innovation studies and 
international business studies. 
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1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
The primary research question in this dissertation is “How does a small firm 
acquire information for innovation in international business?” This is 
addressed by putting forth two sub-questions: 
(1) How can the literature illuminate information acquisition for 
innovation in a small firm in international business? 
(2) How does a small firm acquire information for innovation in 
international business? 
These research questions are tackled through a Straussian grounded theory 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998) study that examines individual-level information 
acquisition for innovation in a small firm. The grounded theory methodology 
is well suited to a study of individual-level information acquisition because it 
emphasizes the analysis of action and interaction strategies of actors 
(Suddaby, 2006). The Straussian grounded theory methodology employs 
abductive reasoning of modifying and combining elements of previous 
knowledge and integrating them with new experience (Anderson, 1987; 
Paavola, 2004). This means that the researcher does not approach the 
empirical study tabula rasa but instead uses the existing literature to see what 
is new and interesting. However, theories are considered preliminary, open to 
questioning, criticizing, rejection, and reshaping upon encounter with 
empirical data (Flick, 2006; Kelle, 2005). Underlying this methodology is the 
philosophy of classical pragmatism (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Mcdermid, 
2006). This philosophical approach is based on the principle of the need for 
ideas to be useful, workable, and practical. Consequently, the truthfulness of 
theories is considered as their ability to anticipate the consequences of 
manipulating things in the world. 
Studying individual-level information acquisition poses certain 
challenges to research design. Key among these is the need to control for 
homogeneity of context in order to be able to draw reasonable conclusions 
(Van de Ven & Poole, 2002). Therefore, the study was situated within a single 
sector and a single research site, both of which were chosen carefully in order 
to illuminate the phenomenon under study. The biotechnology sector was 
chosen because it could illustrate the central aspects of information acquisition 
and innovation. A small firm in Finland was selected because firms originating 
from a small economy such as Finland’s have little choice but to engage in 
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international business operations. Therefore, situating the study in the 
biotechnology sector in a small firm in Finland could provide illustrative data 
concerning information acquisition for innovation in international business. 
1.3 DEFINITIONS 
Two central terms used in the dissertation need to be defined at the outset 
because they may be understood in a variety of ways. These are the terms 
“information” and “innovation.” 
Information 
Information is defined for the purposes of this study in its commonsense 
meaning as communicated messages. More specifically, a subjective concept of 
information is adopted, where information is considered a sign depending on 
the interpretation of a cognitive agent (Capurro & Hjørland, 2005).1 Moreover, 
the conventional distinction between “knowledge” and “information” is 
retained: knowledge is acquired information, information that has been found, 
selected and gathered, often from many sources, assembled into packages, and 
available for use. 
Innovation 
Innovation is defined for the purposes of this study in the economic sense as 
the first attempt to carry an invention (the first occurrence of a new idea) into 
practice (Fagerberg, 2005), this being characterized by the accomplishment of 
the first commercial transaction (Freeman, 1982). However, invention and 
innovation are not considered to stand in a linear relationship (Fagerberg, 
2005; Pavitt, 2005). Moreover, the full range of innovation originally 
identified by Schumpeter is included here under the term “innovation”: new 
products/services, new methods of production, new sources of supply, the 
exploitation of new markets, and new ways to organize business (Fagerberg, 
2005). 
                                                        
1 Hence, the term “information” is not used in this dissertation in the technical 
sense derived from Shannon’s information theory (Bar-Hillel & Carnap, 1953; 
Shannon, [1948] 1993; Shannon & Weaver, 1949) and the “conduit theory” often 
associated with it (Axley, 1984; Day, 2000; Reddy, [1979] 2002). 
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1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The study is presented in four parts following this introductory chapter. The 
first part covers the literature review, which is composed of four sections. The 
first of these sections discusses the definition of biotechnology, the second 
reviews the main historical developments in the modern biotechnology sector, 
the third identifies the main characteristics of innovation in the modern 
biotechnology sector as put forth in the literature, and the fourth section 
presents the main perspectives on information acquisition in international 
business studies. The second part of the dissertation covers the methodology 
employed in the empirical study, presenting the research site, data collection, 
and data analysis. Following this, the third part of the dissertation presents the 
results from the empirical study. Finally, in the fourth part of the dissertation, 
the conclusions drawn from the empirical study are set out, related to the 
literature, and their contribution stated in terms of what is new and important. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research question put forth in this chapter is “How can the literature 
illuminate information acquisition for innovation in a small firm in 
international business?” To answer this question, this chapter provides a 
review of literature that can shed light on information acquisition for 
innovation in a small biotechnology firm engaging in international operations, 
taking into account that this firm is located in the small, developed economy of 
Finland. 
First, it is necessary to define biotechnology for the purposes of this 
study, which is done by briefly reviewing the main historical developments in 
the subject area of biotechnology. This review clarifies the distinction that is 
frequently made between traditional and modern biotechnology. The 
difference between the two can be argued to have been institutionalized to the 
extent that there is real divergence in innovation dynamics in traditional and 
modern biotechnology, even if continuities in the underlying subject matter 
can be said to overcome the revolutionary claims of modern biotechnology. 
Second, the main historical developments in modern biotechnology as an 
economic sector are reviewed. This is necessary because it has been noted that 
innovation dynamics in modern biotechnology are contextual and exhibit 
unique features on both sector and national levels. Hence, it is important to 
clarify the contexts in which theories and models of innovation in modern 
biotechnology have been constructed. Focus in this study is on the first-mover 
nations of the United States and the United Kingdom because their 
experiences have arguably furnished the material for the majority of theories 
of innovation in modern biotechnology. Moreover, these experiences have 
largely provided templates that have been followed when constructing a 
modern biotechnology sector in Finland, a context that is also briefly 
described. 
Second, this historical review of main developments in the subject 
matter of biotechnology and in modern biotechnology as an economic sector is 
followed by a review of the main characteristics of innovation in modern 
biotechnology. This review is theoretical rather than historical, aiming at 
identifying general main characteristics of innovation in this sector. It is 
posited that such general main characteristics can be identified to a certain 
extent because the structures of modern biotechnology sectors have shown a 
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level of convergence as the sector has matured.2 However, there are still 
differences in the national sectors and these are pointed out when relevant. It 
emerges from this review that information acquisition can be identified as a 
core activity in modern biotechnology innovation but that its characteristics 
notably differ between national modern biotechnology sectors. The main 
difference can be identified to be the extent of reliance on international 
sources for information acquisition. In other words, earlier theories of modern 
biotechnology innovation that have been constructed primarily on the basis on 
U.S. experiences point to strong local agglomeration tendencies of innovation, 
argued to be driven by the necessary information being embedded in local 
networks. However, later studies conducted in European modern 
biotechnology sectors reveal a significantly greater reliance on international 
information sources in these contexts. Although this phenomenon has not 
been analyzed in the Finnish modern biotechnology sector, studies from 
Sweden, which has a very similar economy to Finland, conclude that in the 
context of modern biotechnology innovation in a small economy, the majority 
of information sources are international by necessity. 
Therefore, the third part of this literature review focuses on literature 
on information acquisition in international business operations. Literature 
that appears to hold potential to shed light on this phenomenon can be found 
in the field of international business studies, where information acquisition in 
the international marketplace has been studied for several decades.3 
Consequently, this literature is reviewed in the last part of the current review. 
Most of this literature focuses on information acquisition within multinational 
corporations rather than on information acquisition from external sources. 
Even when this literature does consider information acquisition from external 
sources, it largely focuses on information acquisition for internationalization 
rather than for innovation. However, theories on information acquisition in 
the international marketplace found in this literature may provide ideas 
regarding the dynamics of information acquisition in international business.  
                                                        
2 Although, as will be discussed, the main characteristics of innovation in 
modern biotechnology identified in the literature may excessively reflect the dynamics 
of the pharmaceuticals industry. This is because most of the existing literature has 
focused on applications of biotechnology to the pharmaceuticals industry, although 
this is only one of several application areas of biotechnology. Hence, sensitivity to 
possible variances in innovation dynamics between the various application areas of 
biotechnology needs to be maintained. 
3 International business studies literature uses both of the terms “information” 
and “knowledge,” but they are not consistently distinguished. Therefore, the umbrella 
term “information” is used for convenience when referring to the full literature of 
international business studies.  
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This literature review provides “theoretical sensitivity” to the empirical 
study. In line with the Straussian grounded theory methodology used in this 
study, the theories examined in the literature review are approached in the 
manner of theoretical pluralism, so that the researcher has a variety of 
diverging theoretical backgrounds at her/his disposal. Theories are seen as 
“versions of the world,” considered preliminary, open to questioning, 
criticizing, rejection, and reshaping. Thus, use of literature does not mean 
settling on a favored theoretical framework prior to empirical research but 
rather providing the necessary material for abductive reasoning that combines 
something old and something unknown.  
2.1 DEFINING BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Biotechnology, at its simplest, is technology based on biology that harnesses 
cellular and biomolecular processes to develop technologies and products. At 
its basic, as referring to the deciphering and use of biological knowledge, 
biotechnology is far from being a recent development (Smith, 2004). Instead, 
it represents a developing and expanding series of technologies as old as 
civilization. Humans have been using the biological processes of micro-
organisms for thousands of years, for example in brewing, baking, and dairy 
processing. However, while these techniques were well worked out and 
reproducible, their underlying biological processes were unknown, which 
limited the possibilities of humans to control and modify these techniques 
(Barnum, 2005; Smith, 2004). It was only with developments in modern 
science that many of these constraints started to be broken. The study of ever-
smaller life forms, beginning in the 17th century with the first observations of 
micro-organisms (Barnum, 2005) and recently triumphing with the 
sequencing of the human genome (Davies, 2001; Potters, 2010), has made it 
possible to develop increasingly powerful techniques to control and 
manipulate biological processes. This has had, and continues to have, huge 
impact across a range of application areas that are fundamental to human 
existence, such as healthcare, food production, and dealing with the 
environment (Enzing, 2011). 
Biotechnology is far from being a coherent, unified body of scientific 
and engineering knowledge (Smith, 2004). It covers a wide and developing 
range of biological, chemical, and engineering disciplines and their 
combinations with varying types and degrees of application to the industrial 
scene. Biotechnology has been applied primarily to healthcare (“red 
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biotechnology”), industrial processes (“white/grey biotechnology”), and 
agriculture and environment (“green biotechnology”) (Enzing, 2011).4 The 
various application areas of biotechnology exhibit different innovation 
dynamics (Senker, van Zwanenberg, Caloghirou, Zambarloukos, Kolisis, 
Enzing, et al., 2001). Moreover, there is diversity even within application 
areas. For example, healthcare applications of biotechnology span several 
industries, such as pharmaceuticals and equipment/supplies, which exhibit 
dissimilar innovation dynamics (Senker, van Zwanenberg, Caloghirou, 
Zambarloukos, Kolisis, Mangematin, et al., 2001). New biotechnology 
applications are also continuously emerging, adding to the diversity. 
This diversity in biotechnology has resulted in a multitude of differing 
definitions for biotechnology, some of them wildly conflicting with each other. 
Indeed, some have suggested the abandonment of the term biotechnology 
altogether as too general and the replacement of it by the precise term of 
whatever specific technology or application is being used (Smith, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the term biotechnology has persisted. Bud (1991) suggests that 
the ambiguity of the term biotechnology has contributed to its staying power.5 
Therefore, this term is used here, but it is recognized that it is important to be 
clear about the main ways in which it can be, and has been, used in order to 
utilize the term with some degree of precision. This requires a brief look at the 
historical developments in the sciences and industries associated with 
biotechnology. It is particularly important to contextualize, and thus clarify, 
the distinction that is usually made between traditional and modern 
biotechnology6 (Brink, McKelvey, & Smith, 2004). Making this distinction 
clear is important because most of the literature on biotechnology innovation 
has focused on modern biotechnology. Therefore, understanding how modern 
biotechnology is defined and how it differs from traditional biotechnology is 
crucial for making sense of the biotechnology innovation literature. 
                                                        
4 To these main categorizations are sometimes added applications of 
biotechnology to marine uses (“blue biotechnology”) and applications of biotechnology 
that integrate multiple areas (“multicolored biotechnology”). 
5 Bud (1991) posits that biotechnology has become a phenomenon that is not 
only scientific and technological but also cultural. Therefore, there is a richness of 
cultural material attached to the term that has been used by various protagonists even 
while they have been able to define the specifics of the term according to their own 
interests. 
6 However, even this distinction is not always clear and is used in varying 
ways. The way the distinction is described here may, nonetheless, be argued to be a 
common one.  
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2.1.1 Traditional Biotechnology 
Traditional biotechnology is usually defined as the biotechnology techniques 
developed prior to the 1970s that made it possible to manipulate biological 
processes at the genetic level. At its broadest, traditional biotechnology can be 
seen to comprise all of the techniques developed by humans over thousands of 
years that utilize biological processes. However, the techniques used by 
humans over thousands of years in brewing, baking, and dairy production 
were artisanal practices developed through empirical observation but lacking 
in understanding of the underlying biological processes (Bud, 1993). The 
development of modern science introduced a decisive break to these ancient 
traditions as it made it possible to begin developing an understanding of the 
underlying biological processes. Therefore, the definition of traditional 
biotechnology is limited in this study to refer to biotechnology techniques 
developed with modern science from the 19th century onwards but before the 
genetic engineering breakthroughs of the 1970s. 
Traditional biotechnology was associated primarily with the scientific 
fields of microbiology, biochemistry, and chemical engineering (Bud, 1993), all 
with roots strongly in the 19th century. Of course, the 19th century advances in 
these fields relied on earlier developments: improved tools of inquiry, 
especially the microscope, had enabled the discovery of gradually smaller life 
forms throughout the 17th and 18th centuries (Barnum, 2005). However, crucial 
for developments in what would come to be called biotechnology was the 
ability of scientists by the 19th century to observe the existence of micro-
organisms such as fungi, protozoa, and bacteria by using increasingly powerful 
microscopes (Barnum, 2005). The discovery by the French chemist Louis 
Pasteur in the mid-19th century that micro-organisms cause fermentation 
made it possible, for the first time in the thousands of years that humankind 
had been using fermentation to produce and preserve foods, to understand 
how the fermentation process worked. Pasteur was also able to demonstrate 
that micro-organisms were responsible for the spoilage of alcohol and 
foodstuffs, and through his experiments encouraged the belief that there were 
micro-organisms in the air that could cause disease in humans. Although 
Pasteur was unable to prove this latter theory, the German physician Robert 
Koch provided the proof a few years later. The groundbreaking work by 
Pasteur and Koch led to a “Golden Age of Microbiology” in the late 19th century 
and the first decade of the 20th century (Schaechter, 2003). 
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The discoveries by Pasteur, Koch, and their students did not take place 
in an isolated scientific vacuum. Far from it, these scientific developments had 
great practical importance with applications to healthcare, nutrition, and the 
environment (Schaechter, 2003). The discovery of the microbial etiology of 
major infectious diseases took place during this first Golden Era of 
microbiology and resulted in accurate diagnoses and attempts at prevention 
and cure. Several vaccines used today stem from those developed by early 
microbiologists. Early microbiological research also made it possible to 
understand the cycles of matter in nature and provided a rational basis for 
food production and preservation. These scientific developments had 
significant practical applications and, in turn, were often instantiated by real-
world problems and actors outside of the scientific field. An important 
example of this close interaction between basic science and the rest of society 
in the early days of biotechnology development is the fact that many of 
Pasteur’s groundbreaking findings were made when he was studying problems 
plaguing the French wine industry, as commissioned by the French 
government (Bud, 1993; Stokes, 1997). It was during the years that Pasteur 
spent studying wine that he made his discovery that micro-organisms caused 
the spoilage of wine and subsequently developed methods for improved 
control of the fermentation process, thus helping to improve the 
competitiveness of the French wine industry (Bud, 1993). 
This point of close interaction between basic science and the rest of 
society, in not only applying scientific discoveries to practical problems but 
also being instantiated by them, is important to emphasize because it provides 
important insights into historical innovation dynamics in biotechnology. What 
it reveals is that far from being the isolated basic science that biotechnology 
has often been portrayed as, it has instead evolved in close and iterative 
interaction with the rest of society. Indeed, it was in the search for a better 
understanding of industrial fermentation under the label “zymotechnology” 
that the foundations of what was to become biotechnology lay. This search 
involved various scientific fields ranging from microbiology to chemistry and 
engineering. Moreover, it took place in close interaction with industry, as 
zymotechnology brought together established industries with new sciences and 
technologies (Bud, 1992, 1993). In many ways, in this broad field of 
zymotechnology lay the foundations of what was to become biotechnology 
(Bud, 1993). As Bud put it: “the meaning of zymotechnology would be 
incorporated within biotechnology, and nurturing its descendant, its 
institutions would provide a continuity as important as the close intellectual 
heritage” (Bud 1993: 7). Thus, traditional biotechnology evolved from the 
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beginning as a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary effort in close 
interaction with the rest of society, especially industry. 
In the early 20th century, the introduction of biological thinking into 
industry, especially in the form of industrial fermentation, became 
increasingly common. To the earlier issues of alcohol and hygiene were added 
the cultivation of yeast, the disposal of sewage, and the manufacture of a 
variety of chemicals including organic acids such as lactic, citric, and butyric 
acid (Bud, 1993). A gradual shift from a narrower focus on brewing to a greater 
emphasis on the use of science across several industries underlay the evolution 
of zymotechnology into biotechnology (Bud, 1998). In 1919, the term 
“biotechnology” was coined in a book published by Hungarian engineer Karl 
Ereky in Germany, titled Biotechnologie (Bud, 1993; Fári & Kralovánszky, 
2006). Ereky’s work was widely acclaimed in Germany, with the famous 
microbiologist Hugo Pringsheim praising Ereky’s attempt to lay the 
foundations of biotechnology. Ereky’s work also earned recognition beyond 
Germany, especially in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom, thus 
spreading his definition and understanding of biotechnology (Fári & 
Kralovánszky, 2006). Ereky’s work, like that of Pasteur and Koch, was closely 
tied to real-world problems: Ereky used the German term “Biotechnologie” to 
describe his vision of transforming agricultural production into capitalistic 
industry based on science, so that “the word hunger could be cancelled from 
dictionaries” (Fári & Kralovánszky, 2006: 10). Notably, Ereky not only 
described a theoretical vision but also implemented his ideas into practice: as 
an example of the scientific approach to agriculture that he called 
Biotechnologie, Ereky described his own project of fattening pigs, which he 
called “biotechnologische Arbeitsmachinen,” by converting scientifically 
calculated amounts of food input into meat output (Bud, 1993). 
Ereky defined Biotechnologie as “all such work by which products are 
produced from raw materials with the aid of living organisms” (Ereky 1919, 
cited in Bud 1993: 27). In doing so, he laid out the basic definition of the term 
biotechnology that still stands. In his work, Ereky also emphasized a theme 
that would continue to be linked to biotechnology for the next century: that 
biotechnology could address fundamental human problems and herald a new 
era based on biological sciences connected with chemistry (Bud, 1993). Thus, 
although biotechnology acquired a connotation in the 1920s and 1930s that 
was quite different from its earlier interpretation as focusing primarily on 
agriculture, it continued to carry with it the earlier vision of being the way to a 
better future for humankind. In the 1920s and 1930s, a new attention to 
human health arose in Western societies, not just as a matter of the occasional 
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medical intervention but also as a result of an environment harmonized with 
the needs of society, with issues such as nutrition and non-polluting 
manufacturing technology becoming prominent. Biotechnology seemed to 
hold great promise for improving both human health and the environment. 
Thus, earlier interpretations and uses of biotechnology were merged with 
visions of a new, healthier technology (Bud, 1993). These developments 
reached their first zenith during World War II as advancements in biochemical 
engineering led to the development and mass production of microbial 
antibiotics, especially penicillin. 
In the post-World War II era, many of the wartime developments in 
microbiology, chemistry, chemical engineering, and biochemical engineering 
continued to boost growth across a variety of industries including plastics, 
food, and pharmaceuticals. Biotechnology also seemed to represent an ideal 
alternative to various earth-destroying “neo-ologies” associated with the 
military-industrial complex (Bud, 1993). This resonated with several 
ideological and cultural forces in the 1960s and 1970s, as biotechnology was 
seen to hold potential to solve fundamental human problems such as hunger, 
disease, and resource depletion. In the 1960s, a process that grew single-cell 
protein on paraffin raised great expectations, especially as producing food 
locally by growing it on waste seemed an ideal solution to the threat of world 
hunger. Companies, such as BP and ICI, and governments, such as that of the 
Soviet Union, made considerable efforts in this field. In the 1970s, gasohol—
gasoline with 10% alcohol added—raised great expectations especially in the 
United States, as fermenting agricultural surpluses seemed a fitting solution to 
the oil shortage threatened by the Iran-Iraq war. Although the idealistic 
visions were often dimmed by later disappointments, the new synergy at the 
intersection of microbiology, chemistry, chemical engineering, and 
biochemical engineering did seem to provide products and technologies to 
address many of the central needs of the time (Bud, 1993). 
Developments at the intersection of microbiology, chemistry, chemical 
engineering, and biochemical engineering, and their applications to various 
industries, provided many of the institutional foundations for the so-called 
“biotechnology revolution” of the 1970s. These included the founding of 
journals and organizations that provided opportunities for microbiologists, 
chemists, chemical engineers, and biochemical engineers to discuss advances. 
It was the title of one of these—the Journal of Microbiological and 
Biochemical Engineering and Technology founded in 1958 and renamed the 
Journal of Biotechnology and Bioengineering in 1961—that launched an 
updated use of the term biotechnology. The term biotechnology had been 
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adopted into this journal title as a translation of the term “Biotechnik” from 
German. The term Biotechnik had come to be used in many European 
countries instead of Ereky’s Biotechnologie to signify also industrial 
techniques, not just basic science. The focus of the term was on microbiology 
and “bioprocesses” in partnership with chemical engineering (Bud, 1993). 
Industry associations established at the time, especially the influential German 
chemical industry association DECHEMA, put forth a similar understanding of 
biotechnology as the integrated use of biochemistry, microbiology, and 
engineering sciences in order to achieve the technological application of the 
capacities of micro-organisms, cultured tissue cells, and parts thereof (Bud, 
1993). 
2.1.2 Modern Biotechnology 
In the 1970s, two scientific discoveries were made that are considered to 
comprise the main building blocks of modern biotechnology, defined as 
biotechnology at the genetic engineering level that has ushered in the post-
genomic era (Barnum, 2005; Brink et al., 2004). In 1973, Stanley Cohen at 
Stanford University and Herbert Boyer at the University of California at San 
Francisco developed the recombinant DNA (rDNA) technique by which a 
section of DNA was cut from the plasmid of an E.coli bacterium and 
transferred into the DNA of another. The recombinant DNA technique made it 
possible to create highly productive strains in micro-organisms and eukaryotic 
cells, meaning that they could be used as “biological factories” for the 
production of a variety of proteins, such as insulin (Glick & Pasternak, 2003). 
In 1975, César Milstein and Georges Köhler at the Medical Research Council 
Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge developed the hybridoma 
technique for producing monoclonal antibodies. In this technique, antibody-
producing cells isolated from immunized laboratory animals are fused with 
cancer cells, resulting in hybridoma cells. These continue to reproduce in vitro 
like cancer cells while retaining the capacity to produce antibodies, thus 
allowing for the large-scale production of particular antibodies. The antibodies 
produced by the hybridoma are all of a single specificity and are therefore 
monoclonal, as opposed to polyclonal, antibodies. Monoclonal antibodies are 
essential to the manufacture of genetically engineered proteins. As Köhler and 
Milstein recognized, such cultures could be valuable for medical and industrial 
use (De Chadarevian, 2011). 
These discoveries were grounded in molecular biology rather than in 
the scientific disciplines of microbiology, biochemistry, and biochemical and 
 18 
 
chemical engineering traditionally associated with biotechnology (Bud, 1993). 
The significance of this was that molecular biology was a more recently 
institutionalized science than microbiology, biochemistry, and biochemical 
and chemical engineering. Emerging at the interface of biology, physics, and 
chemistry, it had become an institutionalized socio-historical reality in the 
1930s (Abir-Am, 1987; de Chadarevian & Kamminga, 1998; Olby, 1990; Yoxen, 
1982) and had made its first great scientific breakthrough in 1953 as James 
Watson and Francis Crick elucidated the structure of DNA (Barnum, 2005; 
Olby, 1994). It did not have the close links with industry that traditional 
biotechnology did (Bud, 1993). This meant, as will be reviewed in the following 
section, that the utilization of the revolutionary new techniques developed in 
molecular biology was accompanied by different innovation dynamics than 
those in traditional biotechnology. Most importantly, modern biotechnology 
techniques had to be transferred specifically from the realm of basic science to 
industry because—unlike traditional biotechnology techniques—they had not 
evolved in close interaction between science and industry.  
The 1953 discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick is 
typically considered to constitute the final threshold to modern molecular 
biology from which the revolutionary techniques of genetic engineering and 
genome sequencing stem (Barnum, 2005; Gierer, 2002; Olby, 1994). The 
widespread acceptance among geneticists that DNA carries genetic 
information and the discovery of its molecular structure in 1953 opened up the 
possibility that genes could be manipulated at the molecular level, their 
function understood, and possibly corrected or controlled. Within twenty 
years, the possibility of working with DNA at the molecular level had been 
realized, with the 1973 development of the recombinant DNA technique a 
crucial step (Rhodes, 2010). The recombinant DNA technique gave scientists a 
method of participating directly in gene activity (Rhodes, 2010), which opened 
up a host of possibilities for developing innovation in a wide range of 
industries, including healthcare,  agriculture and food industry, environmental 
protection, energy conversion, metal recovery, and chemical manufacturing 
(Bourgaize, Jewell, & Buiser, 2000; Ratledge & Kristiansen, 2001). The 
revolutionary possibilities offered by modern biotechnology have so far had 
the greatest impact on healthcare through the development of new diagnostics 
and cures (Rhodes, 2010). Prominent examples include the production of 
human insulin (1978), the production of human growth hormone (first cloned 
in 1979), and the development of gene therapies (1990). 
An important recent development in modern biotechnology has been 
the sequencing of genomes, which has ushered in the post-genomic era whose 
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benefits continue to unfold. Advances in sequencing tools, and particularly the 
increased speed at which the information produced can be processed, made it 
possible to begin sequencing the human genome in 1990. The $3 billion 
Human Genome Project was established to carry out this task. The project was 
coordinated by the Department of Energy and the National Institutes of 
Health in the United States and the Wellcome Trust in the United Kingdom, 
with contributions from Japan, France, Germany, China, and other countries 
(HGP, 2012). The Human Genome Project had the goal of identifying all of the 
approximately 20,000-25,000 genes in human DNA, determining the 
sequences of the three billion chemical base pairs that make up human DNA, 
and storing this information in databases (HGP, 2012). Additionally, tools for 
data analysis were be improved and the related technologies transferred to the 
private sector while also addressing the ethical, legal, and social issues arising 
from the project. In 1998, the project was transformed into a race between the 
public sector consortium and a private firm, Celera Genomics headed by 
scientist Craig Venter, which sought to take over the project for business gain 
(Davies, 2001). However, in 2000, Venter and the public consortium reached a 
truce and the project remained in the public realm. In 2003, the Human 
Genome Project was declared complete. However, analyses of the data 
continue and are thought to continue for many years to come.  
The Human Genome Project was projected to produce a plethora of 
benefits, many of which are already emerging. Moreover, it is not only the 
human genome that has been sequenced, but also key reference genomes such 
as the fruit fly, the nematode worm, and the common house mouse. Over 
1,200 other genomes have been completely sequenced, most of them 
microbial. The sequencing and mapping of genomes have contributed to 
increased knowledge of the biological processes of various organisms and to 
better understanding of genetic functions. They provide vast amounts of data 
to which the tools of genetic engineering can be applied, increasing the scope 
of biotechnology applications. A main benefit is the enhanced understanding 
and improved treatment of many human diseases, but the information 
resulting from the Human Genome Project has many other applications as 
well. Among them are biofuels and other energy applications, agriculture, 
livestock breeding, bioprocessing, risk assessment, bioarcheology, 
anthropology, and better understanding of evolution (HGP, 2012). Also, the 
Human Genome Project has offshoots such as the Microbial Genome Program, 
which will increase understanding of various micro-organisms (Potters, 2010), 
and the Human Proteome Project, which is designed to map the entire human 
protein set (Legrain et al., 2011). These are already yielding benefits in 
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healthcare, waste treatment, and environmental management, with potential 
for much more as work progresses (Legrain et al., 2011; Potters, 2010).  
Modern biotechnology is thus continuously evolving, in terms of both 
scientific development and applications across a wide range of industries. 
Therefore, the OECD has put forth a two-part definition of biotechnology that 
consists of an intentionally broad single definition and an evolving list-based 
definition that helps keep the single definition up-to-date as modern 
biotechnology continues to evolve. The broad single definition by the OECD 
defines biotechnology as: 
the application of science and technology to living organisms, as 
well as parts, products and models thereof, to alter living or non-
living materials for the production of knowledge, goods, and 
services (OECD, 2005b). 
This broad single definition is accompanied by an evolving list-based 
definition that supplements and clarifies the single definition (OECD, 2005b). 
It currently covers the following techniques:  
• DNA/RNA: genomics, pharmacogenomics, gene probes, genetic 
engineering, DNA/RNA sequencing/synthesis/amplification, gene 
expression profiling, and use of antisense technology 
• Proteins and other molecules: sequencing/synthesis/engineering 
of proteins and peptides (including large molecule hormones), 
improved delivery methods for large molecule drugs, proteomics, 
protein isolation and purification, signaling, and identification of 
cell receptors 
• Cell and tissue culture and engineering: cell/tissue culture, tissue 
engineering (including tissue scaffolds and biomedical 
engineering), cellular fusion, vaccine/immune stimulants, and 
embryo manipulation 
• Process biotechnology techniques: fermentation using bioreactors, 
bioprocessing, bioleaching, biopulping, biobleaching, 
biodesulphurization, bioremediation, biofiltration, and 
phytoremediation 
• Gene and RNA vectors: gene therapy and viral vectors 
• Bioinformatics: construction of databases on genomes, protein 
sequences, modeling complex biological processes including 
systems biology 
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• Nanobiotechnology: application of tools and processes of 
nanofabrication and microfabrication to build devices for studying 
biosystems and applications in drug delivery and diagnostics  
As the OECD specifies in its work on biotechnology statistics, the area covered 
is wide, diverse, and evolving. There is diversity and constant development at 
all levels: scientific bases, techniques and technologies, and applications. The 
broad OECD definition of biotechnology is used in this study and the area it 
covers is referred to as modern biotechnology. This is justified because 
although continuities between traditional and modern biotechnology are clear 
(Hopkins, Martin, Nightingale, Kraft, & Mahdia, 2007; Nightingale & Martin, 
2004), the institutional context of modern biotechnology, with developments 
starting in the 1970s, has differed from the institutional context of traditional 
biotechnology. The different institutional contexts have strongly influenced 
innovation dynamics, with literature widely acknowledging that the modern 
biotechnology sector evinces unique innovation dynamics. Therefore, it is 
important to make clear that the focus here is on modern biotechnology 
innovation, the institutional context of which is discussed next. 
2.2 MAIN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MODERN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
The preceding discussion concerning the definition of modern biotechnology 
has made it clear that biotechnology is not an isolated basic science but rather 
a series of science-based technologies that have developed in institutional 
contexts. Therefore, to understand innovation dynamics in modern 
biotechnology, it is necessary to contextualize these by reviewing the main 
developments of the modern biotechnology sector. This is because modern 
biotechnology innovation dynamics have been strongly affected by societal 
factors. However, because the focus in this study is on firm-level innovation 
dynamics, this review will only touch upon those historical developments in 
the societal context of modern biotechnology that may be considered to have 
had the greatest impact on firm-level innovation dynamics, without delving 
into policy discussions. The review is focused on the United States and the 
United Kingdom as modern biotechnology sector developments in these 
countries have provided templates of innovation dynamics in modern 
biotechnology, with efforts made to replicate them in Finland, thus affecting 
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the immediate context of the research site (Lemola, 2002). Finally, main 
developments of the modern biotechnology sector in Finland are reviewed. 
2.2.1 Beginnings of Modern Biotechnology in the United States 
The 1973 discovery of the recombinant DNA technique by Stanley Cohen and 
Herbert Boyer in California is usually considered the starting point of modern 
biotechnology. This discovery was indisputably highly significant scientifically, 
but much of the excitement around this discovery was institutionally created 
(Bud, 1993), which highlights the importance of viewing scientific and 
technological developments in biotechnology in their institutional context 
(Bud, 1993). In 1976, Herbert Boyer and venture capitalist Robert Swanson 
founded a company called Genentech to exploit the recombinant DNA 
technique. Genentech is typically considered the first modern biotechnology 
company, representing the “beginnings of (modern) biotechnology” (Hughes, 
2011). In 1978, Genentech succeeded in developing a technique for microbial 
production of human insulin that was lucratively licensed by the 
pharmaceutical giant Eli Lily. This event caught the imagination of the 
financial community, demonstrated by the influential financial journal The 
Economist declaring that a new kind of innovative biology-based company, 
exemplified by Genentech, was emerging. 
The fact that a new, small company such as Genentech had been able to 
outplay an established corporation like Eli Lilly also caught the interest of 
financial analyst Nelson Schneider at the high-technology investment firm E.F. 
Hutton (Bud, 1993). To find out more about genetic engineering, Schneider 
attended a meeting at London’s Royal Society in January 1979 titled “New 
Horizons in Industrial Microbiology.” This meeting brought together a wide 
range of promoters of what had long been called biotechnology in Europe—this 
being the integrated use of biochemistry, microbiology, and engineering to 
achieve the technological application of the capacities of micro-organisms, 
cultured tissue cells, and parts thereof. The recombinant DNA technique was 
discussed at the meeting, but only as the topic of the very last paper (Bud, 
1998). However, Schneider returned to the United States confident in his 
belief that the recombinant DNA technique held great commercial potential 
and that his company could market the concept. To boost marketing efforts, 
Schneider distanced the recombinant DNA technique from traditional 
biotechnology techniques that were already financially mature. In doing so, he 
reinterpreted the message put forth at the London meeting, narrowing the 
definition of biotechnology to refer only to the recombinant DNA technique, 
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thus making it possible for him to claim that this was a completely new 
technology. Nonetheless, he simultaneously maintained the breadth of 
perception and optimism of vision long associated with biotechnology, so that 
while claiming that biotechnology was a brand new technology that had come 
into being in 1970s California, Schneider declared that it had great potential to 
revolutionize a wide variety of industries from pharmaceuticals to energy 
production and agriculture (Bud, 1998). 
Schneider was remarkably successful in marketing his reinterpreted 
definition of biotechnology. In August 1979, he wrote a paper to investors 
titled “DNA—The Genetic Revolution,” in which he described his vision of the 
potential of genetic engineering. According to him, genetic engineering offered 
great potential for both large and small companies and could affect several 
industries (Bud, 1993). Schneider later testified to Congress that in this area 
lay the roots of a new IBM. In September 1979, Schneider organized a meeting 
in Washington, D.C. to market his vision to institutional investors that turned 
out to be a huge success. Instead of the thirty participants expected, the 
meeting drew more than five hundred. Encouraged by the success, Schneider’s 
company E.F. Hutton trademarked the word biotechnology and adopted it as 
the title of a newsletter to investors, one dealing with applied genetics rather 
than with biotechnology in the established, broader meaning (Bud, 1998). 
In practice, modern biotechnology drew upon more than visions 
created in previous decades. Additional established skills were also required 
and were brought in from other disciplines. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
distinction between traditional and modern biotechnology was exaggerated 
because it was in the interests of many influential stakeholders, especially in 
the United States, to uphold the view of modern biotechnology—narrowly 
equated with genetic engineering—as something entirely novel and 
revolutionary. Scientists were keen to emphasize the novel nature of genetic 
engineering and the great promise inherent in it to ward off negative public 
opinion that could turn against their freedom to engage in this research. 
Politicians were enthusiastic to declare that the genetic engineering techniques 
were a reflection of the wisdom and success of heavy public investment in 
basic scientific research and would ensure U.S. industry’s strategic advantage. 
The financial community saw genetic engineering as another great growth 
opportunity, as the scientific advances of the 1970s facilitated promoting 
biotechnology as “the next industrial revolution,” resonating with other 
catchphrases of the time such as that of the “information age” (Bud, 1993). 
The impetus in the late 1970s United States for portraying 
biotechnology as a completely novel development with huge promise for the 
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future is particularly understandable when viewed in historical context. The 
decade of the 1970s was the worst decade for the United States economically 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The energy crisis caused by the OPEC 
oil embargo adversely affected the competitiveness of traditional 
manufacturing industries and led to stagflation as well as a radical contraction 
in the stock market. At the same time, international economic competition, 
especially from Japan with its booming economy, was stiffening. The energy 
crisis, combined with growing interest in environmentalism, led to a 
widespread view that the technological system had become largely obsolete. In 
this environment, biotechnology, impregnated with cultural material 
constructed over a period of nearly a hundred years of being a solution to 
economic and technological problems as well as to human and environmental 
problems, appeared to be the technology of the future (Bud, 1993). Combining 
this breadth of vision with a portrayal of biotechnology as a novel science and 
technology born in the 1970s United States, it could be seen to hold potential 
to bring about economic and technological renewal for the nation while 
offering solutions to the most pressing problems of the time, such as those of 
environmental degradation and energy constraints. 
The year 1980 was a turning point for the U.S. biotechnology sector. 
Four events in 1980 triggered great excitement about biotechnology as a new 
revolutionary industry that would revitalize the national economy. One, 
Genentech went to market with great success. The initial public offering 
marked the fastest rise of any stock in the history of the New York capital 
market until that point. The offering price was $35 per share but the stock was 
so oversubscribed that the price per share soared to more than $80 on the day 
of offer (Bud, 1993). This successful offering demonstrated that biotechnology 
companies could be sold successfully to the public even while they had 
negative cash flow and no products on the market (Kenney, 1998). Two, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, that 
genetically altered life forms could be patented (Eisenberg, 2006; Kevles, 
1998). This revolutionary ruling changed a long tradition in Western countries 
that patents could not be granted to living material.7 Three, the Bayh-Dole Act 
was passed, which allowed universities and their faculty members to stake 
patent claims on discoveries they made through research funded by federal 
                                                        
7 The view held until then had been that granting a patent to a living organism 
would remove from the public domain something that nature had produced and which 
had been intended for public use (Westerlund, 2002). The 1980 Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty judgment held that the fact that micro-organisms are alive is without 
legal significance for purposes of the patent law and that “manufactured” life forms 
could be considered as analogous to chemical compounds and thus patentable 
(Martinez & Guellec, 2004; Pila, 2003). 
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agencies instead of leaving ownership of the intellectual property with the 
government (Shane, 2004). Four, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC), a specialist patent court, opened. It proved receptive to maintaining 
the interests of patentees. In making patents easier to defend, the CAFC made 
them more valuable and thus increased the attraction of patenting 
(Macdonald, 2011). These events had a huge impact on the U.S. biotechnology 
sector and in the next few years, hundreds of U.S. patents were issued to 
“manufactured” life forms and hundreds of dedicated biotechnology firms 
were founded (Bud, 1993; Kenney, 1998; Pila, 2003). Biotechnology’s image 
became one of opportunity and familiarity rather than one of danger and 
uncertainty (Plein, 1991). Biotechnology thus seemed, in the early 1980s 
United States, to characterize a nascent industry with a triumphant future 
(Bud, 1993).  
In the next decades, vibrant conglomerations of dedicated 
biotechnology firms grew around the San Francisco Bay Area and Boston, 
boasting such commercial successes as Cetus, Genentech, and Genzyme, with 
many more coming up in the following years (Breznitz & Anderson, 2005). 
Although following the initial success of small companies, established 
pharmaceutical corporations moved into biotechnology in the 1980s by taking 
over small biotechnology companies or by setting up their own biotechnology 
sectors (Rhodes, 2010), the public science base continued to generate new 
startups (Kenney, 1998). More biotechnology clusters formed in San Diego,8 
Raleigh/Durham,9 New York/Philadelphia,10 Seattle,11 Washington, 
D.C.,/Baltimore,12 and Los Angeles13 (Cortright & Mayer, 2002; Link, 2006). 
                                                        
8 San Diego has many flourishing smaller biotechnology companies as well as 
branches of big pharmaceutical companies, including Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and 
Novartis. Additionally, San Diego boasts many universities and research institutes, 
including J. Craig Venter Institute and Hubbs Sea World Research Institute. 
9 Called “The Research Triangle,” the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill region of 
North Carolina is known for acclaimed academic institutions such as Duke University 
and the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, many startup companies, and major 
pharmaceutical companies, including Syngenta, Novartis, Pfizer, Biogen Idec, and 
GlaxoSmithKline. 
10 This large biotechnology cluster, sometimes referred to as “PharmCountry,” 
stretches from Connecticut down to Philadelphia and features several universities 
including Princeton University, Columbia University, Yale University, and University 
of Pennsylvania, as well as a large amount of startups, and large pharmaceutical 
companies such as Bristol-Myers Squibb, Johnson and Johnson, Pfizer, and Watson 
Pharmaceuticals. 
11 Seattle and its surrounding area have many startups and big pharmaceutical 
companies such as Amgen and Bristol-Myers Squibb.  Seattle is also the home of the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Allen Institute for Brain Science, and Fred 
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center. 
12 Nicknamed “BioCapital,” this area includes Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
and Washington D.C., home to George Washington University, Georgetown 
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Often aided by state-level policy, these clusters grew around publicly funded 
university research, and by the 21st century were home to 75% of the largest 
biotechnology firms in the United States (Link, 2006). By 2011, the U.S. 
biotechnology sector boasted 1,870 companies (including both public and 
private companies), generated nearly $60 billion in revenues, and employed 
nearly 100,000 employees. Even in a period of poor macro-economic 
performance, the U.S. biotechnology industry’s revenues increased by 12% in 
2011 from year before, although only after normalizing for the large 
acquisitions by non-biotechnology firms of three commercially leading U.S. 
biotechnology firms of Genzyme, Cephalon, and Talecris. The number of 
companies held steady and the number of employees grew by 5% on a 
normalized basis. Perhaps even more noteworthy is that the biotechnology 
sector in the United States was dynamic enough that the loss of three 
commercial leaders through acquisition was compensated for by a fresh crop 
of biotechnology companies graduating into the ranks of commercial leaders. 
Specifically, by 2011, the revenues of Salix Pharmaceuticals, Vertex 
Pharmaceuticals, and ViroPharma crossed the $500 million threshold, leaving 
the total number of commercial leaders (that is, companies with revenues in 
excess of $500 million) unchanged at sixteen. (Ernst & Young, 2012) 
However, during the 21st century criticism concerning the U.S. 
biotechnology sector has grown. Criticism has been targeted especially at the 
possible long-term effects of the changes to the intellectual property regime 
instituted in the 1980s. Beyond ethical concerns about increased patenting in 
the biotechnology sector (Brody, 2006a, 2006b), critics have begun arguing 
that aggressive patenting hurts innovation and scientific and technological 
progress. These critics assert that privatizing science through patenting leads 
to an “anti-commons” that detracts from the open environment necessary for 
the advancement of science and technology (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Pisano, 
2006; Rai & Eisenberg, 2003).14 There is empirical support for this concern 
(MacKenzie, Keating, & Cambrosio, 1990; Murray & Stern, 2007) and some 
critics have gone as far as claiming that the privatization of science endangers 
the fundamental long-term health of the U.S. biotechnology sector (Pisano, 
                                                                                                                                                  
University, Johns Hopkins University, and many other famed universities conducting 
biotechnology research, as well as many startups. 
13 Los Angeles is home to the largest biotechnology firm in the United States, 
Amgen, located in Thousand Oaks. 
14 Moreover, if firms increasingly move to use strategic patenting —that is, 
secondary use of patents to protect the company's reputation, to be offered as 
bargaining chips, to block competitors, etc.— as opposed to the primary use of patents 
as a means to promote innovation (Thumm, 2004), this may intensify risks to 
scientific progress and innovation. 
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2006). Thus, the apparent success of the U.S. biotechnology sector may rest on 
an untenable long-term basis, an issue that has significance beyond the United 
States because the U.S. biotechnology innovation model is so widely emulated 
in other countries (Mowery & Sampat, 2005). 
2.2.2 Efforts to Catch Up in Modern Biotechnology in Europe  
In Europe, excitement similar to that in the United States about the creation of 
a new industry was quite lacking in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Bud, 1993). 
Instead, the first reactions in Europe to the 1970s scientific breakthroughs in 
genetic engineering and the concomitant developments in the United States 
were rather fearful. Reservations towards modern biotechnology, and 
especially the commercial exploitation of new genetic engineering techniques, 
were quite widespread as the potential risks and horrors were often considered 
to outweigh possible benefits (Bauer, Durant, & Gaskell, 1998; Bud, 1993; 
Torgersen et al., 2002).15 Ethical debates were heated in many European 
countries as critics perceived in biotechnology “a technological and 
reductionist perception of life itself, one that seeks to instrumentalise life for 
the sake of profit” (Torgersen, Hampel et al. 2002: 16). Observable in debates 
and discussions in nearly all European countries was a tendency to engage a 
wider scope of issues than in the United States, rarely concerning just the 
technology but also involving broader societal discourses about ethics 
(Torgersen et al., 2002). 
However, while public opinion was largely opposed to modern 
biotechnology, policymakers in many European countries were propelled to 
react to the changes taking place in the United States by fear of being left 
behind. The United Kingdom was the first European country to react fully to 
modern biotechnology. Germany had been proactive in fostering its 
biotechnology sector since the early 1970s, putting forth a DECHEMA16 report 
in 1972 that outlined an ambitious program of state intervention to nurture its 
biotechnology sector. However, this report dealt mostly with the traditional 
approach to biotechnology, associating biotechnology with microbiology, 
chemistry, and biochemistry (Goujon, 2001). The United Kingdom, in 
contrast, did not take direct action with regard to biotechnology until 1979, 
                                                        
15 Obviously, debates differed between countries, but differences within 
Europe were smaller than those between Europe and the United States (Bauer et al., 
1998; Torgersen et al., 2002). 
16 Die DECHEMA Gesellschaft für Chemische Technik und Biotechnologie e.V. 
(Society for Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology). 
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with the consequence of this delay being that the British government was able 
to take into account the progress in genetic engineering techniques which 
deeply influenced the concept of biotechnology from the mid-1970s onwards 
(Goujon, 2001). 
The 1970s had been a gloomy decade economically for the United 
Kingdom at least to the same extent as it had been for the United States. As in 
the United States, radically rising oil prices created massive inflation, and 
traditional manufacturing industries lost export markets to cheaper 
competition with nothing apparently filling their place, leading to fears of 
mass unemployment. Japan became an overwhelming challenge on the 
international economic stage. Government officials and civil servants were 
aware of the urgency with which new sources of work and industrial renewal 
needed to be sought. It seemed to many that the old industries should be 
replaced by new industries just as, half a century earlier, textiles and coal had 
been replaced by chemicals and electronics. Given the strong tradition of 
biology research in the United Kingdom, as well as sizeable government 
research institutes and large oil and chemical companies seeking 
diversification, biotechnology appeared to be a solution to many of the 
crushing worries at the time (Goujon, 2001). Where previously the nation had 
made and used machine tools, now the United Kingdom would make and use 
biological organisms. In this transformation, it was widely expected, science 
would have a huge role in driving biotechnology to be the new means to 
industrial and economic rebirth (Bud, 2010; Goujon, 2001). 
Consequently, the Spinks Committee was formed in 1979 as a 
collaborative enterprise between the Advisory Council for Applied Research 
and Development, the Advisory Board for the Research Councils, and the 
Royal Society. This Committee was tasked with reviewing existing and 
prospective science and technology relevant to industrial opportunities in 
biotechnology (Bud, 2010). In the report it produced, the Spinks Committee 
came to a rather devastating conclusion concerning the state of biotechnology 
in the United Kingdom, claiming that the British structure of public and 
private support for R&D was not well suited to the development of a subject 
like biotechnology. This was, the Spinks Report posited, because strategic 
applied research was not well served by the research funding mechanisms in 
existence at the time, especially in an area such as biotechnology where there 
were neither university departments to promote it nor well-developed 
industries to provide market pull (Bud, 2010). Thus, the Spinks Committee 
Report posited, the United Kingdom needed a strong government-led strategy 
to foster its biotechnology industry. The key elements in this strategy would be 
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sufficient funds, strong engagement of the research councils through 
substantially increased support and coordination of activities in a Joint 
Committee for Biotechnology, coordination of government departments, and 
creation of an interdepartmental steering group (Gottweis, 1998). Overall, the 
Spinks Committee Report reflected a sense of crisis and urgency, depicting the 
need for a biotechnology strategy as crucial in the face of worldwide 
competition (Bud, 2010). 
The sense of crisis and urgency reflected in the Spinks Report was 
intensified by the shock that same year, 1979, caused by the announcement 
that scientists in the United States had obtained two patents on the hybridoma 
technique developed by Milstein and Köhler in Cambridge in 1975 (De 
Chadarevian, 2011). Having been turned down by the university authorities in 
his attempt to patent the discovery, Milstein had freely distributed the 
myeloma cell line required for the production of monoclonal antibodies. 
Scientists at the Wistar Institute in Philadelphia had accepted cells from 
Millstein and their patenting of a technique for producing monoclonal 
antibodies against tumor antigens was considered by many to be an obvious 
extension of Köhler and Milstein’s original invention, causing great 
controversy in the scientific community. However, in the United Kingdom, the 
shock caused by the patenting announcement went beyond the scientific 
community. The perceived failure of the responsible British authorities to file a 
patent on the technology grew into a scandal. It conjured up an old perception 
of the United Kingdom's inability to transform research advances into 
commercial products, as the missed opportunity to secure the rights to the 
commercialization of penicillin in the early 1940s was still very much a live 
issue (De Chadarevian, 2011).  
As the United Kingdom entered the 1980s, there was thus a great sense 
of shock, crisis, and urgency to develop a modern biotechnology sector. 
Although the change in power following the 1979 elections meant a 
modification in the government strategy proposed in the Spinks Report, the 
new government quickly declared its belief that biotechnology would be of key 
importance in the world economy (Bud, 2010). The first major government 
statement on biotechnology after the change in power followed many of the 
key recommendations of the Spinks Report, although it indicated a change in 
strategy for pursuing the outlined goals into “relatively intensive” intervention. 
The strategy developed for biotechnology made the following central 
recommendations (Gottweis, 1998: 116): 
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 to strengthen the scientific base of biotechnology within the 
existing framework of funding, mainly by concentrating and 
shifting resources 
 to coordinate the government’s biotechnology-related 
activities between government departments, and between 
those departments, the research councils, the National 
Research Development Corporation, the National Economic 
Development Council, and the National Enterprise Board 
 to coordinate and foster collaboration between universities, 
research councils, and industry 
 to encourage the increase of private investment into the 
biotechnology industry 
 to remove regulatory constraints inhibiting biotechnological 
development 
 to foster international collaboration and competition 
This targeted strategy focused on more efficient use of existing resources and 
facilities on national and international levels rather than on increasing 
government resources for biotechnology. However, this strategy required 
substantial intervention from the state and the cooperation of industry 
(Gottweis, 1998). Thus, although the Spinks Report recommendations for far-
reaching collaboration between research councils, government, and industry 
were not fully implemented, even the limited implementation led to new 
models of science that would be significant in the emergence of a re-
construction of science (Bud, 2010). Government policymakers worked with 
the Royal Society to help bind together the triple helix of industry, 
government, and science. 
The establishment of a research-oriented biotechnology company was 
one of the recommendations of the Spinks Committee. This recommendation 
was followed with the formation in 1980 of the first British biotechnology firm, 
Celltech, as a private–public cooperation to exploit the advances made at the 
Laboratory of Molecular Biology at Cambridge, considered the United 
Kingdom’s “national champion” in the emergence of molecular biology. Its 
Nobel Prize count was unparalleled. However, in commercial development it 
did not seem like a world leader in 1980, especially when examined against the 
backdrop of U.S. commercialization successes in biotechnology already 
emerging by 1980 (Bud, 2010). The Spinks Report had also called for 
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concerted efforts to improve commercialization of science across the board. 
This was a key inspiration for the Medical Research Council to rethink its 
policies regarding the commercial exploitation of its research. Consequently, 
beginning in the early 1980s, technology transfer became a key concern of the 
Medical Research Council, and various initiatives were put in place with the 
aim of redesigning lab–industry relations. The first private British 
biotechnology firm, Cambridge Antibody Technology, based on the new 
Laboratory of Molecular Biology technology of fully human monoclonals, was 
founded. Thus, a set of new policies regarding technology transfer, including a 
more generous reward system for researchers and Medical Research Council 
research units, was put in place to encourage and facilitate the 
commercialization of research findings (Bud, 2010). 
These developments took place in a situation where discussion 
constantly alluded to an already existing, or at least threatening, U.S. 
superiority in high technology, a scenario perceived to undermine British 
industry and wealth (Bud, 2010). Moreover, it was around the early 1980s that 
the rhetoric of the high-technology race gained a new meaning, with three 
central metaphors increasingly used to construe the situation (Gottweis, 1998). 
One, Western Europe’s viability was depicted as threatened. Two, a technology 
gap between Japan, the United States, and Western Europe was diagnosed. 
Three, Western Europe was seen to be in a technology race with its two main 
competitors, Japan and the United States. This political discourse was 
supported by interpretations of economists and innovation experts who 
expressed a consensus according to which Western Europe could only survive 
and thrive if it were to engage in the high-technology race and fight its 
technological and economic enemies of Japan and the United States. To do 
this, Western Europe would need to vigorously support and encourage its 
national industries and research systems to innovate, cooperate, and compete. 
Success on the technological front increasingly became represented as a 
strategy to keep Western Europe what it used to be and to save its identity. 
Science and technology had a strategic place in this project: the survival of 
Western Europe was thought to be secured only by facing up to the high-
technology race. (Gottweis, 1998) 
Moreover, in the early 1980s, only true optimists believed that the 
European semiconductor, telecommunications, computer, and consumer 
electronics industries could be effectively “saved.” The competitive advantage 
of U.S. firms and, a bit later, of Japanese firms in semiconductors, computers, 
telecommunications, and consumer electronics increasingly raised the painful 
question of whether Western European industries were still viable in these 
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crucial technological sectors. In this context, attention turned increasingly to 
what was widely perceived to be the second important field for high-
technology innovation after information technology: the new biotechnology 
(Gottweis, 1998). Moreover, this was a sector in which the United Kingdom 
could be considered a world leader in scientific terms. Thus, if the strength of 
the scientific base could be turned into commercialization successes to rival 
those already happening in the United States, this sector could revitalize the 
United Kingdom’s industrial base and economy. It was against this backdrop 
that the United Kingdom started its efforts to catch up with the perceived lead 
of the United States in the modern biotechnology sector (Bud, 2010). 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the United Kingdom developed 
Europe’s largest modern biotechnology sector, closely modeled on the 
strategies and institutional support structures that existed in the United States 
(Casper & Kettler, 2001), but boosted by the government in view of the 
perceived lag, especially in commercialization savvy. 
In the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the economic recession, modern 
biotechnology truly emerged as a “key technology” of economic significance 
across Europe and themes of economic competitiveness became prominent in 
European policy discussions. Many of the earlier worries expressed in the 
United Kingdom about falling behind became prominent in European-level 
policy discussions, as it became increasingly acknowledged that the United 
States held the leadership in commercial exploitation of modern biotechnology 
(Senker, 1998). The U.S. modern biotechnology sector seemed to boast a larger 
number of dedicated biotechnology firms, more revenues, more employees, 
and more patents (Senker, 1998). The “Europe Paradox” of “being good in 
science, bad in commercialization” became a central theme in discussions, as it 
was noted that a large number of key basic science discoveries in modern 
biotechnology had been made in Europe but their commercial potential not 
optimally exploited (Cooke, 2000; European Commission, 2002; Reiss et al., 
2003). As an influential European Commission Green Paper put it:  
Europe suffers from a paradox. Compared with the scientific 
performance of its principal competitors, that of the EU is 
excellent, but … its technological and commercial performance in 
high-technology sectors … has deteriorated. One of Europe’s main 
weaknesses lies in its inferiority in terms of transforming the 
results of technological research and skills into innovations and 
competitive advantages. (European Commission, 1995) 
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Successful commercial exploitation of modern biotechnology seemed to be 
primarily a U.S. phenomenon while it appeared that “Europe (had) fallen 
behind the (United States) in the commercial exploitation in biotechnology” 
(Senker 1998: 6). There was much discussion about the reasons for the 
existence of a commercial performance gap between the U.S. and European 
modern biotechnology sectors. Especially worrisome appeared to be the lack of 
dedicated biotechnology firms in Europe as these were observed to be driving 
much of the innovation and growth in the U.S. modern biotechnology sector. A 
variety of factors were thought to explain the shortage of dedicated 
biotechnology firms in Europe, the primary ones being lack of venture capital, 
insufficient networking, lack of knowledge of the new technology and its 
commercial potential by existing firms, and negative attitudes of the European 
academic sector towards entrepreneurship and industry (Senker, 1998; Sharp 
& Senker, 1999). Many in the European biotechnology sector also considered 
themselves disadvantaged because of censorious public views of modern 
biotechnology (Rabino, 1994).  
These concerns set the agenda for much of the policymaking in 
different European countries as well as on the European Union level. Public 
policy was often employed to make up for the private sector shortcomings in 
order to foster a prosperous modern biotechnology sector (Reiss et al., 2005). 
Efforts to stimulate or to create a modern biotechnology sector in various 
European countries appeared successful, as dedicated biotechnology firms 
began to appear in greater numbers in the 1990s. However, the European 
modern biotechnology sector has not caught up with the U.S. one in terms of 
commercial success. By 2011, the European biotechnology sector17 generated 
about $19 billion in revenues, less than one-third of the revenues generated by 
the U.S. biotechnology sector, although the total number of companies (1,883 
including both public and private companies) exceeded that of the U.S. 
biotechnology sector. Altogether, these companies employed fewer than 
50,000 employees, less than one-half of those employed by the U.S. 
biotechnology sector. (Ernst & Young, 2012) Moreover, perhaps even more 
dishearteningly, only a few large companies in Europe drove most of the 
growth while the rest of the industry saw its already struggling performance 
worsen (Ernst & Young, 2012; Ward & Hodgson, 2006; Ward, Hodgson, & 
Binding, 2005). However, while such figures have led many to believe that the 
European modern biotechnology sector is a bitter disappointment, it is 
                                                        
17 In the Ernst & Young report referenced here, the European biotechnology 
sector includes the biotechnology sectors of Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Ernst & Young, 2012). 
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important to keep in mind that differences in the definition of biotechnology 
and in institutional contexts make comparisons difficult. Some have proposed 
that assertions of the supremacy of the U.S. biotechnology sector may simply 
reflect early empirical evidence concentrated on the U.S. experience, resulting 
in other countries’ biotechnology sectors being evaluated using a U.S. view of 
biotechnology, which may result in misleading conclusions (Laage-Hellman, 
McKelvey, & Rickne, 2004). 
Moreover, efforts to make the European modern biotechnology sector 
more like that in the United Stated may fail to foster commercial success and 
might even hinder it in the longer term. For instance, it is questionable 
whether emulating the U.S. intellectual property regime is beneficial for the 
modern biotechnology sector. The approach to patenting has been more 
reserved in Europe than in the United States, especially until the 1990s (Bud, 
1993). For instance, some important patents, such as the 1988 “oncomouse” 
patent granted to Harvard University researchers, were refused in Europe.18 
Generally, in European patent law, biotechnology has been considered a 
technology unlike any other, with life forms usually seen as too special to 
become the property of a single organization or individual (Bud, 1993; 
Westerlund, 2002). This has contrasted with the situation in the United States, 
where a regulatory approach based on evidence alone has been endorsed 
(Bauer et al., 1998; Torgersen et al., 2002). However, beginning in the 1990s, 
the state’s role in Europe was re-envisioned as restricted to encouraging a 
setting congenial to economic competitiveness, with state promotion of 
societal goals other than economic ones when regulating biotechnology 
considered inappropriate (Torgersen et al., 2002). The greater focus on 
economic competitiveness was accompanied by a move to increase 
biotechnology patenting (Thumm, 2001) and university patenting 
(Macdonald, 2011), so that the European intellectual property regime has 
increasingly come to resemble that of the United States. 
However, as discussion and evidence from the United States suggest, 
increased privatization of science through patenting may not be conducive to 
scientific progress, innovation, and small firm success in the longer term. 
Thus, while there are indications that European science may already be more 
privatized than often recognized (Verspagen, 2006), this might not be a 
beneficial development despite the conventional wisdom which holds that 
strong and broad patent rights are conducive to commercialization success and 
economic progress. This is especially so because evidence shows that large 
European firms have already begun using strategic patenting, which poses a 
                                                        
18 Although this patent was later granted, this was a special exemption. 
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threat to small companies (Blind, Edler, Frietsch, & Schmoch, 2006). Thus, 
rather than considering a less aggressive intellectual regime in Europe a 
hindrance to commercial success, it is worthwhile to note its benefits. Indeed, 
examples from the United Kingdom point to the importance of public, open 
science for innovation. Cambridge University did not patent until 2006, 
believing in the free distribution of academic knowledge, yet Cambridge 
Science Park is the most successful one in the United Kingdom (Macdonald, 
2011). Similarly, the successful fight to keep the scientific information in the 
Human Genome Project from being taken over into private ownership was 
waged in order to ensure continued scientific progress (Sulston & Ferry, 
2002). Indeed, recent results from British universities challenge the view that 
patents are the most effective route for information dissemination in the 
economy (Andersen & Rossi, 2011). Therefore, strong declarations of Europe’s 
failure, as well as attribution of this perceived failure to weaknesses in 
privatization and commercialization, may be misleading.19 Instead, it is 
important to consider the European biotechnology sector and the national 
biotechnology sectors that comprise it in proper institutional context. 
2.2.3 Building Modern Biotechnology in Finland 
Modern biotechnology caught the interest of policymakers also in Finland in 
the 1980s. However, unlike in the United Kingdom, policymakers in Finland 
emphasized the strengthening of the science base rather than the 
commercialization of science. This built on developments in the 1970s, during 
which Finnish political decision makers had set up one of the largest state 
committees ever, the “Technology Committee,” tasked with drafting a national 
view for the technological future of the country. The committee presented a 
long-term program to introduce new technology into the Finnish economy and 
to raise the nation’s overall technological level through resource increases for 
R&D. As a result of the decisions made in the 1970s, the Finnish government 
accepted continuous increases in R&D financing as a high-priority political 
target throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s with three fields of technology 
singled out for extra attention: microelectronics, biotechnology, and material 
technologies (OECD, 2005a). To further these aims, Tekes (the National 
Technology Agency) was established in 1983 to govern and expand the 
                                                        
19 Even the “Europe Paradox” of “being good in science, bad in 
commercialization” has become questioned more recently as data indicates that 
European weaknesses reside both in its system of scientific research (because of weak 
funding) and in a relatively weak industry (Dosi, Llerena, & Sylos Labini, 2006). 
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technology program mechanism originally launched by the Technology 
Committee.  
Beginning in 1984, various public actors started funding research in 
modern biotechnology. The newly founded Tekes and Sitra (the Finnish 
National Fund for Research and Development) funded the first modern 
biotechnology programs that started in 1984 and 1985. These programs were 
carried out in the biotechnology laboratory of the Technical Research Centre of 
Finland (VTT), the Institute of Genetic Technology at the University of 
Helsinki, and the Department of Biochemistry at the University of Turku 
(Kääriäinen, 2000). In 1988, the Ministry of Education also stepped in and 
began funding research in modern biotechnology with special programs. The 
Ministry of Education had identified research in biotechnology and molecular 
technology as one of its primary foci for development activities. The target of 
its special funding programs in biotechnology was to raise both the quantity 
and quality of biotechnological research and research training to a level that 
would give Finland a place at the forefront of biotechnological development. 
Directly serving this purpose, the “Biocenter Program” was initiated, which 
involved the founding of biotechnology centers affiliated with the universities 
of Helsinki, Oulu, Kuopio, and Turku (Viljamaa et al., 2007). These four 
biotechnology centers were to be sanctuaries where excellent science could be 
done without the intervention of university politics. Most of the funding in the 
Ministry of Education’s special biotechnology programs was directed to these 
research centers (Academy of Finland, 2002). 
Public funding to the biotechnology sector, in the form of research and 
technology programs as well as of public venture capital, increased 
tremendously throughout the 1990s (Viljamaa et al., 2007). Adoption of new 
rhetoric emphasizing the emergence of a knowledge-based economy and 
highlighting the importance of knowledge and high technology as major 
factors of international competitiveness helped justify such investment 
(OECD, 2005a). The success of the information and communication 
technology industries in Finland in the 1990s provided additional impetus to 
efforts to develop a modern biotechnology sector in Finland. This success, led 
by Nokia Corporation, was seen as confirmation that the elaborate public 
innovation support system was the right recipe for improving Finland’s 
economic competitiveness (Schienstock & Tulkki, 2001). At the same time, the 
phenomenal success of Nokia caused many to dream of a “BioNokia” that 
would emerge from the biotechnology sector, thus broadening the 
technological basis of the economy (Hermans & Kulvik, 2005). Therefore, 
heavy public funding to biotechnology continued as the government hoped to 
 37 
 
establish a modern biotechnology sector with the help of appropriately robust 
advancement programs. The policy system increasingly introduced top-down 
approaches targeting modern biotechnology R&D (Lacasa, 2007). The science-
led strategy-from-above was extended beyond providing funding for research 
to also providing increased public venture capital for the establishment of 
primarily university spin-off startups. As a result, several dedicated 
biotechnology firms were founded in the 1990s, to the effect that the 
overwhelming majority of dedicated biotechnology firms in Finland currently 
have a history dating back no longer than the 1990s. As a result, most of the 
dedicated biotechnology firms in Finland closely cooperate with universities 
and half of them are located in university biotechnology centers or similar 
science parks (Hermans & Kulvik, 2004; Hermans, Kulvik, & Tahvanainen, 
2005). This has led to a clustering effect, not spontaneously but rather by 
government design. The largest biotechnology cluster is located in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area and the second largest in the Turku area. There are also 
biotechnology concentrations in Oulu, Kuopio, and Tampere, although these 
are much smaller than those in the Helsinki area and the Turku area 
(Hermans et al., 2005). 
In short, the Finnish biotechnology sector has been initiated, funded, 
and designed largely by the government. This has been done with the 
expectation that the government provision and orchestration of resources and 
knowledge flows would create a new industrial pillar for the Finnish economy, 
made possible by public compensation for vital resources that may be missing 
in a small economy with limited private capital (Viljamaa et al., 2007). 
However, although the Finnish biotechnology sector ranks among the best in 
Europe (Senker, Reiss, Mangematin, & Enzing, 2007), its performance has 
disappointed the hopes of policymakers and the expectations of the wider 
public. A BioNokia remains the stuff of dreams and the commercial 
biotechnology sector continues to be largely dependent on public support as a 
large portion of dedicated biotechnology firms in Finland are loss-making 
operations (Hermans et al., 2005). According to most recent detailed statistics, 
nearly half of Finnish dedicated biotechnology firms operated at a loss as they 
struggled to develop commercial applications of their inventions that would 
cover their high R&D expenses (Hermans et al., 2005). Hence, although public 
policy may be seen to have succeeded in fostering the building of an excellent 
science base (Nesta, Patel, & Arundel, 2003; Reiss, Hinze, & Lacasa, 2004; 
Reiss et al., 2003) with good output levels in terms of patenting activities and 
new firm creation (Reiss et al., 2005; Senker et al., 2007), the end goal of 
building a new profit-generating economic sector remains elusive. 
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2.3 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF INNOVATION IN MODERN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Analyses of historical developments in the modern biotechnology sector, 
primarily in the first-mover countries of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, have provided much of the material for constructing models of 
innovation in the biotechnology sector. In Finland, these models have been 
used largely as templates according to which a modern biotechnology sector 
should be developed, with studies of the Finnish biotechnology sector mostly 
focusing on its shortcomings compared to this template. Therefore, the 
present review focuses on the main characteristics of the biotechnology 
innovation models developed based on experiences in the United States and in 
the United Kingdom. Although these historical experiences have differed, 
especially in the early years of modern biotechnology sector development, the 
industrial structures in the two countries showed signs of convergence already 
in the 1990s (Senker, 1996). 
Therefore, it is possible to note certain main characteristics of 
innovation in modern commercial biotechnology. These are the collaborative 
nature of innovation, extensive reliance on information acquisition, and 
tendency towards local agglomeration. However, while certain main 
characteristics can be identified in the literature, it should be noted that most 
of the literature on biotechnology innovation has focused on the 
pharmaceuticals industry (Senker, van Zwanenberg, Caloghirou, 
Zambarloukos, Kolisis, Enzing, et al., 2001). Therefore, it is possible that the 
literature predominantly describes biotechnology innovation dynamics in the 
pharmaceuticals industry, neglecting biotechnology innovation dynamics in 
other industries. Yet, as noted previously, biotechnology is applicable across a 
wide range of industries and there is evidence that biotechnology innovation 
dynamics vary between industries (Senker, van Zwanenberg, Caloghirou, 
Zambarloukos, Kolisis, Enzing, et al., 2001). Hence, the identified main 
characteristics of innovation in modern biotechnology should be considered 
provisional, open to revision upon further research. Nevertheless, as this is the 
current state of research, it is sensible to use these identified main 
characteristics to provide guidance. 
Therefore, this section presents the main characteristics of innovation 
in modern biotechnology identified in the literature. The main characteristics 
of innovation in modern biotechnology are discussed as they relate to a 
dedicated biotechnology firm. However, before delving into a discussion of 
these main characteristics of innovation, it is necessary to contextualize them 
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within larger discussions concerning models of innovation. This is necessary 
because the modeling of biotechnology innovation has been affected by, and 
has affected, wider literature on innovation. Currently, it is possible to identify 
six “generations” of innovation models, which are: (1) the black box model, (2) 
linear models, (3) interactive models, (4) system models, (5) evolutionary 
models, and (6) innovative milieux models (Marinova & Phillimore, 2003; 
Rothwell, 1992). These are briefly reviewed next. 
The first-generation innovation model was the black box model, which 
arose mainly as an attempt to incorporate technological progress into the 
economic equation by Solow (1957). In analyzing U.S. total factor productivity 
during the period from 1909 to 1949, Solow found that there was a component 
of economic growth that changes in capital and labor could not explain. Solow 
concluded that this component of economic growth could be attributed to 
technological advances and that about 90% of per capita output could be 
attributed to technological change. Solow did not clarify the process by which 
technological advances drove economic growth, leaving this as a black box and 
thus giving rise to the so-called black box innovation model. The black box 
model states that the innovation process itself is not important and that the 
things that count are its inputs and outputs. For example, money invested in 
R&D (input into the black box) will generate new technological products 
(outputs), but economists do not need to analyze the actual mechanisms of 
transformation. 
The desire to open up the black box gave rise to the second-generation 
models of innovation. In these models, innovation was viewed as a linear step-
by-step process of activities that led to the adoption of technologies by 
markets. The linear model came in two varieties: the first linear description of 
innovation was the so-called technology-push model that was closely related to 
the science-push model (Godin, 2006). According to this view, discoveries in 
basic science eventually lead to technological developments, which result in a 
flow of new products and processes to the marketplace (Rothwell & Zegveld, 
1985). The second linear description of innovation was similar to the first 
except for its positioning of market pull instead of technological newness as 
the driving force of innovation. Thus, the two varieties of linear models differ 
in their approach to the driving force of innovation, but they share the view of 
the innovation process as a linear step-by-step process. 
The linear models were regarded as very simplified pictures of complex 
interactions between science, technology, and the market. Researchers thus 
sought to provide a more thorough description of the innovation process. This 
led to the breakdown of the sequential view of innovation and the construction 
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of third-generation innovation models, the interactive models of innovation. 
The interactive models of innovation discarded the view of the innovation 
process as a linear process of separate stages. In its place, these models 
depicted the innovation process as a complex net of intraorganizational 
communication paths linking together various in-house functions (Rothwell & 
Zegveld, 1985). The main power of these models may be considered to lie in 
their explanations of the variety of interactions necessary for innovation. 
While the interactive models of innovation focused on 
intraorganizational interactions, researchers such as Dodgson (1991b) and 
Marceau (1994), emphasized that the complexity of innovation requires 
interactions not only among a wide spectrum of agents within the firm but also 
with agents outside the firm. Writers, such as Sako (1992), described this 
phenomenon as the existence of dynamic innovation networks. Researchers 
consequently developed so-called system models to portray 
interorganizational interactions in the innovation process, giving rise to the 
fourth generation of innovation models. The system models argue that firms 
do not have to have large resources to develop innovation in-house as they can 
benefit from establishing relationships with a network of other firms and 
organizations. 
Evolutionary models of innovation, which make up the fifth generation 
of innovation models, were largely in accordance with the system models, but 
placed more emphasis on the role of governments to shape the environment 
for innovation processes (Marinova & Phillimore, 2003). Evolutionary models 
argue that evolutionary processes embedded in socio-economic contexts 
largely determine innovation outcomes. Therefore, the evolutionary processes 
of interaction and collaboration that lead to innovation need to be understood 
in order for governments to create conditions conducive to innovation by 
shaping relationships, encouraging learning, and balancing competition with 
cooperation. The emphasis on government action in the evolutionary models 
makes it possible to argue that these models may be viewed as mainly 
producing policy recommendations, while the system models of innovation 
focus on firm-level processes. 
Innovative milieux models of innovation are the sixth generation of 
innovation models. These models have much in common with systems models 
as both sets of models emphasize interaction and collaboration across 
organizational boundaries. However, innovative milieux models place great 
importance on geographical co-location for interaction and collaboration 
leading to innovation (Camagni, 1991; Camagni & Capello, 2000; Feldman, 
1994; Keeble, 2000). Geographically bound innovative milieux are argued to 
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be characterized by dense networks, ease of communication, and high levels of 
trust, which are posited to foster innovation. Innovation milieux are also called 
“innovation clusters” (Porter, 1990).20 According to the OECD (1999), the 
concept of a cluster is closely linked to firm collaboration and networking but 
goes beyond that as it captures all forms of knowledge sharing and exchange 
within a specific locality. 
These six generations of innovation models may be viewed as different 
ways of looking at the complex processes of innovation rather as competing 
and mutually exclusive theories. Especially the latest three models—system 
models, evolutionary models, and innovative milieux models—may be seen as 
highly complementary as they all emphasize that evolving interorganizational 
interactions are essential for innovation. These three latest generations of 
innovation models are also the ones that have the most resonance with 
innovation dynamics in the modern biotechnology sector, especially in their 
emphasis on the importance of interaction and collaboration across 
organizational boundaries for innovation. 
2.3.1 Interorganizational Collaboration 
Innovation in the modern biotechnology sector has been characterized as 
highly collaborative, taking place in networks of formal and informal 
collaboration among various actors in the public and private spheres 
(Dodgson, 1993). Therefore, it is possible to describe innovation in modern 
biotechnology in line with the system models of innovation, emphasizing that 
the complexity of innovation requires interactions not only among a wide 
spectrum of agents within the firm, but also interactions and cooperation 
among agents in what may be called dynamic, industrial, strategic, or 
innovation networks (Dodgson, 1991a).21 More specifically, innovation in 
modern biotechnology has been characterized as depending upon the 
                                                        
20 Other closely related concepts are “the learning region” (Florida, 1995) and 
“collective learning” (Keeble, 2000). 
21 Innovation in modern biotechnology may also be understood through 
evolutionary models of innovation which, as noted before, may be considered 
complementary to system models of innovation. However, it can be argued that the 
evolutionary models of innovation direct attention largely toward understanding the 
evolutionary processes of interaction and collaboration in order for governments to 
create conditions conducive to innovation. This emphasis can thus be posited to lead 
to viewing innovation largely on the level of national innovation systems, an approach 
that has been widely employed in studies of modern biotechnology. However, in this 
study focus is on innovation from a dedicated biotechnology firm’s point of view, 
where national innovation systems form a context of action rather than being the 
object of action. 
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contributions and interactions of three types of agents: universities, small 
research-intensive dedicated biotechnology firms, and large established 
corporations (Arora & Gambardella, 1990). These three sets of actors are said 
to be endowed with complementary assets to generate, develop, and 
commercialize modern biotechnology innovation (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; 
Dodgson, 1993), so that successful innovation in modern biotechnology 
requires the combination of these complementary assets (Dodgson, 1991a, 
1991b). 
Universities are considered central actors in modern biotechnology 
innovation because the modern biotechnology sector is characterized as 
science-based (Bogliacino & Panta, 2010; Pavitt, 1984), meaning that 
inventions are built up over long periods of time in the realm of publicly 
funded basic science (McMillan, Narin, & Deeds, 2000; Zucker, Darby, & 
Brewer, 1998). Hence, inventions in modern biotechnology emerge from 
universities rather than from the R&D departments of large companies 
(Kenney, 1998). Therefore, to gain access to the newest inventions in modern 
biotechnology, industry actors must collaborate with universities (Dodgson, 
1991a; Rothwell & Dodgson, 1991). This collaboration can, and does, take 
various forms. Forms of collaboration have been noted to include, but not be 
limited to, licensing of university inventions by firms, university contract 
research and consulting, movement of university professors to take jobs in 
industry and/or to sit on industrial scientific advisory committees, and 
informal collaborations through social networks (Kenney, 1986; Liebeskind, 
Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer, 1996; Senker, 1996). The benefits of university-
industry collaboration to firms have been posited to include, but not be limited 
to, access by firms to new inventions (McMillan et al., 2000), lowering of 
firms’ R&D costs (George, Zahra, & Wood, 2002), and signaling value for firms 
of being associated with elite science in recognized hotspots of innovation 
(Lawton Smith & Bagchi-Sen, 2006). 
However, to create innovation from invention, scientific knowledge 
and inventions need to be commercialized (Coriat, Orsland, & Weinstein, 
2003). Small research-intensive firms or dedicated biotechnology firms have 
been found to play a central role in the commercialization of science in 
modern biotechnology. Typically, dedicated biotechnology firms are closely 
attached to universities, which is posited to furnish them with a comparative 
advantage in R&D transfer from universities vis-à-vis larger firms (Dodgson, 
1993). This comparative advantage has been concluded to result from the 
greater ease of dedicated biotechnology firms to recruit the best scientists 
because of their closeness to universities, as well as their greater emphasis on 
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research, both things that larger companies have found difficult to accomplish 
(Kenney, 1998). Dedicated biotechnology firms are also said to enjoy a number 
of behavioral advantages over their larger counterparts in innovation, 
including rapid responses to external threats and opportunities, efficient 
internal communications, and interactive management styles (Rothwell & 
Dodgson, 1991). Large firms, on the other hand, have not been able to 
internalize the knowledge necessary to dispense with either university 
research or dedicated biotechnology firms (Kenney, 1998). Therefore, larger 
firms have found it necessary and advantageous to collaborate with dedicated 
biotechnology firms. As a result, dedicated biotechnology firms have continued 
to proliferate in the modern biotechnology sector even after large corporations 
moved into the field, rather than the sector becoming consolidated into a few 
large firms as it has matured (Kenney, 1998). 
There are two explanations as to why dedicated biotechnology firms 
have remained so buoyant. One is that the science base underpinning 
biotechnology continues to move fast and dedicated biotechnology firms, with 
their privileged links with the science base, continue to perform a vital 
intermediary function of technology transfer between academia and industry. 
The other explanation is that dedicated biotechnology firms typify a new type 
of networked organization, already familiar in information technology, but 
now emerging in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Its advocates 
argue that the small firm retains a flexibility and innovativeness which larger 
firms find difficult to emulate, so that while the large conglomerate 
chemical/pharmaceutical firm certainly retains some advantages, the 
increasing number of linkages between large firms and dedicated 
biotechnology firms suggests that relationships may be changing (Sharp, 
1996). However, it is also worth noting that in the British experience, 
fragmentation of the industry structure has been consciously maintained, with 
dedicated biotechnology firms being kept from being acquired by larger 
companies so that the modern biotechnology sector would not become 
consolidated in the same manner as the semiconductor industry, perceived to 
have led to its stagnation (Oakey, Faulkner, Cooper, & Walsh, 1990). 
However, despite their comparative advantage, small dedicated 
biotechnology firms have also been noted to suffer from a number of mainly 
material disadvantages, such as inability to spread risk over a portfolio of new 
products, problems in funding longer-term R&D, and difficulties in 
establishing an appropriate network of contacts with external sources of 
scientific and technological expertise and advice (Rothwell & Dodgson, 1991). 
Particularly debilitating is believed to be the common lack on the part of 
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dedicated biotechnology firms of “complementary assets” such as competitive 
manufacturing, marketing and distribution networks, and ability to deal with 
regulatory procedures necessary in bringing new products to market. These 
complementary assets are all necessary for firms to attain full returns from 
innovation. Therefore, the lack of these complementary assets has led to 
dedicated biotechnology firms often finding it necessary and advantageous 
collaborate with larger firms. Hence, the distinctive advantages on the part of 
dedicated biotechnology firms (superior ability to internalize the latest 
scientific knowledge) and on the part of large firms (possession of 
complementary assets) have provided the basis for collaborations. Innovative 
startups have been able to overcome resource restrictions through 
collaboration with larger firms, so that collaborative linkages are an important 
means of improving innovation potential. The dominant trend has been for 
dedicated biotechnology firms to conclude cooperative agreements with large 
firms that have the skills and resources to take innovations developed in 
dedicated biotechnology firms to market (Kenney, 1998). 
There are also key intermediaries that help facilitate interactions 
between the three main sets of actors in modern biotechnology innovation. 
Particularly noteworthy are venture capitalists, which have been instrumental 
in helping to found and develop dedicated biotechnology firms in the United 
States. Indeed, Genentech had its start as a collaboration between a university 
professor and a venture capitalist (Hughes, 2011; Powell, 1999). Venture 
capitalists play a crucial role in the U.S. modern biotechnology sector as they 
invest in new, untested technology, something that large corporations and 
banks are reluctant to do because of the high risk. Moreover, venture 
capitalists take an active role in accelerating dedicated biotechnology firm 
growth, as their objective is to increase the value of the fledgling company 
rapidly. Venture capitalists help dedicated biotechnology firms secure 
professional legal and accounting assistance, hire key executives, contact 
potential business partners, and find the right underwriters for a public 
offering. In short, venture capitalists provide both the capital and the contacts 
necessary for a firm to become self-sufficient (Kenney, 1998). The actions 
carried out by venture capitalists have been argued to be vital in the successful 
development of dedicated biotechnology firms in the United States, and the 
shortage of venture capitalists in Europe compared to the United States has 
been found to be a key hindering factor in the development of the European 
modern biotechnology sector (Ward & Hodgson, 2006; Ward et al., 2005).22 
                                                        
22 The shortage of venture capitalists in Europe compared to the United States 
is typically attributed to the fact that venture capitalists are a historically unique U.S. 
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As a result, the functions fulfilled by venture capitalists in biotechnology 
innovation often need to be filled by other means in biotechnology sectors 
outside of the United States. In Finland, public organizations have tried to 
make up for the shortage of private venture capital by supplying public R&D 
subsidies, public venture capital, and publicly funded aid for networking.23 
2.3.2 Information Acquisition24 
Although interorganizational collaboration in modern biotechnology has been 
found to result from complementary resource allocations, critically including 
material resources such as manufacturing and distribution networks, analyses 
of collaboration have led researchers to posit that the most crucial resource 
being shared in these collaborations is knowledge (Powell, 1996). Running 
through the literature on collaboration is the argument that collaboration 
enhances organizational learning (Dodgson, 1993; Powell, 1996). This is 
argued to be the case because the knowledge base of the modern biotechnology 
sector is complex and expanding with sources of expertise widely dispersed, 
which results in the locus of innovation being located in networks of learning 
rather than in individual firms (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Thus, 
the large-scale reliance on interorganizational collaborations in the 
biotechnology sector is posited to reflect a fundamental and pervasive concern 
with access to knowledge (Powell, 1998; Powell et al., 1996). In other words, 
knowledge is argued to be the “lifeblood” flowing through the channels and 
conduits of collaborative networking for innovation in biotechnology (Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2004). These arguments are given further weight by the 
frequently made acknowledgement that biotechnology is a knowledge-driven 
sector, consisting of “knowledge working on knowledge” to create value 
(Cooke, 2002a). 
Hence, as knowledge is seen as the most crucial resource in modern 
biotechnology innovation and the knowledge base is noted to be highly 
distributed, much of the vitally needed knowledge on the part of a dedicated 
biotechnology firm necessarily lies beyond its organizational boundaries. This 
                                                                                                                                                  
phenomenon, coming into being in the post-World War II United States with the lead 
of American Research and Development Corporation whose aim was to supply risk 
capital to new companies based on scientific research (Kenney, 1998; Senker, 1996). 
23 Primarily through Tekes, Sitra, and Finpro (The National Trade, 
Internationalization and Investment Development Organization), respectively. 
24 The term “knowledge” is used here in accordance with the terminology used 
in the literature reviewed but it is worth noting that it is typically not distinguished 
from information in this literature. 
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makes it inevitable that information acquisition plays a significant part in 
modern biotechnology innovation. This is in line with system models of 
innovation which argue that firms do not have to have large resources to 
develop innovation in-house as they can benefit from establishing 
relationships with a network of other firms and organizations (Dodgson, 
1991b). 
Considering information acquisition from the perspective of a 
dedicated biotechnology firm, access to knowledge produced by universities is 
critical for innovation. However, the scientific knowledge produced in 
universities and research institutes requires multiple additional information 
inputs in order to be turned into technologically and commercially feasible 
innovation. The importance of this must be emphasized, as it is precisely the 
problems in translating scientific knowledge into technologically and 
commercially feasible innovation that have been posited to lie at the core of 
the “Europe Paradox.” Thus, scientific knowledge inputs are only one part of 
the multiple knowledge resources needed to produce modern biotechnology 
innovation (Laage-Hellman et al., 2004). Complementary information 
concerning product formulation, production, protection of intellectual 
property, and marketing is essential (Walsh, Niosi, & Mustar, 1995). 
Therefore, as access to multiple information sources is crucial for turning 
invention into technologically and commercially feasible innovation, a 
dedicated biotechnology firm needs extremely good capabilities to identify, 
access, analyze, utilize, and combine information from a multiplicity of 
different sources. Although this phenomenon is by no means exclusive to the 
modern biotechnology sector—indeed, it is argued that to widen the range of 
recombination opportunities for innovation, all firms should seek to combine 
internal competences with information from external sources (Galunic & 
Rodan, 1998; Hargadon, 2003; Rodan & Galunic, 2004)—this phenomenon 
may be considered to be particularly pronounced in biotechnology innovation. 
Moreover, the knowledge necessary for innovation in modern 
biotechnology has considerable tacit components. Indeed, it can be claimed 
that all of this needed knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is partially 
tacit (Senker, 1995).25 Thus, as Senker argues, although firms build up their 
own practical experience in-house by undertaking research and development 
and by interacting with production, they may acquire knowledge also from 
external sources, with all of this knowledge having tacit components (Senker, 
1995). Such partially tacit knowledge, it is argued, can be acquired only by 
                                                        
25 This is in line with Polanyi’s original argument about tacit knowledge 
(Polanyi, [1966] 1983; Tsoukas, [2003] 2005). 
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personal experience or through personal interaction with experts. 
Furthermore, this applies also to scientific and technological knowledge, 
where personal interaction with the sources of new scientific or technological 
knowledge has been found to be compulsory in order to capture fully the tacit 
dimension (Senker, 1993, 1995). This is especially true in new areas of 
research such as modern biotechnology. Considering this argument in the 
context of modern biotechnology innovation, it can be concluded that a 
dedicated biotechnology firm must be able to acquire knowledge with tacit 
components from multiple external sources. This is because if, as posited in 
studies of innovation in modern biotechnology, a dedicated biotechnology firm 
is reliant on external knowledge for innovation and all of this external 
knowledge has tacit components, then the inevitable conclusion is that a 
dedicated biotechnology firm is reliant on external knowledge with tacit 
components for innovation. Furthermore, the acquisition of knowledge in 
full—that is, comprising both codified and tacit dimensions—can be assumed 
to require personal interaction with the sources of knowledge, which in turn 
requires personal contacts and social networks (Senker, 1993). 
2.3.3 Local Agglomeration and International Information26 
Acquisition 
The argument that innovation in modern biotechnology relies heavily on 
external knowledge that always has tacit components, which can be captured 
only in personal interaction, is in line with the common assertion that modern 
biotechnology innovation evinces strong tendencies towards local 
agglomeration into clusters. Material aspects are important in explaining this 
agglomeration, as they are in explaining interfirm collaboration. Therefore, 
researchers such as Prevezer (1996, 2001) and Audretsch et al. (Audretsch, 
2001; Audretsch & Stephan, 1996) have posited that modern biotechnology 
innovation and subsequent business activity first arose in those regions of the 
United States—the San Francisco Bay Area and Boston—that provided the 
right combination of resources: scientific excellence, capital, and 
complementary business assets. Additional biotechnology clusters have arisen 
since in other regions of the United States and in other countries (although 
often in a manner that has been more induced by state policies than 
                                                        
26 The terms “information” and “knowledge” are used here in accordance with 
the terminology used in the literature reviewed, but it is worth noting that the two 
concepts are typically not distinguished, at least not consistently, in this literature. 
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spontaneous), arguably most successfully in areas with complementary 
resources and reinforcing sets of factors (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2005, 2006).27  
However, researchers have pointed to social networks, and the access 
to tacit knowledge that they provide, as being a significant reason for local 
agglomeration tendencies in modern biotechnology (Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2004; Powell, Koput, Bowie, & Smith-Doerr, 2002; Powell, White, Koput, & 
Owen-Smith, 2005). Thus, notwithstanding the acknowledgement of the role 
of complementary resources in cluster formation, a core argument is that local 
agglomeration reflects the geography of information flows. Several researchers 
argue that modern biotechnology innovation is strongly localized, emerging in 
clusters of co-located actors who are able to access effectively each other’s 
knowledge because of their physical proximity (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; 
Cooke, 2002a). Such co-location in clusters is argued to be especially 
important for innovation in a sector such as modern biotechnology, which 
relies on new scientific knowledge and is thus heavily dependent on tacit 
knowledge communication (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996). Empirical studies, 
such as those by Zucker et al. (Zucker, Darby, & Armstrong, 1998, 2002; 
Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998), support this view as they have found that 
where and when star scientists in biotechnology actively produced 
publications was a key predictor of where and when commercial firms first 
began to use biotechnology. Moreover, studies by Zucker et al. and others 
(Liebeskind et al., 1996) posit that the existence of personal, often informal, 
ties between individuals is crucial for successful formal interaction between 
organizations. 
Powell et al. take this argument further, claiming that clusters of 
collaboration are embedded in an ecology rich in informal social networks, out 
of which formal corporate ties grow  (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Powell, 
Koput, Smith-Doerr, & Owen-Smith, 1999). As Powell et al. put it: “social and 
intellectual ties, forged as early as graduate school days, link scientists across 
firms and universities, facilitating collaboration” (Powell et al., 1999: 156). 
Moreover, it is posited that these ties are local because of the importance of 
tacit knowledge and the face-to-face contacts that its sharing necessitates 
(Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Powell et al., 2002; Powell et al., 1999). These 
informal and formal ties thus act as channels and conduits for knowledge, 
                                                        
27 Beyond analyses of the early growth of the biotechnology sector in the 
United States that show a relatively spontaneous cluster emergence in the San 
Francisco Bay Area and Boston, several clusters to be found internationally have been 
built largely through government policies. As the focus in this study is on firm-level 
innovation and not on government policy, most of the literature on biotechnology 
clusters thus falls outside the scope of this study. 
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facilitating access to the multiple external knowledge sources that are crucial 
to an innovating firm in the biotechnology sector. 
However, studies of biotechnology firms’ networking in European 
countries have produced diverging results, as local knowledge networks have 
been found to be eclipsed in importance by national and international 
knowledge ties. In the United Kingdom, it has been found that there is a clear 
tendency for interfirm and university–firm collaborations to be more intensive 
with distant partners—national and international—than with local actors 
(Hendry & Brown, 2006). In France, researchers have found that while 
biotechnology firms rely on local infrastructures in their early stages, their 
networks become international as they mature (Lemarie, Mangematin, & 
Torre, 2001). Studies in Sweden, whose economy is most like that of Finland, 
have found that global knowledge collaboration is indispensable for dedicated 
biotechnology firms. It is concluded that the convenience of local collaboration 
cannot replace the extreme requirement for specialized knowledge, which 
forces Swedish biotechnology firms to seek collaborators in the global arena, 
despite the impediments they face in these situations (McKelvey, Alm, & 
Riccaboni, 2003; Moodysson & Jonsson, 2007). No specific studies of the 
geography of knowledge networking by biotechnology firms have been done in 
Finland, but Luukkonen (2005) alludes to the possibility that the majority of 
Finnish biotechnology firms’ partners are located abroad because of the small 
size of the Finnish economy. Therefore, it can be assumed that for a dedicated 
biotechnology firm from Finland, much of the needed knowledge necessarily 
lies beyond national boundaries due to the small size of the home country. 
Therefore, it is important to look at international information acquisition. 
2.4 PERSPECTIVES ON INFORMATION28 ACQUISITION IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
In international information acquisition, particularly meaningful is that it 
takes place across national borders. There are strong indications that many 
firm-related processes meet with additional challenges when they take place 
internationally: these have to do with differences in language, culture, 
institutional contexts, and “outsidership” of a firm in foreign countries. 
Therefore, a field of literature that seems promising as a source of insights for 
                                                        
28 The terms “information” and “knowledge” are used here in accordance with 
the terminology used in the literature reviewed, but it is worth noting that the two 
concepts are typically not distinguished, at least not consistently, in this literature. 
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international information acquisition is international business studies as this 
literature explicitly deals with issues that arise when firms cross national 
borders in conducting their activities.29 
Defining international business studies literature is challenging, as its 
boundaries are fuzzy and porous. As Caves (2003: 1) put it: “international 
business designates not a class of decisions but a group of firms that face 
decision-making problems beyond those that confront single-nation 
businesses or encounter the same problems transformed by their international 
context.” Therefore, international business studies literature is defined for the 
purposes of this dissertation as the field of study that revolves around the 
issues that arise when business activities are conducted internationally. This 
definition is in line with that put forward by the Journal of International 
Business Studies, which many researchers (DuBois & Reeb, 2000) consider to 
be the main publication in the field of international business. Nonetheless, due 
to the porous boundaries of the field, literature pertaining to international 
business activities is published in a wide variety of journals. The literature 
reviewed in this section is chosen according to its relevance to the 
phenomenon studied, that of (external) information acquisition for innovation 
in a small, internationally operating company in the biotechnology sector 
originating from a small, developed economy. 
International business studies literature lacks a shared set of 
underlying theoretical assumptions or a shared interpretive framework 
(Cantwell & Brannen, 2011). Accordingly, it is possible to identify four 
different perspectives in international business literature regarding 
information acquisition that are based on quite distinct theoretical 
foundations. These perspectives provide diverging approaches to viewing 
information acquisition in international business, particularly with regard to 
what are considered the greatest obstacles and their possible solutions. These 
four perspectives are reviewed next, primarily in the chronological order in 
which they have arisen in international business studies literature. Although 
they all draw on other literature, sometimes merging with larger paradigms in 
economics, organization science, and sociology, the discussion in the case of 
each perspective is limited to its development and uses within international 
                                                        
29 Literature addressing international activities by smaller firms is of relatively 
recent vintage in international business studies and is typically labelled “international 
entrepreneurship research,” considered to have emerged mostly in the 1990s (Jones et 
al., 2011). However, this stream of literature has yet to develop a proprietary 
theoretical framework concerning international information acquisition and instead 
primarily draws on international business literature theory (Fletcher & Harris, 2012). 
Hence, it can be included as part of international business studies literature for the 
purposes of this dissertation. 
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business studies literature. The terms “information” and “knowledge” are used 
here in accordance with the terminology used in the literature reviewed. 
2.4.1 Information Transactions 
The first perspective to examining information acquisition that may be 
identified in international business studies arose in the 1970s based on the 
discipline of economics. This perspective utilizes transaction cost theory and 
focuses on problems of information transactions. Although the terms “know-
how” and “knowledge” are used synonymously with the term “information” in 
this approach, the latter term is used here to characterize this perspective 
because it draws so strongly on Arrowian information economics. 
To understand this line of theorizing, it is important to recap briefly the 
earliest developments in international business literature on which this work 
built. International business theories may be seen as having first arisen to 
explain a key question considered problematic in neo-classical trade theory, 
namely, why foreign direct investment (FDI)30 exists (Dunning, 2003; Hymer, 
1960). In neoclassical trade theory, factors of production are assumed to be 
fixed in specific locations while goods can move freely around the world. 
Consequently, in perfect markets, firms would produce locally and trade their 
goods. This is because local firms, assumed to have superior information about 
the local market, would have a comparative advantage in their home market 
vis-à-vis foreign firms. Hence, a “local production- international trade” scheme 
would maximize each firm's comparative advantage. Therefore, in perfect 
markets, it would make no sense for a firm to undertake foreign direct 
investment because it would be always out-competed by local firms because of 
its “information handicap” (Dimand, 2004; Hymer, 1960). However, in the 
real world, foreign direct investment did exist. The earliest international 
business theories—typically considered to have started with Hymer’s (1960) 
dissertation that called attention to this paradox between theory and practice 
(Dunning, 2003)—were geared toward explaining this apparent paradox. 
Internationally operating firms, it was concluded, must possess some 
advantage over local firms that enabled them to overcome their information 
handicap (Hymer, 1960; Kindleberger, 1969; Knickerbocker, 1973; Vernon & 
Wells, 1966).  
                                                        
30 Defined as having controlling majority ownership of 51% or more in a 
business operation abroad (Hymer, 1960). 
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Transaction cost theory posits that the advantage which makes foreign 
direct investment sensible derives from the ability of internationally operating 
firm to  bypass “natural” imperfections of international markets (Buckley & 
Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1977, 1982).31 This theorizing starts from the premise 
that there are two ways to organize interdependencies between individuals: the 
market, which utilizes the price mechanism, and the firm, which utilizes the 
hierarchy mechanism. In perfect markets, the price mechanism is the most 
efficient organizational method. Consequently, in perfect markets, 
international trade, which relies on the price mechanism, would be the optimal 
solution. However, it is argued that there are “natural” imperfections in 
markets, principally bounded rationality and opportunism, which make 
markets less than perfectly efficient. The existence of market imperfections 
causes the hierarchy mechanism of the firm to be the more efficient manner of 
organizing. Therefore, when market imperfections exist in international 
markets, foreign direct investment that gives rise to the multinational 
corporation, is the more efficient organizational method. 
Although several types of transactions may be more efficiently 
organized using the hierarchy mechanism of the firm rather than the price 
mechanism of the market, transactions involving information present a 
particularly salient case. Indeed, most applications of transaction cost theory 
to multinational corporations have focused on the organization of 
international interdependencies involving information, arguing that the 
multinational corporation arises when internalizing markets for information is 
the most efficiency way of organizing (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1977, 
1982, 2003).32 Information transactions are argued to be special, because 
information as an economic good has many characteristics that differentiate it 
from other economic goods. In transaction cost theorizies in international 
business, two particularly prominent characteristics of information are 
highlighted as reasons to internalize information transactions within the firm: 
                                                        
31 According to Hennart (2003), transaction cost theories in international 
business literature were developed independently of transaction cost theories in 
economics by Williamson (1985). Consequently, it is transaction cost theories as 
developed in international business literature that are focused upon here. 
32 The term “information” is used here to characterize this approach to 
information acquisition, as the arguments in this stream of international business 
theorizing relating to information largely draw on Arrowian information economics 
(Arrow, 1962, 1984, 1999). Hence, although terms such as “know-how” and 
“knowledge” are used in transaction-cost based international business theorizing, they 
are typically used (quite) synonymously with the term “information” as treated in 
information economics. Consequently, the discussion here will, in line with the 
information economics basis of this argument in international business studies, use 
the term “information” throughout for clarity and consistency. 
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these are information asymmetry and the public good characteristics of 
information.  
Hennart (1977, 1982, 2003) focused in his work particularly on 
information asymmetry—an idea developed principally by Arrow (1962, 
2001)—as the rationale for internalizing information transactions in 
international markets and thus forming a multinational corporation. 
Information asymmetry arises because one party cannot obtain freely (or at 
all) the information available to another (Arrow, 1996). Hence, the buying and 
selling of information is not the same as the buying and selling of most other 
goods, because there are greater opportunities for cheating in information 
transactions. This is because the value of information being sold is hard (if not 
impossible) for the buyer to gauge. This could be achieved only if the seller 
allowed the buyer to inspect fully the information being sold, but doing so 
would lead to a situation where the seller would no longer have anything worth 
selling. In other words, it is difficult (if not impossible) for the seller to 
simultaneously advertise and protect the information being sold, while it is 
difficult (if not impossible) for the buyer to gauge its value. 
Hence, the price mechanism often does not work well when the good 
being transacted is information because there are so many possibilities for the 
agents to cheat. This means that it can be more efficient to internalize 
information transactions by subjecting them to the hierarchy mechanism of 
the firm. When the agents transacting information are located in different 
countries, it is efficient to internalize the transactions within a multinational 
corporation. This explains the existence of a multinational corporation even in 
the face of the information handicap. As Hennart put it: 
Know-how developed in one country is often potentially useful in 
others and can be transferred at low marginal cost. Markets for 
know-how suffer, however, from the fundamental problem of 
information asymmetry. For markets to function well, buyers and 
sellers must have perfect knowledge of what is being sold. As 
Arrow first argued, the buyer of know-how does not generally 
know its exact characteristics, and the seller cannot provide the 
buyer with that information, since by doing this he would be 
transferring his know-how to the buyer free of charge. … Transfer 
within a firm can then be more efficient, because both the sender 
and the receiver of the know-how are now rewarded for effective 
transfer, and not for cheating each other as in a market setting. 
Buyers and sellers of knowledge will therefore form an MNE 
(multinational enterprise) and put their behavior under the 
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control of a central party charged with maximizing their joint 
income. (Hennart 2003: 137)   
Buckley and Casson (1976), while making the same general argument of 
benefits of internalizing information transactions, emphasize a different aspect 
of information as an economic good that causes it to differ from most other 
economic goods: the public good character of knowledge. A public good is 
defined as having two distinct characteristics: non-excludability and non-
rivalry. Non-excludability means that an individual cannot be prevented from 
consuming the good, while non-rivalry means that several individuals can 
consume the same good without diminishing its value. These characteristics 
lead, in Buckley and Casson’s theory, to information having the critical 
properties of being easily transferred and hard to protect. Hence, there might 
be free riders who utilize the information without paying for it. This is clearly 
not in the interests of the economic agent who owns the information, as it can 
lead to depreciation of the value of the information for that specific agent in a 
competitive situation. As a result, Buckley and Casson argue, it is 
advantageous to internalize information transactions, as this makes it possible 
for the multinational corporation to exploit the information in all of its 
locations while simultaneously protecting it from competing economic agents. 
As Buckley and Casson put this:  
There is a special reason for believing that internalization of the 
knowledge market will generate a high degree of multinationality 
among firms. Because knowledge is a public good which is easily 
transmitted across national boundaries, its exploitation is logically 
an international operation. (Buckley & Casson, 1976: 45) 
This section has focused on the two arguably most prominent sources of 
transaction cost theorizing in international business literature, as they cover 
the gist of the argument in this perspective. To summarize, it is posited in this 
perspective that information transactions in markets can be inefficient because 
of possibilities to cheat and free ride that arise from information asymmetry 
and the public good characteristics of information. These problems, it is 
argued, can be alleviated by internalizing information transactions within 
multinational corporations. Hence, multinational corporations come into 
being when they are efficient vehicles for organizing information transactions. 
This efficiency arises from their possibilities to correct for, or overcome, 
“natural” market imperfections that are particularly salient in the case of 
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information as an economic good (Dunning & Rugman, 1985). Hence, by 
internalizing information transactions, multinational corporations can 
alleviate problems of opportunism, cheating, and free riding that are said to be 
prominent in information transactions. In sum, “an MNE (multinational 
enterprise) will expand abroad (will organize interdependencies through 
hierarchy, i.e. through employment contracts) when it can organize 
interdependencies between agents located in different countries more 
efficiently than markets” (Hennart 2003: 136). 
This approach to viewing information acquisition as information 
transactions that are particularly problematic to organize in markets leads to a 
view that emphasizes the benefits of internalizing information transactions. 
This leaves open the question of how small firms in international business, 
which have internalized only a small portion of their information transactions 
(by definition), are able to acquire information in international markets. More 
specifically, how are they able to compete with large multinational companies 
as they are forced to rely on the market for information transactions while the 
large multinationals enjoy the benefits of internalized information 
transactions? One answer could be that these small firms operate in markets 
that approximate perfect markets and therefore do not suffer from market 
imperfections. Yet, as the markets in which small firms operate are often the 
same as those in which large multinational corporations compete, this 
conclusion would not seem likely. Indeed, this perspective would imply that 
information acquisition in international markets is performed best by 
internalizing information transactions, leaving smaller firms at a 
disadvantage. 
However, a more recent development can shed light on how small 
firms may be able to compete in international markets even if unable to 
internalize most information transactions. This is the so-called network view, 
where it is posited that there is a third organizing method in addition to 
markets and hierarchies, that of networks. Focusing on the network view as 
developed primarily on the basis of transaction cost theories, Casson (2000) 
and Buckley et al. (Buckley & Hashai, 2004) posit that information 
transactions within networks may be defined as an additional type of 
information transaction that lies between “internal” and “external” 
information transactions. Information transactions within networks are 
characterized as “external” information transactions in that they do not take 
place within the firm but have the quality of intrafirm information 
transactions. These kinds of information transactions, in this view, can 
therefore correct for market imperfections in the same way that internalized 
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information transaction do, even though they take place across firm 
boundaries. 
This perspective to information acquisition in international business 
implies that a small firm should develop network relationships in which it 
could conduct information transactions in an internalized manner. In this way, 
small internationally operating firms could acquire information without being 
disadvantaged by market imperfections for information transactions, finding a 
way to compete with larger multinational companies. However, the literature 
does not go into much detail concerning how such network relationships could 
be formed or maintained beyond mentioning the importance of shared codes 
and trust. 
2.4.2 Experiential and Network Learning 
The second perspective to examining information acquisition that may be 
identified in international business studies focuses on explaining firm 
international growth and internationalization. The core of this perspective is 
the so-called Uppsala Model, first presented in 1977 (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977),  relaunched in 1990 (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990), and revised in 2009 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). The crux of the Uppsala Model's approach to 
information acquisition is the emphasis on experiential learning—a notion 
adopted from Penrose ([1959] 1995)—which is hampered by “psychic distance” 
and “outsidership” in foreign countries.33 Thus, this model explains firm 
international growth as centrally revolving around knowledge acquisition. As 
Johanson and Vahlne put it: 
We believe that lack of knowledge due to differences between 
countries with regard to, for example, language and culture, is an 
important obstacle to decision making connected with the 
development of international operations. We would even say that 
these differences constitute the main characteristic of 
                                                        
33 Work on organization-level learning by Cyert and March ([1963] 1992) is 
another key theoretical building block for the model, but because the notion of 
experiential knowledge can arguably be seen to play a greater role in how information 
acquisition is seen to function in this perspective it is this latter notion that is focused 
upon here. This is also sensible because in Cyert and March’s theory focus is on 
organization-level learning rather than on individual-level learning, while it is the 
latter type of individual-level learning that the Uppsala Model has come to emphasize. 
Forsgren (2001) highlights this in his analysis of the Uppsala Model, noting that one of 
the core assumptions in this perspective is that knowledge is highly dependent upon 
individuals and therefore difficult to transfer to other individuals and other contexts. 
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international, as distinct from domestic, operations. (Johanson 
and Vahlne 1977: 26) 
A basic assumption of the Uppsala Model is that lack of knowledge about 
foreign markets is a major obstacle to international operations. This lack of 
knowledge creates uncertainty, which correlates positively with psychic 
distance (defined as factors that make it difficult to understand the target 
market). In other words, a company from Sweden would have lower psychic 
distance, and therefore less uncertainty, in relation to Finland than in relation 
to China. However, the model posits that uncertainty can be overcome by 
acquiring knowledge. The most important kind of knowledge for overcoming 
uncertainty created by psychic distance is said to be experiential knowledge. 
Johanson and Vahlne drew the notion of experiential knowledge from the 
distinction made by Penrose ([1959] 1995) between “objective knowledge” and 
“experiential knowledge.” Penrose described these as follows: 
Knowledge comes to people in two different ways. One kind can be 
formally taught, can be learned from other people or from the 
written word, and can, if necessary, be formally expressed and 
transmitted to others. The other kind is also the result of learning, 
but learning in the form of personal experience. … The first form is 
what might be called ‘objective’ knowledge. … (The) second form 
in which knowledge appears (is) … the form I have called 
experience. … Experience produces increased knowledge about 
things and contributes to ‘objective’ knowledge in so far as its 
results can be transmitted to others. But experience itself can 
never be transmitted; it produces a change - frequently a subtle 
change - in individuals and cannot be separated from them. 
(Penrose [1959] 1995: 53) 
Johanson and Vahlne argue that it is this latter kind of knowledge, experiential 
knowledge, which is critical for the international growth of the firm because it 
is less easy to acquire than what they call “explicit information” or “objective 
knowledge”: 
We believe that this experiential knowledge … is critical because it 
cannot be so easily acquired as objective knowledge. In domestic 
operations, we can to a large extent rely on lifelong basic 
experiences to which we can add the specific experiences of 
individuals, organizations and markets. In foreign operations, 
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however, we have no such basic experiential knowledge to start 
with. It must be gained successively during the operations in the 
country. (Johanson and Vahlne 1977: 27) 
Hence, experiential knowledge is specifically—as the name implies—tied up 
with experience, so that such knowledge must be acquired by a firm mainly 
through own operations abroad (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990). Therefore, 
in this model, information is seen to be acquired primarily through activity in 
foreign countries in a gradual process of learning-by-doing, in which the firm 
becomes closely connected to foreign markets (Forsgren, 2001). 
Johanson and Vahlne updated their model in 2009 (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2009). In the newer version, the business environment is viewed as a 
network of relationships rather than as a neoclassical market with many 
independent suppliers and customers. Outsidership in relation to the relevant 
network is considered the primary root of uncertainty rather than psychic 
distance. However, from the point-of-view of information acquisition, there is 
little change:34 in the updated model, the only change to the argument 
concerning knowledge is the assertion that new knowledge is developed in 
relationships. As Johanson and Vahlne put it: 
Given the business network view, we add to our model the concept 
of relationship-specific knowledge, which is developed through 
interaction between the two partners, and that includes knowledge 
about each other’s heterogeneous resources and capabilities. … 
The interaction between a buyer’s user knowledge and a seller’s 
producer knowledge may also result in new knowledge. (Johanson 
& Vahlne 2009: 1415-1416) 
Another slight change to the model in the newer version is the assumption that 
some types of knowledge are only accessible to network insiders. Hence, a 
strong commitment to partners is said to allow firms to build on their 
respective bodies of knowledge and to discover and/or create opportunities. 
The speed, intensity, and efficiency of the processes of learning, creating 
knowledge, and building trust depend on existing knowledge, trust, and 
commitment, as well as on the extent to which partners find given 
opportunities appealing. This is also given as the reason why international new 
                                                        
34 Here the updated model is examined only from the point-of-view of 
information acquisition. The 2009 revised Uppsala Model also changes the view of the 
pattern of international expansion from being determined by psychic distance to being 
determined by opportunities as seen by network partners. 
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ventures may grow very rapidly: the founding entrepreneur may already have 
access to knowledge and relationships prior to beginning international growth. 
This perspective to information acquisition in international business 
implies that a small company should focus on learning through experience and 
through business relationships.35 This would imply that a firm should not aim 
to acquire information—in the sense of "explicit knowledge"— but rather aim 
to gain experiential knowledge through learning-by-doing. Such learning-by-
doing would comprise both the establishment of own operations and the 
building of business networks in different countries. These processes can be 
accelerated by capitalizing on the experiential knowledge and relationships 
that central individuals in the firm may have from their previous lives, i.e., 
from their time prior to joining the firm.36 However, small firms cannot only 
rely on their previously existing knowledge and relationships, as successful 
innovation requires constant learning and new knowledge (Katila, 2002; 
Katila & Ahuja, 2002). The information acquisition mechanisms described in 
this perspective—establishing own operations abroad and developing close, 
committed network relationships in various countries—require considerable 
resources, something that small firms do not have. Therefore, this perspective 
leaves open the question of how small firms in international business can 
acquire information in the international marketplace, given their very limited 
resources. 
2.4.3 Tacit Knowledge Transmission and Conversion 
The third perspective to examining information acquisition that may be 
identified in international business studies arose in the 1990s and can be 
characterized as emphasizing the importance of tacit knowledge and aiming to 
explicate the mechanisms of its transmission and conversion into explicit 
knowledge. There are two variations of the argument in this perspective, one 
by Kogut and Zander (Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1993), and one by Nonaka et al. 
                                                        
35 Although it is acknowledged in this perspective that experiential learning 
may already have been built up prior to the establishment of the firm. Therefore, the 
firm is not constrained to only that information acquisition which takes place after its 
founding, but can benefit from the experiential knowledge and relationships that the 
central individuals (primarily, the founding entrepreneur) have gained prior to 
beginning this particularly business. Additionally, it is assumed in this perspective that 
the more experiential learning and relationships a firm has at a given point in time, the 
better it can build up new experiential learning. 
36 Indeed, the recently emerging field of international entrepreneurship has 
confirmed that information acquisition is enhanced by a new venture’s embeddedness 
in international business and social networks (Lindstrand, Melen, & Nordman, 2011; 
Presutti, Boari, & Fratocchi, 2007). 
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(Erden, von Krogh, & Nonaka, 2008; Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Konno, 1998; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka & Toyama, 2003). However, both of these 
variations largely build on common ground as they draw on artificial 
intelligence and cognitive science, making it sensible to examine them 
together. 
Kogut and Zander (1992, 1993) define tacit knowledge as experiential 
and embedded in shared values and assumptions. It is, they claim, distinct 
from information, which they describe as explicit and restricted to describing 
factual statements about states of the world (Kogut & Zander 1993: 631). 
Kogut and Zander posit that tacit knowledge and information closely 
approximate notions of procedural and declarative knowledge in artificial 
intelligence, respectively. Hence, Kogut and Zander equate tacit knowledge 
with procedural knowledge that consists of statements that describe a process 
(Kogut & Zander 1992: 310). They call this tacit, procedural knowledge 
accumulated practical skill and expertise. More specifically, they characterize 
tacit knowledge as uncodified, experiential, incrementally accumulated, high 
complex, and embedded in shared values and assumptions. As such, it is very 
challenging to transmit, because its transmission requires shared values, 
assumptions, and codes between senders and receivers, which come into being 
only through experience over time. This is different from information, which 
Kogut and Zander claim can be “transmitted without loss of integrity once the 
syntactical rules required for deciphering it are known” (Kogut & Zander 1992: 
310). 
Tacit knowledge is so difficult to transmit, Kogut and Zander continue, 
that it cannot be transmitted through markets even if markets worked 
perfectly. Instead, it is transferred better within a firm. This is because a firm 
is a social community with shared values and assumptions, in which 
individuals, through repeated interactions, have developed common 
understanding of how tacit knowledge is coded and communicated, thus 
making its transmission possible (Kogut and Zander 1993: 627). In other 
words, according to Kogut and Zander, a firm has standardized procedures 
that are an expression of shared knowledge, values, and assumptions, and 
which ease the transmission of tacit knowledge within the firm. In other 
words, a firm is a “repository of social knowledge that structures cooperative 
action” (Kogut and Zander 1993: 627). The advantage of such a community 
with shared values, assumptions, and codes is said to be particularly valuable 
when tacit knowledge needs to be transmitted across national borders. 
Consequently, Kogut and Zander claim that the multinational corporation 
 61 
 
arises because it has superior abilities for the transmission tacit knowledge 
across national borders. 
Nonaka, with various co-authors (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Nonaka, Toyama, & Byosière, 2001; Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 2000; 
Nonaka, von Krogh, & Voelpel, 2006), has developed a very similar argument. 
In a foundational paper, Nonaka (1994) put forth two main premises: (1) tacit 
and explicit knowledge can be conceptually distinguished along a continuum; 
and (2) knowledge conversion explains the interaction between tacit and 
explicit knowledge that leads to the creation of new organizational knowledge. 
Building on artificial intelligence in the same manner as Kogut and Zander, 
Nonaka et al. claim that what he calls “explicit knowledge” is knowledge about 
past events or objects and oriented toward context-free theory. It can be 
created in a sequential manner, easily processed by a computer, transmitted 
electronically, and stored in databases (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 8-9). By 
contrast, tacit knowledge is “highly personal and hard to formalize (including) 
subjective insights, intuitions, and hunches  (that are) deeply rooted in an 
individual’s action and experience, as well as in the ideals, values, or emotions 
he or she embraces” (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 9). Tacit knowledge, according 
to Nonaka et al., is created in social interactions rather than by an individual 
operating in isolation (Nonaka et al., 2000). Moreover, it is created in the 
“here and now” in a specific, practical context of emerging relationships and 
practices of a group (Ba) (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka et al., 2006). 
Tacit knowledge, Nonaka et al. posit, exists at the individual level and 
group level (Nonaka, 1994). Individual-level tacit knowledge “resides” in 
individuals and is therefore difficult to externalize. Group-level tacit 
knowledge is embedded in group culture, norms, and routines, and rooted in 
commitment, ideals, values, senses, and emotions (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
Group culture gives rise to group identity, group language, definition of group 
boundaries, and a feeling of shared belonging. All of these emerge as a result of 
shared experiences and lead to collective sense-making (Erden et al., 2008). 
Like Kogut and Zander, Nonaka et al. assert that tacit knowledge is difficult to 
transmit. According to Nonaka et al., the transmission of tacit knowledge 
requires local, face-to-face, “here and now” interaction of people in small 
groups (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka et al., 2006). Group-
level tacit knowledge facilitates the transmission of individual-level tacit 
knowledge, as it makes it possible for group members to act in a coordinated 
manner, solving complex tasks without explicit rules for action, or even 
without explicit communication. This shared understanding enables the 
transmission of tacit knowledge between group members. 
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However, tacit knowledge must be converted into explicit knowledge if 
it is to be transmitted beyond the local interactions of the small group with its 
common culture, norms, routines, and collective sense-making. Indeed, 
Nonaka et al. argue that conversion between tacit and explicit knowledge types 
constitutes the knowledge creation spiral. There are, according to Nonaka et 
al., four modes of knowledge conversion (Nonaka 1994: 339) that together 
constitute the SECI (Socialization, Externalization, Combination, 
Internalization) model (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka et 
al., 2000). The first mode of knowledge conversion, Socialization, is that of 
“tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge.” In this mode, tacit knowledge is 
communicated through interaction between individuals without necessarily 
involving language but rather by observation, imitation, and practice. The key 
to acquiring and communicating tacit knowledge is experience, and especially 
shared experiences, which enable individuals to share their thinking processes. 
The second mode of knowledge conversion, Externalization, involves 
conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. The third mode, 
Combination, is that of “explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge” and involves 
the use of social processes to combine different bodies of explicit knowledge 
held by individuals. Finally, the fourth mode of knowledge conversion, 
Internalization, is similar to the traditional notion of learning. These four 
modes constitute the spiraling knowledge processes of interaction between 
explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge that results in the creation of new 
organizational knowledge. 
This perspective to information acquisition in international business 
implies that a small company should pay special attention to the processes of 
creating, transmitting, and converting tacit knowledge. However, for a small 
company that needs to acquire much of its information externally, this 
presents a special challenge as it is unclear how it might be able to acquire tacit 
knowledge from outside its organizational boundaries. This is because this 
perspective holds that tacit knowledge is best created and transmitted within 
small groups and firms as such communities have common cultures, values, 
and assumptions that make tacit knowledge transmission possible. Therefore, 
it seems that according to this perspective, a small company looking to acquire 
information from external sources would only have access to explicit 
knowledge. Moreover, small firm size would seem to pose limits to how much 
tacit knowledge can be created in the firm. Therefore, according to this 
perspective, small firms would be quite disadvantaged as it is implied that the 
amount of tacit knowledge that they create internally is limited by their size 
and the information they acquire externally is limited to explicit knowledge. 
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Since this perspective emphasizes the importance of tacit knowledge, it leaves 
open the question of how small firms can acquire information in international 
business that would allow them to be competitive. 
2.4.4 Social Learning in Communities and Networks of Practice 
The fourth perspective that may be identified in international business studies 
views information acquisition as social learning in communities and networks 
of practice. This perspective may be characterized as the most recent and least 
developed in international business studies. It has been developed principally 
by Tallman et al. (Tallman & Chacar, 2011; Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 
2002; Tallman, Jenkins, Henry, & Pinch, 2004), building on work by Brown 
and Duguid (1991, 2001) and by Lave and Wenger (1991), to examine how a 
multinational corporation can source knowledge from multiple locations 
around the world.  
The argument begins from the premise that all knowledge has some 
tacit aspects, rather than knowledge being of two types (tacit and explicit). 
However, knowledge is said to have differing degrees of tacit content. Focusing 
on knowledge high in tacit content, Tallman et al. (2011), building on Brown 
and Duguid (2001), propose that the mechanisms of acquiring external 
knowledge with a high tacit content can be understood and studied best at the 
micro-organizational level of communities of practice and the networks of 
practice that they form. In line with Brown and Duguid (2001), Tallman et al. 
(2011) define a community of practice as a small, focused group of physically 
co-located individuals within an organization who are joined by being engaged 
in the common practice of some activity. Through their joint practice of some 
activity in close physical proximity, individuals in a community of practice 
develop shared language, culture, and values. Individual learning is, in this 
perspective, seen to take place through practice of some activity that enables a 
deep understanding of that activity. Hence, the individual develops knowledge 
not only of the overt, explicit actions that are required but also of the 
architecture of the activity that constitutes the essence of tacit knowledge 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990; Polanyi, [1966] 1983). 
Engagement in practice takes place in a context of social relationships 
by learning from others through observation, imitation, and modeling. Hence, 
learning is largely about becoming part of a community of practice by 
internalizing the group’s shared language, culture, and values (Lave, 1988; 
Lave & Wenger, 1991). By participating in a community of practice, an 
individual is able to learn what Tallman et al. (2011) call “component 
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knowledge”: the common operational and technological knowledge that the 
members of the group have developed through joint practice. Members of a 
community of practice also develop what Tallman et al. call “architectural 
knowledge”: common repertoires of behavior, perspectives on, and 
understandings about the system of knowledge development and application 
(Frost & Zhou, 2005; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Matusik & Hill, 1998; Tallman 
et al., 2004). This architectural knowledge is internalized by participating in 
the experience of the common practice and provides the understanding to 
absorb related component knowledge effectively. In other words, it is the 
undergirding that makes component knowledge sensible. 
When several communities of practice engaged in similar activities 
exist in a confined geographical area, this is said to lead to the creation of 
networks of practice. These networks of practice are composed of interacting 
communities of practice from different organizations in a local geographic 
region or cluster (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Storper, 1993; Tallman et al., 2004). 
Thus, in a local cluster, each community of practice is immersed in a local 
network of practice that is composed of several communities of practice from 
multiple organizations. These networks of practice, and the social ties they 
represent, promote the development of network-level architectural knowledge 
that eases the transmission of tacit component knowledge among embedded 
member communities of practice (Brown & Duguid, 1991, 2001; Tallman et al., 
2004). Consequently, this perspective proposes that the creation and 
movement of valuable tacit knowledge across firms is tied closely to practices 
that exist in specific geographic locations. 
Therefore, co-location is argued to be necessary for the emergence of 
communities and networks of practice. This is because it is posited that dense 
communication, claimed to be essential to knowledge exchanges, breaks down 
over even a short distance. In other words, knowledge flows are assumed to be 
highly localized. However, while co-location may be necessary for local 
knowledge acquisition, it is by no means sufficient (Tallman et al., 2004). 
Instead, a degree of participation and experiential learning is essential to 
learning. This is because only those individuals engaged in the joint practice of 
some activity in communities and networks of practice gain the deeper 
architectural knowledge that eases the transmission of component knowledge, 
especially when it is highly tacit. Therefore, when members of co-located 
communities of practice engage in common practices, interactions, and mutual 
involvement in activities in local networks of practice, they gain the ability to 
acquire experiential and vicarious learning through formal and informal inter-
firm networking (Grandori, 2001). This makes it possible to exchange stocks 
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and flows of more or less tacit component knowledge among nearby 
communities of practice (Tallman et al., 2004). This is because, it is posited in 
this perspective, nearby communities work on similar issues and are 
composed of similar individuals who have similar training and objectives and 
share professional norms (that is, share common architectural knowledge) 
(Faulconbridge, 2008). Thus, they will have high absorptive capacities for 
component knowledge coming from each other and knowledge will flow easily 
across a network of practice (Tallman et al., 2004). Physical proximity offers 
the added benefits of shared local norms, language, and culture, as well as 
national norms and culture (Ouchi, 1980). Likewise, the movement of 
knowledgeable individuals from firm to firm, a largely local phenomenon 
(Almeida & Kogut, 1997), builds social networks and leads to knowledge 
spillovers (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003) that offer value within relevant 
communities. 
This perspective strongly emphasizes that communities and networks 
of practice are local. This is posited to be because of the importance of rich, 
face-to-face communication to transmit tacit knowledge (Pedersen, Petersen, 
& Sharma, 2003). Thus, distance—whether geographical, institutional, or 
cultural—will make knowledge transmission more uncertain (Kogut, 2007; 
Szulanski, Jensen, & Lee, 2003). This is held to be largely because the different 
architectures of knowledge developed in distant communities and networks 
reduce absorptive capacity for component knowledge across both geographic 
and practice boundaries (Tallman et al., 2004). This relates to the assumption 
that communities and networks of practice create shared cultures and group 
identities, and that the local communities and networks of practice are 
strengthened by shared cultural and institutional ties at a higher level (Bell & 
Zaheer, 2007). 
This perspective to information acquisition in international business 
implies that a small company should participate in various local networks of 
practice around the world. It would need to become involved, over time, in the 
mutual activities of these physically co-located networks of practice in order to 
learn the architectural knowledge, which would enable the acquisition and 
absorption of component knowledge. However, as networks of practice are 
said to be closely tied to specific geographic locations, with communication 
breaking down over even short distances, this would mean that a company 
wishing to acquire a diversity of information would need to be present in 
several locales around the world at once. Moreover, it is stressed in this 
perspective that learning of the architectural knowledge necessary to acquire 
and absorb component knowledge takes place in active participation in mutual 
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practices of the network over time, which would seem to require substantial 
resources on the part of a company looking to acquire information in several 
locales internationally. It is unclear how a small company could stretch its 
meager resources to participate actively in practices in multiple localities 
around the world, or whether it would be limited to information available only 
in one or two locales. Therefore, this perspective leaves open the question of 
how a small firm in international business can acquire information from 
around the world. 
2.4.5 Conclusion 
The theoretical perspectives on information acquisition in international 
business studies all offer valuable insights. However, they have been developed 
primarily to explain information acquisition (or, rather often, simply internal 
information transmission) by large multinational corporations. This limits the 
applicability of these theories to small firms operating in the international 
marketplace. The exclusive focus on large multinational corporations is 
particularly evident in the first and third perspectives, those of information 
transactions and tacit knowledge transmission, which quite explicitly argue for 
the superiority of large multinational corporations as international 
information transmission vehicles. The rationales provided for this argument 
differ between the two perspectives, with opportunism, cheating, and free 
riding emphasized in the information transactions perspective and the 
importance of community and shared codes emphasized in the tacit knowledge 
transmission perspective. Nonetheless, the core argument is the same in the 
two perspectives: the multinational corporation as an organizational form is 
advantaged when it comes to international transmission of information. 
Neither of these perspectives explicitly addresses acquisition of information 
from external sources in the international marketplace. Therefore, these 
perspectives leave unanswered the question of how a small firm can acquire 
information in international business. Particularly, as a small firm must rely 
extensively on external information acquisition, the implicit conclusion that 
can be drawn from these perspectives is that the small firm is severely 
disadvantaged, as it is vulnerable to cheating, opportunism, free riding, and 
has trouble transmitting tacit knowledge as it lacks a sizeable international 
community. Even if this conclusion is not drawn, these perspectives shed very 
little light on information acquisition by a small firm in international business, 
although the network argument appended to the information transactions 
perspective may be a move in this direction. 
 67 
 
Even when the argument of the advantage of large firm size is not made 
explicitly, the described mechanisms for information acquisition appear to 
require sizeable corporate resources. This can be seen in the second and fourth 
perspectives, those of experiential learning and social learning. In the 
experiential learning perspective, information acquisition is argued to take 
place by a firm establishing own operations abroad and/or by establishing 
close, committed relationships with network partners in foreign countries, 
both processes that require substantial resources. It is unclear how a small 
firm, which is unlikely to have the resources required to establish own 
operations in multiple countries or to foster and maintain multiple close, 
committed business network relationships, can acquire information in the 
international marketplace. The implicit conclusion that can be drawn from this 
perspective is that a small firm is restricted to acquiring information only from 
those few markets and business network relationships that it has had the 
resources to enter. In the social learning perspective, information acquisition 
is described as taking place through active participation over time in networks 
of practice in multiple locales around the world, which also demands sizeable 
resources on the part of the firm. Like the experiential learning perspective, 
this perspective also seems to indicate that a small firm is restricted to 
acquiring information only from those few locales in which it has the resources 
to be present and active. Therefore, these perspectives leave open the question 
of how a small firm, with very limited resources, is able to acquire information 
simultaneously from several markets around the world as it cannot have own 
operations, close network relationships, or active participation in local 
networks of practice in more than a few markets. 
In sum, because the theoretical perspectives in international business 
studies that can be used to examine information acquisition have been 
constructed with rather large firms in mind, they are not readily applicable to 
small firms. These perspectives either emphasize the benefits of large firm size 
or, at least implicitly, call for substantial corporate resources. As a small firm 
possesses neither, it remains unclear how a small firm can acquire information 
simultaneously from multiple markets around the world. Yet, to create and 
commercialize innovations, small firms need to be able to acquire information 
from several international markets. This information acquisition is unlikely to 
consist of simple and straightforward processes, as small firms rely on this 
information acquisition for their core innovative competitive advantages. It 
may be that theory construction on information acquisition in international 
business by small firms has been slowed down by the challenging nature of 
gathering data in small firms. Overstretched managers in small firms may be 
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averse to giving time to matters not centrally related to the firm's interests and 
may be reluctant to answer questions on sensitive matters relating to 
innovation to an outsider. Nonetheless, the importance of small firms has been 
recognized already in international business studies, as well as the criticality of 
information acquisition in their operations. It is imperative that research now 
begin uncovering the ways and means of information acquisition by small 
firms in international business. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the methodology used in the empirical study conducted 
to answer the research question of “How does a small firm acquire 
information for innovation in international business?” It starts by describing 
the chosen research site where the empirical study was conducted and by 
clarifying the justification for this choice as well as means of accessing this 
research site. It then explicates the data collection for the study, reviewing 
both the methods used and their implementation. Finally, the data analysis 
carried out for the study is described, again reviewing both the methods used 
and their implementation. As such, this chapter forms the basis for the 
following chapter, in which the results from the empirical study are presented. 
3.1 RESEARCH SITE                                                
3.1.1 Research Site Description 
The empirical research for the study was conducted at the research site of a 
dedicated biotechnology firm in Finland, referred to in this study by the 
pseudonym “FinnBiotech” because of the company’s wish to remain 
anonymous. FinnBiotech is a Finnish privately-owned dedicated 
biotechnology firm with 40 employees that develops, manufactures, and 
markets rapid immunodiagnostic tests for use in human and animal 
healthcare as well as food hygiene. It is located in the metropolitan region of 
Finland’s capital city Helsinki, which is home to most of Finland’s 
biotechnology activity. FinnBiotech was founded in 1986 by three 
entrepreneurs who brought with them expertise from academia, business, and 
entrepreneurship: all three of the founders held PhDs in areas related to 
human and animal health and had previously collaborated in founding other 
entrepreneurial ventures in areas related to human and animal health.37 The 
founder who assumed the position of FinnBiotech’s Managing Director also 
came with experience in business beyond entrepreneurship, having held the 
                                                        
37 The founders as well as all other individuals will remain unnamed here 
because of their own wishes to remain anonymous in order to maintain a degree of 
confidentiality concerning their business activities. 
 70 
 
position of R&D Manager at Finland’s only large diagnostics company 
immediately prior to founding FinnBiotech.  
FinnBiotech develops, manufactures, and markets rapid 
immunodiagnostic tests for cardiac, fertility, gastroenterology and infectious 
disease biomarkers mostly for use in human healthcare, but also in animal 
healthcare and food hygiene. Rapid immunodiagnostic tests are low-cost, 
simple to operate and read, sensitive, specific, stable at high temperatures, and 
work in short periods of time. They are a type of point-of-care diagnostic, 
meaning that these tests are intended to provide diagnostic results 
conveniently and immediately to the patient while still at the health facility, 
screening site, or other health care provider. Indeed, rapid tests can be used in 
a variety of settings, from primary care clinics and emergency rooms to 
doctors’ offices and patients’ homes. While the majority of tests are still 
performed in highly automated and advanced hospital laboratories, point-of-
care rapid tests are becoming increasingly critical in healthcare systems of 
both developed and developing countries. This is because they reduce 
dependence on central laboratories, which in turn helps to improve patients’ 
quality of life and alleviates some of the major problems facing healthcare 
systems in both developed and developing economies. 
Immunochromatographic tests, such as those developed, manufactured, and 
marketed by FinnBiotech, are particularly well suited for use in a variety of 
settings outside of central laboratories because they are the simplest type of 
rapid diagnostic test. They require only minimal familiarity with the test and 
no equipment to perform, since all of the reactants and detectors are included 
in the test strip. The simplicity and ease-of-use of these tests allows them to be 
used at home or by minimally trained healthcare workers.  
Point-of-care testing and patient self-testing have significant 
advantages for both patients’ quality of life and the healthcare system at large. 
Receiving diagnosis at the point of care reduces the need for multiple visits to 
receive diagnostic results, thus improving the specificity of diagnosis and the 
chances the patient will receive treatment, reducing dependence on 
presumptive treatment, and reducing the risk that the patient will get sicker 
before a correct diagnosis is made. Correct early diagnosis results in a more 
efficient cycle of treatment for the patient and a more efficient healthcare 
system in general, benefiting the individual and society as a whole. Early 
diagnosis, in particular, can ensure that the patient begins either immediate 
medical treatment or necessary lifestyle/dietary adjustments, in many cases 
before physical symptoms of illness begin to manifest themselves, thus 
avoiding unnecessary pain and suffering. Examples of illnesses in which early 
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diagnosis is crucial for patient recovery are numerous, including various forms 
of cancer where treatment can be pinpointed accurately through diagnostics to 
guarantee the best possible healthcare result. The benefits of rapid tests also 
extend to long-term illnesses and chronic conditions. Rapid tests can be 
utilized regularly to monitor the patient’s medical state and to adapt treatment 
as necessary in a timely and safe manner. This precise monitoring enables 
patients and their medical practitioners to make well-informed decisions that 
will help save precious resources for healthcare systems and expand a patient’s 
lifespan and quality of life. Rapid tests are utilized also in the field of public 
health, where general screenings work to maximize diagnoses and designate 
appropriate treatment where necessary. 
Apart from the enormous contribution to patients’ quality of life and 
improved cycle of treatment, rapid tests also provide many economic benefits 
to national healthcare systems. In developed economies such as the United 
States and Europe, the ability of rapid immunodiagnostic tests to provide 
diagnostic results conveniently and immediately to the patient while still at the 
health facility, screening site, or other healthcare provider can help contain 
escalating healthcare costs (Carlson, 2009). Allowing earlier and more 
appropriate treatments shortens the length of hospital stays, rules out 
expensive treatments, and reduces costs for the treatment of complications. 
Rapid diagnostic tests also reduce the need for multiple visits to receive 
diagnostic results, which is a major benefit especially for patients in poor 
condition, and saves healthcare staff’s time. 
In developing economies, rapid tests can alleviate the shortcomings of 
healthcare systems where large portions of the population have, at best, access 
to poorly-resourced healthcare facilities with almost no supporting clinical 
laboratory infrastructure (Yager, Domingo, & Gerdes, 2008). Rapid tests are 
particularly important in low-resource settings, where harsh environmental 
conditions combined with limited access to electricity and refrigeration 
preclude the use of sensitive equipment, technology, and equipment required 
for more complicated laboratory tests, and many patients cannot travel easily 
to the clinic to follow up on results that take a long time. Moreover, because 
rapid tests can be used by minimally trained healthcare personnel, such as 
community health workers, they can be used to provide diagnosis even when 
highly trained medical personnel are lacking. Indeed, fueled by government 
health insurance initiatives and extension of healthcare infrastructure to rural 
communities, countries like Brazil, Russia, India, and China are experiencing 
high growth rates for rapid diagnostic tests (Rosen, 2011). 
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FinnBiotech develops and manufactures rapid immunodiagnostic tests 
at its facilities in Helsinki’s neighboring town of Vantaa, close to Finland’s 
largest international airport. At this facility, the company’s employees conduct 
R&D in order to develop both new generations of existing tests and entirely 
new tests, adapt them for mass production, and carry out this mass 
production. Additionally, the company’s management, administration, legal 
department, and marketing department are housed in this building. However, 
the overwhelming majority of the 40 people who work there are involved in 
production. This location is highly convenient, because FinnBiotech exports 
over 93% of its production as airfreight to customers in over 50 countries. 
FinnBiotech’s customers are specialized diagnostic and pharmaceutical 
companies worldwide as well as distributors serving these companies, 
meaning that FinnBiotech operates in the business-to-business market. End 
customers—hospitals, doctors’ offices, pharmacies—purchase FinnBiotech’s 
products from intermediaries, often under a brand other than FinnBiotech, 
with FinnBiotech acting in these cases in the role of a sub-contractor/OEM. 
FinnBiotech’s largest markets are Europe, Asia, Middle East, and Africa, with 
South American demand fluctuating and the North American market difficult 
to break into fully because of regulatory issues. In addition to production in 
Finland, FinnBiotech has strengthened its production capabilities by building 
a factory in South Korea in a joint venture in 2000–2001 and by entering a 
joint venture with an Indian medical technology manufacturer in 2012 to build 
a factory in India. These moves have helped it to meet better the needs of 
customers around the world as well as respond to growing demand. 
FinnBiotech also diversified its production in 2008, when it acquired the 
operations of an ELISA test kit manufacturer located in Finland (albeit owned 
by a multinational corporation based in the United States), and merged them 
with its existing operations in Vantaa. 
FinnBiotech remains privately owned by its founders. It has financed 
its operations primarily with bank loans and revenue income. This has been 
possible because FinnBiotech started out with a product that could be 
commercialized quickly to generate profit, which could be reinvested into the 
company. Since FinnBiotech’s business began flourishing, several venture 
capitalists both from Finland and abroad have been interested in investing in 
the company, but the founders have not wanted to give up ownership because 
they have wanted to maintain control of their company. This financing model 
has meant that FinnBiotech’s growth has been somewhat modest, reflecting its 
management philosophy of proceeding in a careful and controlled manner. 
However, with this management philosophy, FinnBiotech has managed to stay 
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alive and profitable for well over two decades, a feat that a significant portion 
of Finnish dedicated biotechnology companies have failed to accomplish. 
FinnBiotech, together with its acquired ELISA test kit operations, has been 
generating annual revenue of about €7 million for the past years, with healthy 
profit margins of around 20%. This can be considered an impressive 
accomplishment in the Finnish biotechnology sector, where a large number of 
biotechnology companies continue to be loss-making operations dependent on 
government support, having been unable to create profitable business from 
their R&D activities.   
3.1.2 Choosing and Accessing the Research Site 
Two characteristics of FinnBiotech formed the main decision criteria for 
choosing it as a research site for the study: its high experience levels of having 
been operational for over two decades and the fact that it has accomplished the 
rather rare feat of being profitable for nearly all of that time. Both of these 
facts are quite unique in the Finnish biotechnology sector, where most firms 
were only founded in the 1990s and have yet to attain profitability, and it is not 
known if they ever will reach profitability and become viable business 
ventures. Most of these firms are still in the stage of conducting R&D, with no 
products in the market. Therefore, since the objective in this study was to 
examine processes underlying innovations, not inventions, it was necessary to 
find a research site that had been able to turn inventions into innovations. 
Moreover, a desirable research site was one where homogeneity of 
context could be controlled by conducting the study within a single research 
site. Controlling the context makes it easier to draw reasonable conclusions as 
the multitude of alternative explanations is minimized (Van de Ven & Poole, 
2002). However, at the same time, it was highly desirable to be able to include 
variation in the data by examining processes underlying both successful and 
less successful innovation outcomes. This research design could be realized at 
FinnBiotech because its high experience levels made it possible to locate a 
richness of data within a single research site that allowed the study and 
comparison of both successful and less successful innovation outcomes while 
controlling the context. In short, FinnBiotech’s success and history made it a 
fertile ground from which to draw a heterogeneous sample that allowed 
comparison while maintaining the context sufficiently homogeneous to keep 
the multitude of alternative explanations at an acceptable level. Additionally, 
FinnBiotech’s small size meant that its internal information processes could be 
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assumed to be relatively simple. This permitted focusing on external 
information acquisition. 
Accessing this site was not entirely unproblematic, as the study 
proposed to examine processes that were close to the core of the business and 
therefore something that most businesses in this sector wished to keep secret. 
It is for this reason that the company is referred to in this study by a 
pseudonym and no individual names are revealed, as this could provide the 
company at least some confidentiality. Access to the site was negotiated 
through social networks, as FinnBiotech’s Managing Director was a close 
family friend of the author of this study. Indeed, it is uncertain whether there 
would have been awareness of FinnBiotech had it not been for this connection 
because FinnBiotech is a rather media-shy company known only to industry 
insiders. As it is privately owned, it is not required to publicize much about its 
operations, and as its owners have little interest in appearing in the financial 
media, it may be considered something of a hidden gem. Therefore, informal 
information networks were very valuable for this research, having raised 
awareness of FinnBiotech’s existence and making it possible to negotiate 
access to this research site in order to conduct the study. 
3.2 DATA COLLECTION 
3.2.1 Interviewees 
Data collection at FinnBiotech focused on the individuals of the management 
team. This choice was motivated by initial research at FinnBiotech, which 
made it clear that because of the company’s small size, its knowledge 
management activities were informal. There is no formal organization or 
system for knowledge management. This is because the company only employs 
40 employees, all of them at the same physical facility in Vantaa, and with the 
overwhelming majority of them involved in production. While this work 
undoubtedly involves knowledge, these individuals do not cross organizational 
boundaries in their work activities or deal with external knowledge, which was 
the focus in this study. Indeed, it turned out in the initial research that 
boundary-crossing activities involving external knowledge are quite 
completely concentrated on the individuals of the management team. The 
choice to focus on the individuals of the management team, which was 
motivated first by initial empirical data, was supported also by theoretical 
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arguments. It has been posited that the management team is the main 
interface between the firm and its environment (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & 
Mooney, 2005). The individuals in the management team are important 
“boundary spanners” (Tushman, 1977; Tushman & Katz, 1980; Tushman & 
Scanlan, 1981) who play a critical role in the knowledge processes between the 
organization and its environment (Child & Heavens, 2001).  
The management team at FinnBiotech comprised six individuals at the 
time of the study. The Managing Director was one of the three initial founders, 
having been active in the company throughout its existence. He was the main 
contact of the firm to the outside world and had overall responsibility within 
the organization. The other five management team members had joined the 
company after its founding, with tenures ranging from 24 and 23 years on the 
longer end to 15 and 13 years on the shorter end. Thus, the management team 
members had all been with the company for relatively long career spans. The 
management team members were all Finnish, with educational backgrounds 
predominantly in fields related to the life sciences. There was, however, some 
diversity in educational backgrounds, as they included veterinary medicine, 
molecular biology, agricultural and forestry marketing, and biochemistry. Four 
of the management team members were male and two female. While the 
Managing Director had overall responsibility and was quite involved in all 
areas of management team work, the other five management team members 
had specific areas of responsibility, these being R&D, export marketing, 
quality, production, and production technology. The titles of the management 
team members were thus: (1) Managing Director (male, PhD in veterinary 
medicine), (2) R&D Manager (male, M.Sc. in molecular biology); (3) Export 
Manager (male, M.Sc. in agricultural and forestry marketing), (4) Quality 
Manager (female, M.Sc. in biochemistry), (5) Production Manager (female, 
M.Sc. in biochemistry), and (6) Technical Manager (male, M.Sc. in machine 
engineering).  
The management team was co-located at the facility in Vantaa and 
closely worked together, and appeared to share information very actively and 
openly with each other both formally and informally. Therefore, in this 
particular small company setting, knowledge activities by individuals could be 
seen to be largely synonymous with knowledge activities by the firm, making it 
possible to focus on the concrete activities of individuals when examining 
external information acquisition for innovation. Enforcing this could be seen 
to be the role and personality of the Managing Director, who as a company 
founder had been involved in all company activities throughout the company’s 
lifespan and continued to involve himself in all of the management team 
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activities. He could be seen as a force binding together the knowledge activities 
of the rest of the management team individuals, making sure that all 
information was shared among all the management team individuals and thus 
distributed to the rest of the company. Additionally, the management team 
members all had long tenures in the company and seemed to have a genuine 
commitment to both the company and the Managing Director, which could be 
assumed to further support information sharing within the company as the 
individuals had little incentive to hoard information. Thus, as the company 
was small and all employees were located in the same building, interaction 
between all of the management team members was frequent, both formally 
and informally. Hence, due to the size of the organization, there were no 
noteworthy internal boundaries, but rather the organization’s boundary with 
its environment was the most pronounced one. FinnBiotech’s small size thus 
enhanced its suitability as an excellent research site for this study, as the 
relative lack of rigid internal organizational boundaries put information 
activities crossing the external organizational boundary into focus. 
3.2.2 Interview Method 
Interviews were determined to be the best method of data collection as they 
made it possible to access accounts of knowledge processes from the actors’ 
points of view. As Flick (2006) notes, when examining reflexive actions such as 
those involving knowledge, it is essential to view them from the individuals’ 
subjective viewpoints as these provide the bases for action. This approach to 
data collection was also in line with grounded theory methodology, which 
tends to be best suited to micro-level analysis where the aim is to understand 
actors’ subjective and intersubjective views. The specific interview method 
used was that of episodic interviewing, a variety of the semi-structured 
interview method developed by Flick (1997, 2000), which seeks to exploit the 
advantages of both the semi-structured and narrative interview types. It does 
this by including in the research question guide both questions that query 
semantic knowledge that is more abstract, generalized, and decontextualized 
from specific situations, and narrative-episodic knowledge that is linked to 
concrete circumstances (time, space, persons, events, situations). Gathering 
both generalized knowledge and narratives appeared to be the most productive 
approach because this was largely in line with how the interviewees recounted 
their views and experiences. Indeed, they provided narratives as examples to 
illustrate and clarify general statements unprompted in the early interviews, 
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which led to the decision to query the interviewees for more narratives as these 
appeared to illuminate powerfully the dynamics under study. 
Although collecting narratives is considered a technique that is 
sensitive and responsive to the interviewees’ viewpoints, invitations for 
narratives also require interviewer input. Narrative interviewing involves the 
paradox of the researcher giving up control while being well prepared to ask 
good questions that will invite the other’s stories. Thus, while questions are 
open-ended and the narratives listened to with “a minimum of interruptions,” 
a “generative narrative question” is needed to stimulate narratives (Flick, 1997, 
2000). This generative narrative question needs to be formulated broadly but 
at the same time sufficiently specifically for the interesting experiential 
domain to be taken up as a central theme. Thus, while it is crucial for the 
quality of the data that the narrative is not interrupted or obstructed by the 
interviewer, the generative narrative question needs to provide the narrator 
with sufficient material and prompts to focus the narrative on the topical area 
with which the interview is concerned. The generative narrative questions as 
well as questions used to query semantic knowledge are presented next. 
3.2.3 Interview Rounds and Themes 
All six members of the management team were interviewed multiple times in 
order to collect the full richness of data that could be gathered at this research 
site. Moreover, carrying out the interviews in a sequential manner made it 
possible to make full use of grounded theory methodology principles of 
constant comparison and theoretical sampling. Hence, it was possible to 
conduct data gathering “in a self-correcting, analytic, expanding process 
(where) early leads shape data collection (to) form a stronger basis for creating 
a nuanced understanding of social processes” (Charmaz 2001: 682). 
Interviews were conducted in four interview rounds, with slightly different 
interview themes focused upon in each round. 
The interviewees were sent an e-mail prior to each interview that 
outlined the main goals of the research and the specific interview themes that 
were to be focused upon. The communications sent to interviewees prior to the 
interviews, and repeated at the beginning of each interview, will be described 
in conjunction with the description of each interview round. All interviewees 
were Finnish and the interviews were conducted face-to-face by the author of 
this study in Finnish at FinnBiotech’s facilities in Vantaa. All of the interviews 
were recorded with the permission of the interviewees and the recorded 
interviews transcribed in Finnish. Additional notes were taken by hand during 
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the interviews and used to supplement the transcriptions. The transcriptions 
were sent to the interviewees for checking after the interviews and any 
questions that arose as a result of this were either dealt with immediately or 
addressed in the subsequent interviews. 
The four interview rounds are described next, detailing who was 
interviewed and what the interview themes in each round were. The first three 
interview rounds took place during the years 2005–2007 while the fourth took 
place in 2011. Therefore, the data collection benefited from a real-time 
longitudinal design in addition to collecting data on FinnBiotech’s history 
prior to 2005. 
First Interview Round Themes and Questions 
The first interview round consisted of four interviews with the Managing 
Director that lasted between three and four hours. This was necessary because 
not only was the Managing Director the person who made it possible to gain 
access to FinnBiotech but also the person with the most knowledge about 
FinnBiotech’s activities. The Managing Director had been one of the original 
founders,38 had led FinnBiotech throughout its entire history, and was 
involved in all of the activities carried out by the management team members. 
Therefore, the Managing Director was the only person capable of providing the 
necessary information on the historical development and overall functioning 
of FinnBiotech’s activities. Gathering this data by way of interviewing the 
Managing Director was also necessary because extremely little information on 
FinnBiotech’s general business activities existed in documented form. This was 
because as a private company, FinnBiotech had not needed to report publicly 
more than the minimum on its activities, and as a media-shy company, its 
activities had not been previously documented by management studies 
researchers or financial journalists. Certainly, in the areas where FinnBiotech 
needed to have documentation, especially in the areas of products and their 
safety, the company had extensive and careful documentation. However, this 
was very product-specific and mostly involved the use and handling of 
biological and chemical components in the products, which was not the topic 
of this particular study. 
 Therefore, because of the lack of general business activity 
documentation and the Managing Director’s high levels of experience and 
knowledge, it turned out to be necessary to conduct four full interviews at this 
                                                        
38 The two other founders were not interviewed because one of them had 
unfortunately passed away prior to beginning this study, and the other had not been 
involved in FinnBiotech’s activities for a long time. 
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beginning phase in order to document all of the relevant data at this point. 
Prior to the interviews with the Managing Director, he was sent an e-mail 
describing the goal of the research, this being to gain an understanding of 
information acquisition activities leading to innovation at FinnBiotech. It was 
furthermore specified that all information acquisition activities of importance 
to innovation outcomes were of interest in the study, and that innovation 
outcomes were not considered to be only new products but also new processes, 
new ways of organizing, and expansion to new markets. It was noted that at 
this stage in the study, the interview would focus on four main themes, these 
being importance of information in innovation activities, the sources of 
information, means of acquiring information, and challenges involved in 
acquiring information. However, it was stressed that these were very general, 
open-ended themes at this stage because it was the goal of the interviews to 
gain as much data as possible from the point-of-view of the Managing 
Director, so that restricting the interview to narrow questions may have 
missed important points. In this way, these four interviews fulfilled the role of 
beginning to answer the basic grounded theory question upon entering the 
field of “What is happening here?” (Charmaz, 2001) while respecting the 
grounded theory philosophy of allowing issues to emerge from the data instead 
of narrowly focusing on pre-decided topics. 
The first interview was very general, but provided a wealth of data. In 
fact, the wealth of data was so overwhelming that it was necessary to conduct a 
second interview on the same topics, delving deeper into those that appeared 
interesting, and clarifying and confirming many of the issues that had come up 
in the first interview. However, after the first two interviews, it was possible to 
focus the interview questions a bit more. Therefore, after the first two 
interviews, the following questions focused on the Managing Director’s work 
tasks rather than the company overall, although it was still stressed that these 
were in the form of open-ended themes and should not unduly restrict the 
interview. These themes were: 
1) Please describe your educational and professional 
background, both before joining FinnBiotech and at 
FinnBiotech.  
2) Please describe your work tasks at FinnBiotech. 
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3) Please describe what information39 you need and use in your 
work tasks at FinnBiotech, specifically focusing on external 
information. 
4) Please describe where and how you obtain the information 
you need in your work tasks at FinnBiotech, specifically 
focusing on external information. 
5) Please describe what challenges are related to obtaining and 
using information you need in your work tasks at 
FinnBiotech, specifically focusing on external information. 
Again, the Managing Director was able to provide such a wealth of data that 
two interviews were deemed necessary in order to cover the material in 
necessary depth. The two interviews conducted using these interview themes 
followed largely the same pattern as the very first two interviews, where the 
second interview was used to delve deeper into interesting topics as well as to 
clarify and confirm issues that had been left unclear. The interviews with the 
Managing Director provided an initial understanding of the company, its 
operations, and its information acquisition dynamics. They also served to 
legitimize the research and to open up the possibility of interviewing the rest of 
the management team with the Managing Director’s permission. 
Second Interview Round Themes and Questions 
The second interview round took place with the other five members of the 
management team.  Each of the management team members was interviewed 
three times during this round. The follow-up interviews were necessary in 
order to delve deeper into interesting and unclear topics that had come up in 
the first interviews as well as making sure that the interviewees had been able 
to express their thoughts and sentiments in the way they wished. The 
interviews lasted between one to four hours. 
The management team members were all sent an e-mail describing the 
goal of the research, this being to gain an understanding of information 
acquisition activities leading to innovation at FinnBiotech. It was furthermore 
specified that all information acquisition activities of importance to innovation 
outcomes were of interest in the study, and that innovation outcomes were not 
considered to be only new products, but also new processes, new ways of 
organizing, and expansion to new markets. It was also mentioned in the e-mail 
                                                        
39 It should be noted that the interviews were conducted in Finnish, in which 
there is only a single word ("tieto") that denotes both "information" and "knowledge" 
so no distinction between the two was made in the interviews. 
 81 
 
that the study had been approved by the Managing Director. The same semi-
structured interview guide was used as had been used in the last two 
interviews with the Managing Director, this having the following themes:  
1) Please describe your educational and professional 
background, both before joining FinnBiotech and at 
FinnBiotech.  
2) Please describe your work tasks at FinnBiotech. 
3) Please describe what information you need and use in your 
work tasks at FinnBiotech, specifically focusing on external 
information. 
4) Please describe where and how you obtain the information 
you need in your work tasks at FinnBiotech, specifically 
focusing on external information. 
5) Please describe what challenges are related to obtaining and 
using the information you need in your work tasks at 
FinnBiotech, specifically focusing on external information. 
However, it was also stressed both in the e-mail and at the beginning of the 
interview that the interviewees were encouraged to bring up any material that 
they deemed to relate to the topic of information acquisition for innovation 
even if interview themes did not seem to directly address this material.  
The fact that the interviews were set up with the backing of the 
Managing Director may have affected the content of the interviews, both in 
positive and negative ways. Positive effects may have been the greater 
willingness of the interviewees to be interviewed, to allocate ample time to the 
interviews, and to be keen to provide plenty of good interview material. 
Negative effects may have been that interviewees may have held themselves 
back from fully discussing problematic issues although all of the interviewees 
were assured of total confidentiality. Some hesitation in discussing 
problematic issues could be detected in some of the interviews, but the 
interviewees did choose to discuss these issues nevertheless, although in 
probably more diplomatic language. In general, an atmosphere featuring high 
levels of trust could be perceived among the management team members, even 
with regard to the Managing Director, as the management team members all 
had long tenures with the company and spoke of the Managing Director as 
acting over the years as an equal with the company employees. Hence, it could 
be assumed that the fact that the interview contacts with the management 
team members came through the Managing Director did not unduly inhibit the 
interviewees in providing data for the study. All in all, the interviews provided 
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a wealth of material that was openly contributed and rich with opinions, 
arguments, and stories. 
Third Interview Round Themes and Questions 
In the third interview round, all six management team members were 
interviewed. Each of the management team members was interviewed three 
times during this round, with the exception of the R&D Manager who was 
interviewed four times because he was able to contribute so much rich and 
complicated material that needed to be clarified over several interviews. The 
interviews lasted between one to four hours. 
In this interview round, emphasis shifted to narratives. This was 
because during the first and second interview rounds, the interviewees had 
already recounted some narratives spontaneously in order to illustrate their 
points. These narratives appeared so interesting that in the third interview 
round more and richer narratives were explicitly invited. Specifically, the 
interviewees were invited to present narratives of events that they judged to 
have been significant in terms of information acquisition and innovation 
outcomes. Continuing with the focus on concrete work tasks by the individuals 
interviewed, narratives that were invited were narratives of personal 
experience, defined as “report(s) of sequence(s) of events that have entered 
into the biography of the speaker by a sequence of clauses that correspond to 
the order of the original events” (Labov, 1997: 397). In such narratives, a teller 
takes a listener into a past time or “world” and recapitulates what happened 
then to make a point. Personal narratives may be considered, especially in a 
context such as that under study here, to be particularly valuable because such 
narratives involve a personal theory of causality (Labov, 1997: 402). This is 
because a personal narrative is a report of a sequence of events, involving the 
narrator assigning “blame and praise to the actors for the actions involved” 
(Labov, 1997: 403). It can thus be considered the narrator’s personal theory of 
what happened and why, involving an evaluation of the events that compares 
them with events in an alternative reality that was not in fact realized. 
Gathering these kinds of narratives was seen to be particularly 
productive in these interviews because it appeared that it was largely the way 
the management team members organized their experiences and drew more 
general conclusions from them. Moreover, since the focus in the study was 
information activities, which involve high levels of personal subjectivity, it was 
deemed particularly fruitful to gain understanding of events that could include 
such subjectivity. Therefore, in contacting the six management team members 
by e-mail for this round of interviews, they were asked to think about events in 
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which information acquisition had been particularly important in leading to 
innovation outcomes. Moreover, they were asked to recount at least one event 
in which they considered the innovation outcome to have been successful and 
at least one in which they considered the innovation outcome to have been less 
successful. To help prompt narratives, and especially their specifics, the idea of 
social networks and personal connections being important to information 
acquisition for innovation in modern biotechnology was adopted from existing 
literature, and specific questions were asked about the persons involved in 
each event. Therefore, the questions that were communicated to the interviews 
in an e-mail and re-iterated at the beginning of each interview were as follows:  
1) Could you please describe an event(s) in which external 
information has been important and the outcome of work 
tasks (such as development of a new product version etc.) has 
been successful? 
2) Could you describe 3-5 individuals who were important in 
this event? 
3) What (what kinds of) information did they have that was 
important? 
4) What kinds of work roles were they in? 
5) What was their educational/professional background? 
6) What country were they in? 
7) How would you describe your relationships to these 
individuals (e.g. current or former colleague, employee at a 
customer company, individual met at an industry fair, etc.)? 
8) Why were you in contact with these individuals? 
9) Where did you know these individuals from? 
10) How frequently were you in touch with these individuals? 
However, it was also important to collect data on events in which the 
innovation outcome had not been successful in order to provide material for 
comparison. Therefore, interviewees were also asked to recount narratives in 
which the innovation outcome had been less successful. Hence, the same 
questions were asked, but of events in which the outcome had been less 
successful: 
1) Could you please describe an event(s) in which external 
information has been important and the outcome of work 
tasks has been less successful?  
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2) Could you describe 3-5 individuals who were important in 
this event? 
3) What (what kinds of) information did they have that was 
important? 
4) What kinds of work roles were they in? 
5) What was their educational/professional background? 
6) What country were they in? 
7) How would you describe your relationships to these 
individuals (e.g. current or former colleague, employee at a 
customer company, individual met at an industry fair, etc.)? 
8) Why were you in contact with these individuals? 
9) Where did you know these individuals from? 
10) How frequently were you in touch with these individuals? 
The interviewees were surprisingly willing to recount narratives of both 
successful and less successful outcomes and in many cases provided multiple 
narratives. There was some variation of how clearly they articulated their 
views concerning the reasons for success or lack of it, but altogether, the 
interviews provided several interesting narratives. Most interviewees provided 
more than the two minimum accounts asked for, thus providing abundant 
material. However, most of the narratives were so rich that they needed to be 
delved into further, thus necessitating second and third interviews in this 
round. Each of the management team members was interviewed three times 
during this round in order to delve deeper into interesting and unclear topics 
that had come up in the first interviews, as well as making sure that the 
interviewees had been able to express their thoughts and sentiments in the 
way they wished. The interviews in this round lasted between one to four 
hours.The additional interviews were also necessary in order to clarify and 
confirm many of the points of the narratives. Therefore, all interviews in this 
round focused on the narratives, but while the first interviews focused on the 
interviewees recounting narratives, the second and third interviews focused on 
delving deeper into the already recounted narratives. 
Fourth Interview Round Themes and Questions 
The fourth round of interviews took place with the Managing Director to round 
out the empirical research. This round included two extensive interviews with 
the Managing Director, focused on ascertaining the results derived from the 
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previous interview rounds and on deepening the understanding of the 
conclusions drawn from them. Changes in the world economy as well as 
developments at FinnBiotech had resulted in such a wealth of developments 
that several interviews with the Managing Director were again necessary in 
order to capture all of the relevant data. 
This interview round did not introduce new themes but rather sought 
to enrich the collected material by gaining a longitudinal view to it. This was 
especially important because many of the events recounted in the earlier 
interviews were only fully coming to fruition later on, making it possible to 
judge their success only at this point. Consequently, conducting interviews 
with the Managing Director in 2011, four years after finishing the first three 
interview rounds, made it possible to take advantage of a longitudinal research 
design in real time in addition to collecting data on FinnBiotech’s activities 
prior to the year 2005 when data collection at this research site was first 
started. This made it possible to see how the events on which data had been 
collected between the years 2005 and 2007 had played out in the longer term, 
adding a valuable dimension to the data. 
Summary of Interviews 
The four rounds of interviews resulted in a total of 40 interview with the six 
management team members. As mentioned before, all of these interviews were 
conducted face-to-face at FinnBiotech’s Vantaa facilities by the author of this 
study. The interviewees as well as the author of the study are all Finnish and 
therefore the interviews were all conducted in Finnish. The four interview 
rounds followed the interview guidelines set out for each interview round and 
communicated to the interviewees prior to the interviews. All interviews were 
recorded with the permission of the interviewees and transcribed verbatim in 
Finnish. The transcripts were sent to the interviewees after the interviews by e-
mail so that they could check them for correctness. Data collection was carried 
out until saturation in the grounded theory sense, which is that no new 
categories of data appeared to be arising in the data collection. The following 
table summarizes the interviews conducted, including the interviewees as 
identified by their work roles (rather than by name because of their wish for 
anonymity), topics of the interview, the place and format in which the 
interviews were conducted, the language in which the interviews were 
conducted, and the interviewer. 
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Table 1: The Four Interview Rounds of the Empirical Study 
First Interview Round (2005) 
# Interviewee Topic Place Format Language Interviewer 
1. Managing 
Director 
FinnBiotech’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
2. Managing 
Director 
FinnBiotech’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
3. Managing 
Director 
Managing 
Director’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
4. Managing 
Director 
Managing 
Director’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
Second Interview Round (2005) 
5. R&D 
Manager 
R&D 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
6. R&D 
Manager 
R&D 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
7. R&D 
Manager 
R&D 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
8. Export 
Manager 
Export 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
9. Export 
Manager 
Export 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
10. Export 
Manager 
Export 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
11. Production 
Manager 
Production 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
12. Production 
Manager 
Production 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
13. Production 
Manager 
Production 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
14. Quality 
Manager 
Quality 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
15. Quality 
Manager 
Quality 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
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16. Quality 
Manager 
Quality 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
17. Technical 
Manager 
Technical 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
18. Technical 
Manager 
Technical 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
19. Technical 
Manager 
Technical 
Manager’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
Third Interview Round (2006) 
20. Managing 
Director 
Managing 
Director’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
21. Managing 
Director 
Managing 
Director’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
22. Managing 
Director 
Managing 
Director’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
23. R&D 
Manager 
R&D 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
24. R&D 
Manager 
R&D 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
25. R&D 
Manager 
R&D 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
26. R&D 
Manager 
R&D 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
27. Export 
Manager 
Export 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
28. Export 
Manager 
Export 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
29. Export 
Manager 
Export 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
30. Production 
Manager 
Production 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
31. Production 
Manager 
Production 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
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32. Production 
Manager 
Production 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
33. Quality 
Manager 
Quality 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
34. Quality 
Manager 
Quality 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
35. Quality 
Manager 
Quality 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
36. Technical 
Manager 
Technical 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
37. Technical 
Manager 
Technical 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
38. Technical 
Manager 
Technical 
Manager’s 
narratives 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
Fourth Interview Round (2011) 
39. Managing 
Director 
Update on 
FinnBiotech’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
40. Managing 
Director 
Update on 
FinnBiotech’s 
activities 
FinnBiotech, 
Vantaa 
Face-to-
face 
Finnish Author 
3.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
3.3.1 Coding and Categorizing 
The first step in data analysis was to prepare two further documents from the 
interview transcriptions to function as the basis for further analysis. The first 
of these documents was a version of each interview transcription coded 
according to conceptualization of data, since it is from conceptualization of 
data, not the actual data per se, that conclusions are drawn (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). This analysis was started with the completion of the very first 
interviews and their transcriptions in order to capitalize on the grounded 
theory approach of constantly comparing and contrasting data throughout the 
data collection and analysis process. Therefore, as the interviews were being 
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completed, each interview was subjected to a process of coding using 
developing concepts and categories.  
Concepts are the basic units of analysis in Straussian grounded theory. 
The first round of codes that gradually emerged as fitting the transcripts 
involved the subject areas of information used for innovation. It began 
emerging from the very first interviews that information acquisition activities 
related to different subject areas differed quite substantially from each other 
so that it was impossible to speak of information acquisition activities in 
general. Therefore, the first set of codes applied to the transcripts was as 
follows: (1) information about science; (2) information about products and 
product development; (3) information about production and production 
technology; (4) information about customers and markets; and (5) 
information about quality, regulation, and patenting. When presented with 
this coding scheme in the subsequent interviews, the interviewees confirmed 
that this made sense and further provided evidence of the ways in which the 
different domains differed in their dynamics. Therefore, the data was arranged 
according to these codes. In addition, two other codes emerged that touched 
upon all of the information domains. These were the importance of “right 
information” and the facilitating factors in information acquisition in the 
international marketplace. 
Having arranged the data according to the coding scheme explicated 
above, the next step was to move to the second level of abstraction in grounded 
theory analysis, that of categories. Here the grounded theory coding paradigm 
developed by Strauss and Corbin (1998) proved to be a valuable heuristic aid. 
Hence, the data organized according to the codes of information domains was 
subjected to a review using this heuristic aid, which covers the following: (1) 
conditions/context; (2) strategies and tactics in action; (3) strategies and 
tactics in interaction; and (4) consequences. These items were modified to 
better fit the specific data, giving rise to the following items to be used in 
categorizing data: (1) sources of acquiring information; (2) ways of acquiring 
information; (3) ease of acquiring information; and (4) difficulties and 
challenges experienced in the acquisition of information. By combining these 
items with the previously coded data, it was possible to derive descriptions of 
information processes leading to innovation that captured both the specifics of 
different information domains and the dynamics of each information domain. 
3.3.2 Narrative Analysis 
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The narratives told in the interviews by the interviewees were separated from 
the verbatim interview transcriptions and re-transcribed using Labov’s (Labov, 
1972, 1981, 1997, 2001; Labov & Waletzky, [1967] 1997) event structure of 
narratives. This involves identifying the core narrative and reducing it to a 
skeleton plot using structural categories so that parts of the narrative are 
identified by their function. These parts are (Labov, 1972: 363):` 
1) Abstract: an initial clause in a narrative that reports the 
entire sequence of events of the narrative 
2) Orientation: gives information on the time, place of the 
events of a narrative, the identities of the participants and 
their initial behavior 
3) Complicating action: the clause of complication action that is 
a sequential clause that reports a next event in response to a 
potential question, “and what happened (then)?” 
4) Evaluation: provides evaluation of a narrative event; 
evaluation of a narrative event is information on the 
consequences of the event for human needs and desires 
5) Resolution: the set of complicating actions that follow the 
most reportable event 
6) Coda: a final clause which returns the narrative to the time of 
speaking, precluding a potential question “and what 
happened (then)?” 
As this chain of causal events as described by an interviewee is intimately 
linked with the assignment of praise and blame for the actions reported, it 
allows insights into the interviewee’s perception of the events in terms of 
his/her individual theory of what happened and why. It thus makes it possible 
to analyze the personal narrative as a subjective theory of the causes of the 
“most reportable event” (Labov, 1981, 1997). In this particular study, it made it 
possible to examine the events told by the interviewees that had significantly 
involved external information acquisition and had led to successful and less 
successful innovation outcomes, both from a factual point of view and taking 
into account the interviewees’ own perceptions of why the events had unfolded 
as they did. This was important because activities involving information are 
highly reflexive, and the participants’ own perceptions of events and the 
reasons for their unfolding to result in either successful or less successful 
innovation outcomes formed an important portion of the data. 
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4 RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical study conducted at 
FinnBiotech. Throughout this chapter, the conventional distinction between 
“knowledge” and “information” is retained as presented in the introductory 
chapter: knowledge is acquired information, information that has been found, 
selected and gathered, often from many sources, assembled into packages and 
available for use. However, it is important to point out a translational detail: 
the results presented in this chapter derive from interviews conducted in 
Finnish. In the Finnish language, there is only one term for both “knowledge” 
and “information,” which is “tieto.” Hence, the Finnish language did not allow 
for a linguistic distinction between the two concepts in the interviews. As a 
result, the term “information” is used predominantly throughout this chapter 
as a translation of the Finnish word “tieto” used in the interviews. 
The results are organized following the data analysis methods 
described in the preceding chapter. Therefore, the first part of this chapter is 
organized according to the descriptions of these information domains and 
their dynamics. In addition, important issues that came up spontaneously in 
the interviews about the importance of “right information” and of ability to use 
it, as well as of facilitating factors in information acquisition in the 
international marketplace are explicated. The second part of this chapter 
presents the narratives gathered in the interviews, presented according to the 
Labovian event structure and grouped into narratives of successful innovation 
outcomes and into narratives of less successful innovation outcomes. Not all of 
the narratives gathered in the interviews are presented here, but only those 
that were told in greatest richness and which appeared to have been especially 
significant for FinnBiotech, evidenced by the fact that some of them were told 
by more than one person. Where this happened, the write-up represents a 
merger of the accounts. 
The terms “FinnBiotech” and “management team” or the job titles of 
specific members of the management team are used quite synonymously in 
this description. This is because information acquisition processes are handled 
as taking place at the individual level. When specific individuals 
predominantly handle certain types of information, they are referred to by 
their job titles. When the information acquisition activities involve all of the 
management team members, the term “management team” is used. Finally, 
when the entire operations of FinnBiotech are referred to (for instance, when 
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talking about competitiveness or profitability, which are organization-level 
issues), or the information acquisition activities affecting such operations, the 
term “FinnBiotech” is used. However, the information acquisition activities are 
always at the level of individuals, and no specific attention is paid to how such 
individual-level information is transformed into organizational knowledge 
because FinnBiotech is small enough as an organization that the management 
team members all share information with each other without problems, 
especially as they are located at the same physical facility. Several of the 
management team members stressed that they shared information very openly 
and actively with each other, and with the rest of the company employees.  
As the Production Manager, a 25-year veteran of FinnBiotech, 
described it: 
“Everyone is together in the same facility—product 
development, quality control, production, everything. 
Everyone is working together, so communication of 
information is really good. Nobody sits in his or her room, but 
everyone works together, so that it is easy to share 
information constantly. Even though the facility has two 
floors, people run between the rooms all the time during the 
day, because even though everyone carries a mobile phone, 
communication is best face-to-face.” 
The R&D Manager, a 17-year FinnBiotech veteran, expressed similar 
sentiments, noting: 
“Because the company is so small, sometimes I have to jump 
in to help with any task if somebody is away or if there is a 
time crunch, which means that I have good knowledge of all 
the developments in the company.” 
The Export Manager, a 25-year FinnBiotech veteran, stressed the role 
of the Managing Director in encouraging this egalitarian company culture in 
which everyone, regardless of position, helps out with any task, which has led 
to a strong sense of camaraderie that supports open information sharing: 
“When things get busy, the Managing Director himself jumps 
in to help in production or packaging or whatever needs 
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doing. So it feels easy to communicate with him after I have 
been standing next to him on the production line packaging 
products.” 
The Production Manager also emphasized the close interaction of the 
management team with the rest of the company employees: 
“It is important for the management team to stay very close 
to the ground and to be familiar with all aspects of the 
company’s activities. This comes through interaction and 
communication with everybody.”  
Although none of the interviewees specifically mentioned it, it is also 
likely that the fact that all of the management team members have been with 
the company for so long also facilitates open internal communication. Such 
long tenures could also lead to silos and to keeping information from each 
other because of internal politics that could have developed over the years, but 
this truly did not appear to be the case. It seemed from the interviews, as well 
as from observation of behavior at the company facility, that the company 
culture really was egalitarian and informal, characterized by high levels of 
trust among all of the employees and easy, open interactions. The role of the 
Managing Director appeared to have been central in this, as the other 
management team members had several positive anecdotes to tell about him 
and the way in which he was willing to participate in even the most menial task 
at the company, thus making the employees feel valued and that they could 
trust him. Of course, a few management team members did mention slight 
problems at times in communication resulting from everyone being so busy 
that they sometimes forgot to share a piece of information with the others. 
However, the way these problems were described made them appear as rare, 
isolated instances related to small, rather inconsequential pieces of 
information. Moreover, in nearly every instance described, the information 
was communicated a bit later when it became apparent that the person 
holding that information had forgotten to pass it on to relevant employees. 
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4.1 INFORMATION DOMAINS AND DYNAMICS 
4.1.1 Importance of “Right Information” 
Prior to describing the identified information domains and their dynamics, it 
is essential to present an important theme that emerged in all of the interviews 
and which runs through all of the information domains: the importance of 
“right information.” All of the interviewees emphasized that acquiring 
information per se is not difficult, but acquiring the “right information” is. 
Especially in the current world of digitalized information, there is rarely ever a 
shortage of information. Rather, challenges have shifted to not just acquiring 
information, but to acquiring the “right information” for the issue at hand. 
Indeed, the current onslaught of information may even make this task of 
acquiring the “right information” more difficult, as the interviewees all 
described having challenges shifting through all of the voluminous 
information available to find the wheat from the chaff (or to determine that 
there was no wheat at all to be found in a particular pile of chaff). The 
Managing Director put it aptly already early on in the interviews, but the same 
theme was echoed throughout the interviews with the other management team 
members: 
“There is so much information nowadays and much of it is 
unnecessary. There is certainly no lack of information. 
However, there may be lack of right information. Important 
information is only a small part of all information that is 
available.” 
All of the interviewees described the concept of “right information” in 
much the same terms, as being focused, relevant, reliable, and correct 
information. As the Managing Director described it: 
 “The difficulty with information is to be able to tell good 
information from bad. Reliability makes information 
valuable, and reliability of information comes from being 
able to confirm the information from several sources and 
from being able to see how the information has been 
produced. If information comes from only one source, it 
cannot be relied upon. Incorrect information is dangerous 
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because it can lead to mistakes. For a small firm like us, 
making wrong choices and going down wrong paths because 
of incorrect information can be fatal.” 
Moreover, all of the interviewees described getting from the surplus of 
available information to “right information” as requiring activity. This involved 
actively seeking out necessary information, shifting through all the 
information available to find that which was needed, and then evaluating it for 
reliability, analyzing it, and combining it with other information to draw 
conclusions. Furthermore, although the interviewees did not explicit state so, 
it was possible to identify that this activity also required expertise. As the 
Managing Director put it: 
“What is of primary importance is being able to select what is 
good and worthwhile information. … One needs to be able to 
detect what is relevant and valuable, select amongst 
information, and determine what is reliable. …  Even then, 
information in itself is not valuable. One must gather various 
pieces, assess and evaluate them for reliability and relevance, 
combine and interpret them, and then one can figure things 
out and see the bigger picture.” 
Moreover, information—even if it is “right information” and is 
processed into knowledge—is not valuable if it cannot be used. As 
FinnBiotech’s Managing Director put it:  
“Information in itself is not valuable; it needs to used. This 
presents the challenge of turning spirit into flesh, so to say.” 
4.1.2 Information about Science 
Knowledge about science is the foundation and starting point for 
FinnBiotech’s operations. The company came into being on the basis of 
developments in science: the 1980s were a time of revolution in 
immunodiagnostics, and research carried out on the new techniques in 
Finland provided the starting point for FinnBiotech. Moreover, the 1980s 
revolutionary changes in immunodiagnostics depended on decades of 
scientific work. These include the 1950s development of the radio-
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immunoassay and the 1960s replacement of radioisotopes by enzymes, the 
development of the hybridoma technique in the 1970s, and the advent of 
automated plate reader systems and personal computers to analyze data in the 
1980s. As these several developmental trends converged, it became possible to 
develop entirely new kinds of tests, such as the rapid immunochromatographic 
tests that formed the starting point for FinnBiotech. Hence, science is a sine 
qua non for FinnBiotech, since the firm would not exist without the multiple 
developments in science over several decades. The first-hand experience in 
these developments by the founders of FinnBiotech made it possible for them 
to have the knowledge about these latest developments in science, which in 
turn made it possible for them to see the business opportunity in this field and 
seize it. The founders’ own scientific background also provided the basis for 
generating revenues in the beginning in order to cover high R&D costs, as they 
were able to prepare and sell more basic agglutination tests while developing 
immunochromatographic tests, the production of which they started in 1990, 
four years after FinnBiotech’s founding. 
Beyond having had its start in science, FinnBiotech must continuously 
be able to handle information about science in order to develop new products, 
keep existing products up-to-date, and to be able to manufacture the products 
it develops. The scientific field of immunodiagnostics changes quite rapidly, 
and academic scientists as well as for-profit and non-profit organizations are 
constantly developing new assays with higher sensitivities which will enable 
the discovery of new biomarkers. As a result, products already on the market 
quickly become outdated as they are no longer at the cutting edge of scientific 
development. Consequently, the competitiveness and profitability of such 
products are significantly negatively affected. Therefore, if FinnBiotech is to 
uphold the competitiveness and profitability of its existing products, it must be 
aware of the latest developments in science. This is the only way it can ensure 
that its products are up-to-date and therefore competitive vis-à-vis the 
offerings of competitors. FinnBiotech must also continuously innovate in 
terms of being able to develop new products in order to maintain 
competitiveness and profitability. This is because even when existing tests are 
as up-to-date as possible, the more mature they are, the lower their prices. 
Therefore, fresh, innovative products are the pre-eminent profit-generators for 
FinnBiotech. To produce these, it is crucial to keep up with developments in 
the field of science, which can provide new ideas and at best, unique 
inventions for FinnBiotech to commercialize.  
The main individuals at FinnBiotech who deal with R&D are the 
Managing Director and the R&D Manager. They use multiple sources for 
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acquiring scientific information. The basic and most straightforward way of 
acquiring scientific information is through scientific publications. Both the 
Managing Director and the R&D Manager experience this as easy and quite 
routine. As the Managing Director put it: 
“Scientific information is public and much of it is available 
digitally via the Internet. There are both free publications and 
ones you have to pay for, but as a docent at the University of 
Helsinki, I have access to them all. I just look them through to 
see what is relevant and rank articles according to which 
ones have information relevant to us, both to tests that we are 
already making and to tests that we might make. The 
databases are huge and public, as nearly all scientific 
publication is public. There is a plethora of scientific 
information available, and simply having access to it is not a 
problem. However, searching, selecting, evaluating, and 
analyzing among the deluge of available information may be 
a challenge.” 
The R&D Manager echoed this sentiment, stating: 
 “If it is necessary to search for scientific information, it is 
quite routine work … it is always possible to find information 
… there is a lot of scientific information, and getting it 
depends on activity and ability to find and choose. If there is 
some specific information that needs to be looked up, I usually 
delegate that task to someone else.” 
Scientific conferences are another way of acquiring scientific 
information. FinnBiotech’s management team members—again, mostly the 
Managing Director and the R&D Manager—actively attend multiple scientific 
conferences around the world, where they can acquire information about latest 
developments in science that have not yet been published. They also use 
conferences as a way to meet interesting researchers and to gain ideas for new 
tests. For instance, the Managing Director attended a scientific conference in 
Japan in the early 2000s and listened to a presentation about a new 
technology that he thought could be used to develop a new test for 
FinnBiotech’s product portfolio. Hence, scientific conferences provide a way to 
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stay up-to-date on the latest developments in science even before they make 
their way into publications and suggest ideas for updating tests and developing 
new kinds of tests. Moreover, they provide a venue to make new connections 
with scientists and to meet scientists with whom the Managing Director and 
the R&D Manager are already familiar. 
FinnBiotech has a plethora of connections with university scientists, 
most of them informal and most of them friends of the Managing Director. The 
R&D Manager is also well on his way to developing his own networks, but 
because of his younger age has simply not had the chance to develop the same 
width of network that the Managing Director has. These informal connections 
with scientists are used to acquire information about new research projects 
that have just started or are starting, thus providing information of scientific 
developments already in the embryonic stage before even conference 
presentations could be made of them. This makes it possible to sense where 
the field is likely to be developing in the future. Some of the informal ties also 
develop into formal collaborative projects, as in the case of working to develop 
the world’s first cancer diagnostic test for commercial use together with 
scientists at the National Institutes of Health in the United States, in South 
Korea, and in Russia. Similar collaborative projects, albeit on a smaller scale, 
have been realized in collaboration with scientists in Italy with the aim of 
jointly developing a new test. However, none of these collaborations has yet 
resulted in new products. 
In addition to networking and collaborating with scientists around the 
world on its own initiative, FinnBiotech has also taken part in several projects 
orchestrated by Finnish public authorities and European Union authorities. 
These projects have also largely grown out of personal connections, as friends 
(especially of the R&D Manager) are active in alerting FinnBiotech to 
interesting projects and recruiting the company to become involved in these 
projects. A major motive in this collaboration is the fact that the public 
authorities that fund R&D projects in Finland, such as Tekes, require that the 
projects include public-private collaboration between universities and 
companies. The same applies to European Union-funded R&D projects. 
However, these projects are mostly for keeping up connections with 
universities and ensuring access to what is going on in them. As the R&D 
Manager said: 
“FinnBiotech’s role in these projects is mostly in participating 
on the board of directors without any financial investment in 
the projects. So we don’t really even expect that we would get 
 99 
 
something concrete from the projects in the near future, but 
really just participate in order to maintain relationships to 
scientists and universities and to keep up with what is going 
on in universities.” 
Thus, these projects have not led to lasting collaborations with 
universities, and while FinnBiotech has a wide network of connections in 
universities around the world, they are very much connected to the person of 
the Managing Director. This is one instance in which information sharing 
within the company appeared to not always be optimal, because sometimes the 
information acquired from these contacts could stop at the Managing Director, 
who did not always have time to share the information or did not remember to 
do so. Therefore, the firm has sometimes been caught in a situation in which 
they have had a test in the market which has been outdated from a scientific 
point-of-view because the latest scientific results have escaped the 
management team’s attention. 
All in all, scientific knowledge is crucial for innovation at FinnBiotech 
and the management team members—especially the Managing Director and 
the R&D Manager—continuously and actively acquire information about 
science from multiple sources. However, scientific knowledge only forms a 
general background to the company operations. It is a sine qua non, a 
necessary but insufficient information domain which needs much 
complementary information in order to generate innovations from it. The R&D 
Manager summarized it well: 
“Research at universities is not very applied … it is the kind of 
research knowledge that is difficult to use for our operations, 
because it cannot help us in our short-term projects. Maybe if 
we did a long-term project, then we could better use 
university research. But we cannot really do that, because as 
we are a small company, our strategy is to focus on short-
term projects where we can get a payback in a short amount 
of time. Trying to develop a radical innovation is extremely 
difficult, nearly impossible for a small company, because it 
requires a long time of great investments with an elusive 
payback only in a very distant future, so it is unrealistic and 
excessively risky for us.” 
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There has been only one event where FinnBiotech has directly been 
able to use university research in its innovation. However, the distinguishing 
feature of this event is that the scientist at the University of Tampere in 
Finland had proceeded so far in development that he had a ready invention, an 
entirely new test for celiac disease that was one of a kind in the world. 
Moreover, the university’s technology transfer office had already taken care of 
patenting the invention, and offered the licensing rights to the invention to 
prospective applicants. FinnBiotech was extremely keen to purchase the 
licensing rights, succeeded in doing so, and went on to commercialize this 
invention to great success.40  
Co-location, which has been paid great attention to in the modern 
biotechnology sector, appeared to play only a limited role in FinnBiotech’s 
information acquisition about science. Certainly, co-location was 
determinative in the founding of the company, as FinnBiotech was established 
in the Helsinki metropolitan area where the science it was founded on was 
developed. However, since its founding, it is clear that it has not been able to 
rely on the convenience of local contacts. Local contacts are advantageous, as 
the management team members have close contacts to universities in Finland, 
underpinned by the Managing Director’s docent position at the University of 
Helsinki. However, it became clear in the interviews that in seeking to acquire 
the best and latest scientific information, FinnBiotech’s management team 
members had to endure lots of air travel all around the world, as they needed 
to go where the needed information was. This also meant relying heavily on 
digital communications, even if face-to-face communications would have been 
preferable. Surprisingly, however, it did not come up either directly or 
indirectly in any of the interviews that networking internationally rather than 
locally would have presented particular difficulties (beyond the need for 
expensive and time-consuming air travel), although establishing some of the 
international scientist connections involved peculiar events that will be 
described in the narratives section. 
A surprising finding, which is rarely acknowledged when discussing the 
acquisition of scientific information in modern biotechnology, was that 
universities were certainly not the only sources of such information, and 
possibly not even the most important. Instead, it turned out that the primary 
purveyors of scientific information to FinnBiotech were FinnBiotech’s 
suppliers. The immunochromatographic tests developed and produced by 
FinnBiotech are made up of hundreds of ingredients, all of which are being 
constantly developed, as reagents and raw materials are critical for the quality 
                                                        
40 This event will be elaborated on in the section of event narratives. 
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and cost of the tests. The suppliers of these ingredients are highly specialized 
in their own areas and up-to-date about scientific developments in their 
specialties. As FinnBiotech is a customer for these suppliers, it is in the 
suppliers’ interests to interact frequently with FinnBiotech, making visits to 
Finland to present their latest products and, at the same time, provide 
information about the latest scientific developments in their area. The 
suppliers openly share this information as it is in their interests: it is part of 
their marketing efforts to explain how and why their latest products are at the 
cutting edge of science and how they differ from competing products. The 
suppliers are thus active, open, and forthcoming about sharing this 
information. Moreover, as this scientific information is highly specific to 
FinnBiotech’s innovation processes, it is very relevant to FinnBiotech.  
All the management team members hold graduate degrees in areas 
related to life sciences, most of them from the University of Helsinki, which is 
highly ranked internationally overall and very highly ranked in the life 
sciences. After their graduate studies, the management team members all have 
gained several years of experience in their field, ranging from the low of 13 
years to a high of 43 (this last being the Managing Director, who had 
significant expertise in responsible positions prior to founding FinnBiotech). 
Therefore, they could all be considered to have very high expertise in the field. 
They found the acquisition of scientific information to be easy because of this 
expertise. For individuals who had attempted to acquire the same scientific 
information without the expertise, the process and the results would most 
likely have been very different. What this underscores is the importance of 
expertise in information acquisition, a point which may seem obvious but is 
not always paid much attention. 
4.1.3 Information about Products and Product Development 
Science forms the basis for product development. However, it is not enough, as 
noted before. This process was described by the Managing Director in terms of 
one company product: 
“For example, how celiac disease can be diagnosed is the 
culmination of a long, gradual process of scientific research. 
Now it has been noticed how technology can be used to better 
diagnose celiac disease, and this combination has been turned 
into a product innovation. Thus, one must keep track of 
lengthy records of scientific evidence, but one must be able to 
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combine these with technology to allow masses of tests to be 
manufactured at consistent quality and low cost.” 
FinnBiotech must therefore be able to keep up with information about 
science incessantly, but also be able to turn information about science into 
products that consistently function at required quality levels and can be mass 
manufactured at consistent quality and decent cost. Moreover, to maintain 
competitiveness, FinnBiotech must continuously keep existing products up-to-
date and develop new products. The field is highly competitive and changes 
quickly, so that products in the market face quick price depreciation. Thus, to 
maintain profit margins, FinnBiotech must constantly be putting out new 
generations of products as well as entirely new products. This creates tensions 
for the firm, as the manufacturing costs of new products are higher because of 
lower production volumes and lack of production experience, but to maintain 
profitability as well as innovative image, new products are essential. 
FinnBiotech is thus in a constant product development race. 
 The immunochromatographic tests that FinnBiotech develops and 
manufactures are composed of roughly seven to nine components and 
hundreds of ingredients.41 Performance attributes and manufacturing 
considerations can vary dramatically from one diagnostic test to another. To 
be competitive, a test needs to be technically optimized to have the highest 
possible sensitivity and specificity, while being amenable to being mass-
manufactured at low cost.  Additionally, a good test is about more than just 
science and technology, having been designed with user needs in mind, so that 
the test is ergonomic, intuitive, and has graphic instructions. However, as 
FinnBiotech competes on quality and price, it emphasizes these attributes in 
its product development. 
This can be understood better when one considers the structure of the 
rapid test market. The market is polarized into a few big players, such as 
Abbott Laboratories, and hundreds of smaller players vying for market space. 
Although well-known and respected, FinnBiotech is still one of these small 
                                                        
41 The common components of these products are a sample pad, a conjugate 
pad, detection conjugate, solid phase membrane, test and control reagent lines, 
absorbent pad, and plastic-adhesive backing card. The components are layered onto 
the plastic backing card, and each component must be carefully positioned so that they 
overlap. The assembled strips are dried and packaged, making them stable for months 
when properly protected from moisture and excessive heat. Packaging of the strips is 
typically done with laminate cover tape which acts as a protective barrier and prevents 
evaporation of reagents and helps to limit back-flow of reagents, and a strip 
housing/cassette which protects the assembly, containing the test strip and the 
absorbent pad so that the unit can be handheld more easily. 
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players. Because of its small size and limited resources, it has adopted a 
strategy of incremental innovation where it follows what the large players are 
doing and then brings out an innovative alternative solution of high quality 
and decent cost. For instance, if a large company has developed and launched 
an entirely new type of test, FinnBiotech will look to offering a similar kind of 
test in a rapid test format. This strategy is followed because to create markets 
for radical innovations requires changing behaviors and entire healthcare 
system structures. The resources to bring about such changes and to create 
new markets and demand are held only by big companies. Therefore, 
FinnBiotech starts its product development work from existing demand, and 
focuses its efforts on creating high-quality, moderate-cost tests to meet that 
existing demand. 
Product development knowledge has been predominantly developed 
and kept in-house because of the Managing Director’s management 
philosophy. The reason for this has been largely the fact that there is so much 
unique knowledge and experience that resides within FinnBiotech, that it is 
not necessary to collaborate very widely when it comes to product 
development. Thus, in line with company strategy, products are nearly all 
developed in-house at FinnBiotech, mostly through experience. As the R&D 
Manager described it:  
“Knowledge for developing products and keeping them up-to-
date is not the kind of knowledge where one could say that 
when you do one thing, it leads to another. … What I mostly 
use in my work is knowledge that has been gained through 
experience. When you have experience, and insight that has 
been developed on the basis of experience, it’s possible to 
guess how things will work. Most of the work time goes to 
overseeing what is being done, making decisions as to which 
direction we should go. It’s the kind of work where you cannot 
have certain knowledge that doing X will solve the problem. 
It’s more like guesswork informed by having seen a similar 
situation so many times that you know what to try.” 
However, despite wanting to keep the core of product development, 
and the knowledge and expertise related to it, in-house, FinnBiotech is keenly 
alert to information related to products coming from multiple sources. The 
two main sources of information related to product development are industry 
fairs and customers. Industry fairs are opportunities to keep up-to-date with 
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what other relevant market actors are doing, especially competitors, so as to 
know where the leading edge is. As both the Managing Director and the R&D 
Manager described it, in industry fairs, competitors display their latest 
products, so that attending the most important industry fairs around the world 
and actively walking around, inspecting things, and talking to people makes it 
possible to keep on top of what products are being brought out by competitors. 
This provides ideas on how to keep the company’s existing products 
competitive, and on developing new products. As the Managing Director put it: 
“One hears things from people in the industry sector … ideas 
come from industry fairs where one meets people, sees what 
is available, hears of things.” 
Indeed, being able to survey competitor offerings is a central activity in 
at least two industry fairs, one in North America and one in Europe. The 
industry fair in North America showcases perhaps the most cutting-edge 
advances from competitors, making it easy to find new product ideas. The 
industry fair in Europe is possibly not quite so cutting-edge, but as Europe is 
one of FinnBiotech’s key market areas, it is extremely important to see what 
competitors are offering. This industry fair offers fewer new product ideas, but 
makes it possible to gauge the situation in European markets. Therefore, for 
example, if it is seen that a rapid test for a certain condition is not available, 
FinnBiotech will know to speed up its development process in order to be 
among the early entrants in the market. Certainly, especially in cases where 
ideas for brand new products are to be found only in the industry fairs, rather 
than in products already in development, it is unlikely that FinnBiotech will be 
the first to market with a certain test. As the R&D Manager explained: 
“Development of a new product typically takes two to three 
years. In that time, it is likely that competition will emerge. 
However, this is not necessarily bad. For instance, if a large 
company enters the market with a similar test before we do, 
that can even be good for us, because they can create a 
market for that test. It is difficult to be first to market, so if we 
can follow in their footsteps, providing an innovative and 
possibly cheaper alternative, this is good for us.” 
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In addition to industry fairs, FinnBiotech has four sources of 
information alerting it to existing demand to which they could respond by 
developing a new generation of an existing test or a new test. As the R&D 
Manager explained: 
“One, we notice that there is a problem in an existing product, 
and begin to develop that product further. If we are not 
talking about a crisis situation, then this is not a very hurried 
process, it is just that we are aware of a competitor having a 
better test and noticing that we should develop our test to the 
same level. But the process is largely contingent upon 
whether we can find new materials and how much 
development time we can invest. Second, we receive 
information from a customer that a certain test should be 
developed in a certain direction, or a customer wants us to 
develop a specific test. Third, we find an interesting topic and 
begin exploring whether we could develop a new test based 
on this. These ideas usually come from industry fairs or from 
meeting people, sometimes friends in the industry or material 
suppliers who have a new product. Sometimes, although 
rarely, ideas come from reading scientific publications. Our 
firm has a reputation that we are technologically oriented 
and have a low threshold to begin experimenting, so we also 
receive a lot of ideas and suggestions that we try out to see if 
they lead to anything. Four, we get a request to develop a 
custom-made test for a customer, for instance to develop a 
rapid test version of a test that the customer already has in 
another format. In such a case, we put a price tag on the R&D 
work that we do for the customer.” 
Therefore, customers are an important source of ideas and information 
for product development. Customer communications are of special 
significance as it is in the interests of the customers to constantly monitor the 
wide range of products available and in development. The customers provide 
this information to FinnBiotech as they have an interest to have FinnBiotech, 
as their supplier, provide the best possible product range to them. Ideas 
coming especially from existing customers are in central position for product 
development, because it is in FinnBiotech’s interests to keep their existing 
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customers happy in order to retain them. The Export Manager related a 
representative development of a new product based on customer feedback: 
“The helicobacterium test was launched to market in 1995, 
and the entire product idea largely came from the fact that 
there was a laboratory test in the market but no home test. 
Our customer thought that there was clear market potential 
for a home test and wanted to have such a test in their 
product portfolio. So this is where the product development 
started. The product was the ‘baby’ of the Marketing Director 
at the time42 and he was deeply involved in its development in 
the mid-1990s. The product development was successful, so 
although the idea for the test came from our customer, we did 
the product development work ourselves, and it turned out to 
be a success.” 
However, keeping up interactions with customers around the world in 
addition to attending multiple industry fairs requires a lot of air travel. Indeed, 
the management team members fly around the world quite incessantly, 
especially the Managing Director, who was praised by all of his management 
team members as “being good at sniffing out opportunities for new product 
innovations.” Altogether, looking at FinnBiotech’s development over time, it is 
quite clear that there is a virtuous circle of first having some information, then 
gaining customers on the basis of that information, then gaining more 
information from the customers, then gaining more customers, then gaining 
more information, etc. FinnBiotech has thus been able to start and maintain a 
virtuous cycle where customers provide them with information to provide new 
products, which in turn help gain new customers, who in turn provide 
FinnBiotech with more information, in iterative cycles. 
However, as with information about science, more is not always better. 
With information related to product development, there is also the challenge 
of identifying, evaluating, and interpreting the information that comes at 
industry fairs and from customers. It is critical to be able to evaluate what of 
this information is relevant, and, in the case of market rumors, to evaluate 
whether there is truth in them. In addition, customers present a plethora of 
requests for product improvements and new product developments, only some 
of which can and should be responded to, and it is crucial to know the 
                                                        
42 One of FinnBiotech’s founders, who sadly passed away before the beginning 
of this study. 
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difference. For example, although customers present very valuable new 
product ideas, they also present requests for FinnBiotech to develop products, 
which it must turn down. The Export Manager explained: 
“We received a product request from a customer to develop a 
rapid drug test. However, when we looked at the situation, 
we realized that competitors had already had such tests in the 
market for a long time. For a small firm, it does not make 
sense to enter a mature market. If the market is already 
mature, then we are too late, because the prices will be low. 
Therefore, because we could tell that the market was mature 
and highly competitive, we told the customer that it was not 
worthwhile to begin developing the product they asked for. 
Only in a situation where we can develop a new generation of 
tests that have clear benefits over the older generations, 
might we enter a market. However, no such situation has 
come up, so we seek to enter markets that are not yet mature 
and do not have excessive competition.” 
4.1.4 Information about Production and Production Technology 
FinnBiotech has chosen a rather rare strategy among dedicated biotechnology 
firms in that it produces its own tests, instead of licensing its products or 
outsourcing production. This has been largely a matter of necessity, because 
much of the production equipment that FinnBiotech has needed in order to 
produce its tests has simply not been available. As the Technical Manager 
simply stated:  
“There are not many manufacturers of equipment for (this) 
industry, so the types of equipment and machinery often 
simply are not manufactured.” 
Therefore, FinnBiotech has had to develop much of its own production 
technology. Even when it buys ready-made machinery, it usually must 
significantly customize it to fit the needs of its own specialized production. 
Such customization has been possible because the expertise for production 
exists in-house and the critical phases in production are well known. This 
accumulated in-house experience provides knowledge about what have been 
 108 
 
correct decisions and what decisions have caused problems that have needed 
to be solved. Therefore, the knowledge about production technology has been 
developed in-house through experience over many years, so that currently 
FinnBiotech has the best expertise in both building and customizing 
equipment for the production of its own tests. As the Technical Manager 
explained: 
"Tailored equipment is developed and constructed in-house as 
this is where the best knowledge of the specific needs and 
critical production phases is … Technical development has 
gone on for many years and is based on accumulated 
knowledge from experience.” 
Equipment that is purchased from the outside for customization in-
house is procured routinely from existing partners who have sold equipment 
to FinnBiotech before and are knowledgeable about the company’s needs.  
New links to equipment providers are also sought through industry contacts 
and industry fairs. Although price is a large decision factor, FinnBiotech 
prefers buying equipment from its old partners as it can rely on them. 
However, no equipment has been acquired that could have been used for 
production without in-house customization. Therefore, the knowledge and 
expertise concerning the construction and customization of production 
equipment for FinnBiotech is solidly in-house. Central in the development of 
expertise has been a single individual, who has been doing this kind machinery 
work for FinnBiotech for about 26 years, thus accumulating a wealth of 
knowledge and experience, familiarity with the biological materials and how to 
handle them. As a result, production technology is the one area in which 
knowledge is most tightly kept in-house. As the Technical Manager put it: 
“In some cases it might be possible to cooperate with an 
equipment manufacturer, but it would be very unlikely 
because FinnBiotech does not want to reveal its latest 
developments to an outside firm, since a lot of very detailed 
information would need to be communicated in such case.” 
Indeed, such protection of production knowledge makes sense, as 
FinnBiotech also earns revenues from licensing and selling its production 
technology, although this is not their core business. Thus, as knowledge 
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related to production technology has been developed in-house over a 
considerable period of time, this knowledge is mostly not shared with outside 
parties unless in the form of licensing or sales of machinery. Nor does 
FinnBiotech significantly acquire information about production technology 
from outside its own boundaries, as even equipment which is purchased is 
heavily customized in-house to fit FinnBiotech’s production. 
When a test has been developed in R&D, it passes on to production. 
Although in-house production, especially with technology developed in-house, 
is rare in a small dedicated biotechnology firm, it may be detected from the 
interviews that FinnBiotech has made a virtue out of necessity. None of the 
interviewees noted this outright, simply stating that it had been necessary to 
develop the company’s own production technology because of lack of such 
technology in the markets. However, especially when the Production Manager 
described the process of adapting newly developed products to mass 
production, it appeared that having production co-located with product 
development at the Vantaa facility may have improved both product 
development and the adaptation of products to production. This was because 
both activities were in the same facility and it was easy to go back-and-forth in 
iterative cycles to fix problems that new products presented to mass 
production. This, in turn, was crucial because a test design that works well in 
the R&D lab is of little use if it is difficult to manufacture reliably—and at 
acceptable cost—at high yield. Indeed, manufacturing has a significant effect 
on the quality and cost of the tests produced. Thus, co-location made it 
possible to try the process of manufacturing tests under development, 
tweaking ingredients and design choices to optimize the test for production. 
Indeed, R&D and production carry out the first production batches of a new 
test jointly and work out possible problems at this point, so that mass 
production can then begin without problems. 
4.1.5 Information about Customers and Markets 
FinnBiotech’s products are marketed and distributed by specialized diagnostic 
and pharmaceutical companies in more than 50 countries. The largest 
customers are in Europe and Asia, but over its history, FinnBiotech has sold its 
products to all parts of the world: Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, the Middle 
East, North America, and South America. Paying customers are clearly crucial 
for the profitable operation of the business, but are not necessarily easy to find 
for a small niche firm originating from a small country. FinnBiotech had a 
good start in acquiring customers because of its founders’ connections. The 
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Managing Director had excellent international connections form his previous 
role as the R&D Manager of Finland’s largest diagnostics company. Another of 
the founders also had outstanding connections and experience in marketing as 
he had occupied the role of Marketing Director of Finland’s largest diagnostics 
company. He assumed the role of Marketing Director at FinnBiotech, and, in 
addition to his contacts, brought with him a strong appreciation of the 
importance of market-orientation and marketing.43 As two of FinnBiotech’s 
founders came directly from a large diagnostics company, they were able to 
use the customer connections they had developed at that company to acquire 
the first customers for FinnBiotech. Therefore, FinnBiotech’s first customers 
were also the large diagnostic company’s customers. This was possible because 
FinnBiotech’s product did not directly compete with the large diagnostics 
company’s offerings. Indeed, the large diagnostics company had turned down 
further development of the technology and sold the intellectual property rights 
to FinnBiotech.  
As a result, FinnBiotech has been able to succeed with minimal 
investments in marketing, gaining further customers through word-of-mouth 
and references. In this way, FinnBiotech was gradually able to gain recognition 
and respect in the market, which facilitated its success in gaining new 
customers at industry fairs. Indeed, industry fairs have been the main means 
of gaining new customers throughout FinnBiotech’s history. Nearly all 
customer contacts are generated at industry fairs, and about half of these turn 
into actual paying customer relationships. The fact that FinnBiotech has had 
excellent customer references from the beginning has played a large role in 
how effective industry fairs have been for the company in terms of gaining 
customers. Quite soon, because FinnBiotech regularly attended the same large 
international industry fairs, the majority of other people in the industry 
became familiar with the company. 
Hence, attending industry fairs quickly started to become effective 
when the company depended less on hoping that someone would be interested 
in the company’s stand, and instead began to arrange a plethora of meetings 
with existing customers and contacts. As FinnBiotech is so active in attending 
international industry fairs every year, meetings can even be arranged from 
one industry fair to the next, thus make networking even more effective. For 
example, one year the R&D Manager had engaged in conversation with 
potential Indian customers at an industry fair in Dubai, and when the Export 
Manager attended an industry fair in India a short time later, he contacted 
                                                        
43 This person is the one who sadly passed away before beginning of this study, 
and information about him is therefore only at second-hand. 
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these potential customers and was able to turn them into existing customers at 
the fair in India. Industry fairs around the world are an effective networking 
tool for contacting potential and existing customers, as they save time and 
money that would otherwise be spent on air travel to visit each potential and 
existing customer individually. 
There are a couple of large industry fairs that “everyone attends.” 
Everyone is aware of the existence of these industry fairs and of how important 
they are. The Managing Director and the founding Marketing Director gained 
this information during their time at the large diagnostics company, and the 
decision to attend these industry fairs was clear. However, it is not always so 
straightforward to know about all possible industry fairs taking place 
internationally, especially if they are new or highly specialized. It can be even 
more difficult to know whether these fairs are worth attending. Therefore, it is 
important not only to learn how to network at industry fairs, but also to learn 
which industry fairs are worth visiting. It can be a considerable waste of money 
and time for a small company to attend an industry fair where there are no 
promising potential customers. Moreover, it is important to learn which 
industry fairs best serve which purpose: some industry fairs are best for 
acquiring R&D information, whereas others are best for acquiring information 
about customers. This theme came up in interviews again and again: several of 
the interviewees remarked that while communication skills, social skills, and 
perseverance are extremely important in winning customers, a good level of 
technical expertise makes meaningful discussion much easier. Such technical 
expertise makes it possible to ask better questions, to gain a better 
understanding of customer needs, and to explain the benefits of FinnBiotech’s 
products. 
Although the industry fairs have maintained their crucial position in 
the industry despite the advent of the Internet and e-mail, digital 
communications are heavily used. The Internet is used to check the 
backgrounds of potential partners and to provide an easy way for those who 
may not have had time to talk to FinnBiotech’s representatives at an industry 
fair to find out more about the company’s products and make contact. 
Similarly, after first establishing contacts at industry fairs, FinnBiotech’s 
representatives then do detective work online to determine the current 
product portfolio of potential customers in order to tailor their offer better. 
Similarly, e-mail is a very important communication medium, both for 
communicating with potential customers and for settling details with existing 
customers. Proposals and all of the information that needs to be attached to 
them are communicated via e-mail: the extensive scientific documentation 
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related to tests, terms of delivery, negotiations about packaging, terms of 
payment, and so on are all delivered via e-mail. 
Nonetheless, while the heavy use of digital communications is clearly 
very important in business operations such as those of FinnBiotech that are 
spread all over the globe, they complement rather than supplant face-to-face 
communication. This is probably why industry fairs, which may seem old-
fashioned, have retained such an important position in the industry: they 
enable many people from all over the world to meet face-to-face, while 
reducing the time and money required for air travel. The Export Manager 
described this importance of face-to-face contact even in a world that is by 
necessity heavily reliant on digital communications: 
“We communicate a lot by e-mail, but at an industry fair, you 
get to look in the other person’s eyes and better figure out 
what they are thinking.” 
However, although FinnBiotech has been successful in gaining 
customers and acquiring information about them (especially at industry fairs, 
and through the networks formed and maintained at industry fairs), these 
customers are only business-to-business customers. The significance of this is 
that FinnBiotech is several intermediaries away from the end users of their 
products, putting them at a disadvantage in terms of prices and of knowledge 
of end users. To be able to succeed in profitably selling its products, 
FinnBiotech needs to have knowledge not just about its direct customers, but 
also about end customers, prices, and healthcare systems around the world. As 
the Managing Director aptly put it:  
“To develop, introduce, and market new products, it is 
necessary to know the processes concerning the introduction 
and use of these products in various markets around the 
world. It is necessary to know how to operate profitably in 
each market and how to develop business in each market. To 
do this, one must not only be able to operate with customers, 
but have knowledge of competitors, technologies, new 
product adoption processes, and the functioning of the 
healthcare system in each market.” 
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FinnBiotech’s distribution network typically includes two to four 
intermediary companies between FinnBiotech and its end users. At its longest, 
this distribution chain consists of four intermediaries: the first intermediary—
and FinnBiotech’s immediate customer—is an importer, wholesaler, large 
pharmaceutical company, or a diagnostic company. This first intermediary 
then sells the products to a local distributor, this being the second 
intermediary. The local distributor sells the products to laboratories, 
physicians’ offices, retailers, and/or pharmacies, these being the end users in 
the former two cases, or third intermediaries in the latter two cases, who then 
sell the tests to consumers. 
The Managing Director, especially because of his prior experience at a 
large diagnostic company with its own sales subsidiaries, is very aware that 
this lengthy distribution chain is a disadvantage to FinnBiotech. However, 
FinnBiotech is too small to take the risk of establishing its own sales 
subsidiaries as these would require very high and regular sales volumes. 
FinnBiotech’s profitability clearly suffers when many intermediaries are 
involved, as each takes a cut of the profits, leaving FinnBiotech only about 10-
15% of the price at which the product is sold to the end user. Moreover, this 
long distribution chain isolates FinnBiotech from much of the information it 
needs to know about markets and end users. 
Certainly, by far the primary source of information about markets are 
FinnBiotech’s customers. As the Managing Director says: 
 “Market information comes from customers; it is important 
to listen to customers, to their suggestions and wishes.” 
Customers also provide information to FinnBiotech about other market 
participants, so that references from existing customers can help in finding 
and choosing new customers. Thus, information and customers create a 
virtuous, self-reinforcing spiral: as the number of customers has grown, the 
company has increasingly received information through them, which has 
helped them get more customers. However, the problem is that as the 
customers are often FinnBiotech’s only direct information source in its various 
markets, FinnBiotech is dependent on its customers and on the information 
they provide.  
The customers only provide information when it benefits them: for 
instance, they will let FinnBiotech know if there is demand in a particular 
market for a product that FinnBiotech is developing, but will not divulge 
information about possible volumes or prices of similar products in the 
 114 
 
market. Therefore, FinnBiotech can be at the mercy of its customers in terms 
of information about markets. Such information would include information 
about overall volumes, end customer prices for classes of products (both 
competitors’ products and FinnBiotech’s own products) in the markets, trade 
prices between the intermediaries, general profit margins of the various 
intermediaries, possible competing customers in the same market for 
FinnBiotech’s products, and end users’ experiences of FinnBiotech’s and 
competitors’ tests. Keeping FinnBiotech in the dark about such matters gives 
its customers power and leverage in price negotiations with FinnBiotech. As 
the immunodiagnostics market is very cost-conscious, and part of 
FinnBiotech’s competitive strategy is to provide good quality at decent cost, 
information about prices would be tremendously valuable. As it is, with 
FinnBiotech often ignorant about price levels for end customers in different 
countries, as well as about transfer prices between intermediaries, it is easy for 
customers to push FinnBiotech’s prices down in negotiations by claiming that 
they could get a better deal from a competitor. The Managing Director 
described this in the following way: 
“Useful, valuable pieces of information are hoarded because 
there is high price awareness in the market and prices are 
talked about a lot.… It is thus sensible that information about 
prices is kept hidden.” 
Moreover, it would be “worth gold,” as the Export Manager put it, to 
have knowledge about how end users use and experience FinnBiotech 
products, how product quality and especially the price/quality ratio are 
perceived, how easy-to-use and reliable the products are, and how the users 
perceive the products. It would also be valuable to know how various segments 
of end users differ, for instance in their price sensitivity, behavior with the 
product, the point-of-sale, and the purchase decision criteria. All of this 
information would be of great value for R&D but, as the Export Manager put 
it: 
“Feedback from end users … comes only through distributors. 
It is necessary to pump them to get any of this information. 
This information gets lost on the way, as intermediaries do 
not have an interest in passing it on because they want to 
keep this information to themselves to be able to maintain 
control over the producers. The only thing that they do 
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communicate back is complaints, as this also gives them more 
power in negotiations.” 
FinnBiotech has devised several ways to get around the intermediaries’ 
desire to keep FinnBiotech in the dark and to gain information about prices 
and end users, although none of these has been able to correct the problem 
completely. This market information is rarely sought in consulting and market 
research reports, because they have been found to be “expensive, superficial, 
and not very reliable,” in the words of the Managing Director. Sometimes 
information about markets can be received from public research institutes, 
export promotion agencies, and non-profit organizations, but typically the 
information needs to be further analyzed, evaluated, and often combined with 
other information before conclusions can be drawn. Sometimes, knowledge 
about markets can be developed through own analytical work using public 
databases, as the Managing Director described: 
“Based on public statistics, much can be inferred about 
markets, for instance about market potential. … Similarly, 
based on public documents, quite a lot can also be learned 
and inferred about competitors and product end prices in 
some markets, especially if you analyze and combine data 
from various sources.” 
Sometimes important information is stumbled upon: in one case, the 
local partner seemed sincere in not having information about the market 
potential for a certain infectious disease test in China. However, with a little 
work on the Internet, it was possible to find public statistics, from which the 
prevalence of this disease, and therefore the theoretical market potential for a 
test diagnosing it, could be inferred. However, finding information in this way 
requires time and skill, and it is necessary to check that the information is 
correct. Indeed, any decision made by the management team members at 
FinnBiotech is based on information coming from several sources that is in 
line with experience and general appraisals.  
Although Finnbiotech’s own analytical work can provide quite a lot of 
the information that the customers keep from FinnBiotech, the best 
information about markets and customers comes from personal contacts. 
However, interesting here is that personal contacts do not intentionally pass 
on confidential knowledge. Instead, it is from personal interactions and 
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discussions that one can infer things when alert. The Managing Director 
illustrates this: 
“Important information relating to market conditions, 
especially prices and end users, comes in small pieces that are 
spilled accidentally, mostly in informal situations, such as in 
lunch conversations. … If you can connect one small piece to 
something else, you can figure things out.”  
The Managing Director went on to emphasize the importance of 
network connections as sources of relevant information of the kind that 
market actors do not want to share openly: 
“You can get information from several places, but specific 
information comes from contacts. And the more you travel 
and interact with people, the more contacts you have.” 
However, the Managing Director still emphasized the importance of 
alertness in FinnBiotech staff, noting that they could not simply rely on 
contacts feeding them the information they needed: 
“Even when listening to contacts, you need to figure out what 
is valuable, reliable information, because there is a lot of 
superfluous information. Only a small part of what you hear 
is relevant. There are a lot of rumors in the markets, and you 
need to evaluate them for yourself to figure out if there is 
truth to them.” 
Such personal interaction needs to take place around the world, as this 
information about market conditions is—understandably—distributed around 
the world as well. Therefore, frequent air travel is a necessity for the 
management team members. The primary purpose of most trips is to meet 
customers, but while in a certain country, the management team members try 
to maximize the benefits of their presence. They try to find out more about the 
actions of competitors in different markets and to gather information about 
end prices of products in the various markets, if only by visiting pharmacies 
and seeing what is on offer and at what prices. They also aim to learn more 
about the healthcare systems of particular countries and to meet relevant 
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individuals. For instance, the Export Manager was once driving back through 
Poland from an industry fair in Germany, and arranged to visit the Polish 
subsidiary of a company whose headquarters in Germany were already 
FinnBiotech’s customer. The visit paid off in a deal with the Polish subsidiary, 
as well as in contacts for the company’s Hungarian subsidiary, which also 
ended up buying the test. Another time, the Export Manager was vacationing 
in Argentina and had set up a meeting with FinnBiotech’s Argentine customer 
before the trip, as well as contacting the commercial arm of the Finnish 
Embassy in Argentina. As a result, the Export Manager was able to gain two 
new local customers from his holiday. 
However, one of the most important functions of these multiple 
personal contacts and travels around the world to visit potential and existing 
customers and other business partners, and to observe the competitors and the 
market, is to form an overall perception of where the industry is going. This 
makes negotiations with customers easier and widens horizons as to business 
opportunities. It is crucial to try to create a holistic view of industry dynamics 
and trends, and at the same time to try to make sure that the information 
gathered is correct and that FinnBiotech is able to use it. Indeed, it is in this 
area of information about customers and markets that arguably the most 
uncertainty and lack of information exist, not because information about 
customers and markets would be complex, difficult, or highly tacit, but 
because it is so tied up with power and profit. 
4.1.6 Information about Quality, Regulation, and Patenting 
FinnBiotech’s industry sector is highly regulated. The tests must comply with 
the regulations, which are proliferating as point-of-care tests are becoming 
more common. For instance, concerns over the quality of point-of-care tests 
have resulted in a hierarchy of regulations in a number of countries. A bevy of 
standards and regulations dictates the quality of tests and their production. 
This means that everything about the tests and their production must be 
carefully quality controlled and documented. Based on this documentation, 
the tests can receive CE markings that allow them to be sold within the 
European Union, and FDA registration that allows them to be sold in the 
United States. Beyond these countries, the tests typically need to be registered 
separately for each country in which they are to be sold. Moreover, the 
markings on the test packaging and the instructions accompanying each test 
must typically be translated into the language of every country in which the 
tests are sold. Meeting all these demands takes substantial amounts of time 
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and money. Indeed, overcoming the multiple regulatory hurdles impedes 
market entry of innovations from smaller companies in particular. This 
problem is multiplied when a firm sells its products in dozens of markets 
around the world, as FinnBiotech does. 
However, it is the duty of public officials to make clear the procedures 
and materials required for receiving regulatory approval and, as the Quality 
Manager put it, “legislation concerning registration is quite clear.” Indeed, 
while most of the information about documentation and registration can be 
quite easily accessed from public officials as it is part of their job to distribute 
this information publicly, the challenge is in distilling this plethora of 
information and making sure important bits are not lost in the process. As the 
Quality Manager described it: 
“Information about legislation comes from public officials. … 
There is a lot of information but it can sometimes be a bit 
difficult to get because for instance directives rain from the 
EU so it is necessary to be able to pick out the right 
information.” 
Indeed, although FinnBiotech’s Quality Manager, who is responsible 
for regulation issues, is a scientist, she has been able to handle the legal part of 
registration processes. Although this has required some determined learning 
from her, she considered that “the legal texts are clear enough that it is 
possible to handle registration documents without a lawyer’s training.” 
Also, information about regulation in different countries is received 
from customers, as they are knowledgeable about their local systems and have 
an interest in communicating information about specific local regulatory 
demands to FinnBiotech to ensure that the products can be sold in their 
market. They also often deal directly with local officials on behalf of 
FinnBiotech because once they have made the purchase decision, it is in their 
interest that local regulatory demands are satisfied as quickly as possible in 
order to get the product to market. However, even the local distributors face 
problems, or at least claim to, as the Quality Manager explained: 
“Sometimes getting a product registered is a challenge. For 
example, in Argentina, the process of getting our product 
registered has taken nearly a year, because the public 
authority handling this constantly requires something new, 
just because it is a way for them to earn money. Our local 
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distributor is handling this, as a local firm usually knows the 
customs of a country, such as the need to take a public official 
out to dinners and so on. So we just have to trust the local 
company, but we do not really know if we can. For instance, 
in Argentina, we do not know if sales will ever be able to 
start. We definitely have to take risks in trusting local 
distributors.” 
Moreover, while customers often help with navigating the public 
authorities’ registration and documentation demands, they can also have 
additional demands of their own. For instance, certain markings on test 
packaging are mandatory in European Union countries, but customers will 
often want their own markings on the packaging, and sometimes also require 
the instructions to be printed with their logos and brands. Sometimes this is 
simply not possible because of regulatory demands, so FinnBiotech also needs 
to educate their customers as to what regulation requires. 
Information about patent legislation is, however, quite a different 
matter. Throughout most of FinnBiotech’s history, the company has had no 
major problems with patents as the regional market areas in which it has done 
most of its business—Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and South America—have 
not had traditions of aggressive patenting. However, the entry of U.S. 
competitors into Europe has introduced entirely different dynamics. U.S. 
companies have used patenting as a strategic competitive weapon. They have 
threatened competitors with lawsuits claiming infringement of their patent 
rights, and the legal costs of fighting such a suit in court has persuaded smaller 
competitors, such as FinnBiotech, to settle out of court. Even though 
FinnBiotech would probably have won its legal battle against a U.S. company, 
the threat of an extremely costly legal battle was enough to cause FinnBiotech 
to back off. The use of patenting lawsuits as a hostile strategic weapon is an 
area in which FinnBiotech has had little exposure. The company lacks 
knowledge as to how best to maneuver and is only now beginning to acquire 
the necessary information. 
4.1.7 Facilitating Factors in International Information Acquisition 
Tendencies for affiliating with other actors for information acquisition were 
not driven by shared national culture or geographic proximity. Instead, 
primary facilitating factors for information acquisition appeared to be shared 
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experience in the diagnostics industry and similar educational backgrounds. 
As the Export Manager explained: 
 “There is quite a strong industry culture that is outside of 
national cultures. We are all part of the diagnostics industry, 
and these shared experiences help us understand each other.” 
The Production Manager echoed this, stating: 
 “People in the diagnostics industry have developed their own 
culture. Thus, when dealing with other people, it is easiest to 
communicate with others who have been involved in this 
industry for a long time and are familiar with it. National 
cultures do not have much influence on our interactions. 
Rather, it can be difficult trying to communicate with 
someone unfamiliar with the industry. This is true even for 
individuals coming from a related industry, such as 
functional foods or pharmaceuticals.” 
The R&D Manager also emphasized the importance of shared work 
experience in the diagnostics industry as a facilitating factor for interaction 
and communication. He also highlighted the importance of similar educational 
and professional backgrounds: 
“To an extent, it might be easier to communicate with other 
people from the Nordic countries, but this is not really a big 
deal. No, national cultural differences are not really felt that 
much. If there seem to be any differences, they are more 
saliently among those of different educational and 
professional backgrounds. So for instance for me, with a 
scientific training, it is easiest to communicate with others 
from science backgrounds. By contrast, someone from a 
commercial background, and holding an MBA, for example, 
may seem foreign and to be speaking a different language.” 
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4.2 NARRATIVES 
4.2.1 Successful Outcome Narratives 
Narrative 1: New Product Development 
Abstract: A very successful event was the development project for the test for 
celiac disease, currently the company’s second most important product. 
Orientation: FinnBiotech wanted to develop this particular kind of test and 
had worked on it before, but had not succeeded. Then, someone from the 
technology transfer institute of the University of Tampere in Finland got 
informally in touch with FinnBiotech regarding an invention for diagnosing 
celiac disease that had been developed by a professor at the University of 
Tampere together with a scientist from Hungary. The University of Tampere 
technology transfer institute had patented the invention and wanted to 
commercialize it on behalf of the scientists. The Director of Business 
Development at the technology transfer office contacted FinnBiotech because 
he was previously familiar with the company, having met FinnBiotech’s R&D 
Manager before at an industry fair in Germany. After this, FinnBiotech 
received more detailed information about the invention through the 
technology transfer office. Then, very quickly, FinnBiotech’s R&D Manager 
and Managing Director got in direct contact with the scientists who had 
developed the invention. The invention was tried out at FinnBiotech, but it did 
not work. However, after exploring the situation and being in more contact 
with the inventing scientists, the R&D Manager at FinnBiotech realized that 
there had been a misunderstanding and there had been an internal error at 
FinnBiotech. After correcting for this error, the invention worked well.  
Complicating action: At this point, the University of Tampere technology 
transfer office was contacting several companies in Finland and abroad to find 
a suitable licensee for the invention. FinnBiotech was very keen to license the 
invention and it was perhaps this enthusiasm which won them the license, 
although the fact that the technology transfer office was looking to 
commercialize the test in a rapid test format also meant that FinnBiotech was 
a strong contender. As a result, FinnBiotech succeeded in licensing the 
invention. After the contract for licensing the invention had been signed, there 
was very close cooperation between FinnBiotech's employees and the scientists 
who had developed the invention. FinnBiotech's R&D Manager was in touch 
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with the inventing professor nearly weekly for several months in order to share 
information. The scientists also came to visit FinnBiotech to educate 
FinnBiotech employees about the disease, the scientific research, and the 
invention that had been developed.  
Evaluation: Things worked really well because, in addition to the technology, 
the scientists who had developed the invention also offered the clinical testing 
results. The scientists had also published in several journals and presented 
papers at conferences. They were attending various events, talking about the 
new product and where it could be obtained. This was not intentional sales or 
marketing and the scientists did not have any contract with FinnBiotech to do 
such marketing. It was simply that the professor had spent his entire career on 
this and was passionate about getting the test out to markets where it would 
benefit child healthcare, in which he was specialized. Over his long career, this 
professor had also established himself as one of the world’s foremost celiac 
disease researchers, and therefore had a wide contact base, which helped 
generate sales. This professor was, therefore, a leading “sales person” for the 
test, apparently not because of monetary incentives but because it was his 
personal ambition to get his own invention into use worldwide to help 
patients. This was also probably because through his work with patients, he 
had observed that a rapid test for celiac disease would help patients, especially 
children, but none had been available before his invention. The professor and 
his collaborating scientist were also able to provide the scientific and clinical 
research needed for quality registration, so the invention could be rapidly 
turned into an innovation ready for sales because the scientists provided a 
ready-made product together with documentation about scientific and clinical 
tests and user tests. It would not have been possible to turn the invention into 
an innovation and to start selling it, at least not so rapidly and successfully, 
without their input. 
Resolution: When FinnBiotech launched the celiac test, its revenues grew 
significantly, both from existing customers buying the new product and from 
new customers attracted to the company by the new product. The rapid test for 
celiac disease was a very competitive product and easy to sell because it was 
unique. This also meant that it was possible to get a good price for it because 
there were no competitors and no substitute products. The test was also easy 
to use and had a strong and credible scientific backing as there were so many 
scientific publications about it. This scientific background helped to make the 
product well known in  Europe, so that it was easy to begin sales. Moreover, 
even in markets outside of Europe, there has been great demand for the 
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product because of its uniqueness and for example a distributor in the Middle 
East has set up a training center dedicated to educating the public about celiac 
disease in order to create markets for this test. 
Coda: This product has been a great success because of its uniqueness, its 
strong scientific backing, and the fact that the scientists who developed it have 
acted as its “sales persons” by talking about it in international conferences and 
telling their contacts about it. It is now one of FinnBiotech’s most important 
products. 
Narrative 2: New Product Development and Expansion to New 
Markets 
Abstract: FinnBiotech established a facility to develop rapid tests for cancer 
in a joint venture with South Korean partners where FinnBiotech is the largest 
owner with a 20% stake. The joint venture also involved building a factory in 
South Korea for manufacturing existing FinnBiotech tests. To build the 
factory, FinnBiotech sold production knowledge and expertise to its joint 
venture partners and was in charge of the technology transfer from Finland to 
South Korea. 
Orientation: The connection came through the Soviet Union in 1988-1989. A 
Russian man from Moscow was visiting Finland. He came to visit FinnBiotech 
and wanted to begin selling the company’s tests in the Soviet Union. He had 
heard about FinnBiotech from his sister who was working in Finland. He 
looked like “Rasputin” and said he had no money, so I (the Managing Director) 
thought that if a man is honest enough to admit that he has no money, it is 
worth the risk, so I gave him five hundred tests to sell. He sold the tests in the 
Soviet Union and cooperation began this way. He also had a friend in South 
Korea who wanted to begin selling FinnBiotech's tests in South Korea, which I 
(the Managing Director) agreed to. 
Complicating action: This co-operation with our South Korean contacts 
then deepened in the 1990s so that FinnBiotech founded a joint venture in 
South Korea to develop rapid tests for cancer and to build a factory there to 
produce existing FinnBiotech tests. It turned out that both the Russian man 
and his Korean friend were connected to many highly positioned researchers 
and officials in the Soviet Union—now Russia—and in South Korea. The 
Russian man had had freedom to travel during Soviet times because his father 
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was a leading cancer researcher in the Soviet Union and his grandfather 
belonged to the Academy of Russia, and he had in fact been returning from a 
research visit to the National Institutes of Health in the United States when he 
came to visit Finland. That is also how he knew the Korean man. It turned out 
that the Korean contact belonged to a very highly positioned family in South 
Korea, and since hierarchy and families are very important for trust there, this 
helped very much in establishing contacts and in getting the South Korean 
government to support the venture. That is also how the South Korean joint 
venture has been able to become affiliated with a Nobel Prize–winning cancer 
researcher, as he was the Korean contact’s research mentor at the National 
Institutes of Health in the United States. To accomplish the technology 
transfer for building a factory in South Korea for the production of existing 
FinnBiotech tests, and the rapid tests for cancer if their development was 
successful, two people from Korea came to study in Finland for a month. They 
were taught how to operate the equipment sold to them by FinnBiotech. They 
spent one month in Finland and were taught the entire process. The two 
people were given all the training related to the tests and their production, and 
they produced a few model batches together with FinnBiotech employees to 
make sure they had mastered the necessary processes. FinnBiotech employees 
carried out work tasks with them from beginning to end. Also, once the factory 
in South Korea was built, FinnBiotech employees went to visit and suggested 
improvements, provided help if there were problems, and provided further 
assistance and information. 
Evaluation: I (the Managing Director) figured that even if we lost five 
hundred tests to the Russian man if he turned out to be unreliable, it would 
not bankrupt us, but if things turned out well, there could be considerable 
potential. After all, he had made the effort to find us and was interested in our 
tests. So I thought, “Why not?” 
Resolution: So now we have the joint venture in South Korea and also have 
important contacts in the United States and in Russia. We are working on 
developing rapid tests for cancer in South Korea and also manufacturing other 
FinnBiotech tests there, so that if the production in Vantaa is busy, it is 
possible to source tests from the South Korean factory, and FinnBiotech also 
sells raw materials to the factory in South Korea. 
Coda: The Russian connection was dormant for a long time, but in 2005-
2006 the man contacted FinnBiotech again and said that his mother was 
interested in FinnBiotech’s helicobacterium test, because she had been put in 
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charge of public healthcare in Moscow where the Russian government was 
financing extensive testing for public health, and she wanted to use 
FinnBiotech's rapid test for that. So new cooperations and opportunities keep 
coming up from these connections. 
Narrative 3: New Product Development 
Abstract: FinnBiotech had been sued by a U.S. company who was 
implementing a very aggressive patent strategy in order to gain market space 
in Europe. It was driving competitors away from markets by threatening them 
with patent litigation. The U.S. company also took FinnBiotech to court, 
claiming that FinnBiotech was infringing on their patent. This meant that 
FinnBiotech was suddenly in the position where it could no longer produce 
and sell one of its most popular tests. 
Orientation: The motive for product development, therefore, was the urgent 
need to develop a new product version that could not be claimed to be 
infringing on the U.S. company's patent, so that FinnBiotech could continue 
selling this type of test. Otherwise FinnBiotech's sales would have crashed. 
Complicating action: FinnBiotech was in a huge hurry because it was facing 
a crisis and needed to come up with a new product really quickly. The idea for 
the new product version was clear because it was necessary to develop a 
version that would not infringe on the U.S. company’s patent. 
Evaluation: FinnBiotech was able to develop a new test very quickly and thus 
avert the crisis because its product development function was so strong. But as 
it was in such a hurry to develop a new product version, there was not 
sufficient time to listen to customers. 
Resolution: A new product version was quickly developed for sale, but many 
customers disliked the product because it was so different from the traditional 
version. 
Coda: Customers have realized that if they want to buy this type of product 
within Europe, they have to buy the version that does not infringe on the U.S. 
company’s patent, even if they do not like it as much. 
 126 
 
Narrative 4: Expansion to New Markets 
Abstract: FinnBiotech acquired the operations of a company subsidiary 
developing ELISA tests to widen its product portfolio. The acquisition gave 
FinnBiotech already developed ELISA tests, related production technology, 
and resources to develop these new kinds of tests to strengthen its business. 
Orientation: I (the Managing Director) was familiar with this company 
because it had originally been a Finnish startup that had then been acquired by 
a U.S. company. However, now the U.S. company had decided to sell this part 
of its business. A hint of the U.S. company’s intentions came from an Indian 
contact before the U.S. company had made its sales desire public. The Indian 
man had an interest in seeing FinnBiotech purchase these business operations 
because then he could get more custom from us. 
Complicating action: At first I was not interested. However, then we had 
the big patent dispute that showed how vulnerable our business could be if it 
relied on a product portfolio based on a single technological platform. I 
thought that it would be good for business stability to have another supporting 
leg. So the U.S. company was contacted and the decision made to purchase the 
operations. 
Evaluation: So the hint turned out to be valuable and the Indian man has 
profited from it himself, as he now sells ingredients for both of our product 
lines. 
Resolution: In 2004, the operations were merged and now FinnBiotech has 
a wider product portfolio and another technological leg to the business, which 
makes it more secure and stable. 
Coda: FinnBiotech’s business expanded and we began developing new tests 
based another technological platform. We now also have a joint venture in 
China that came with the acquired ELISA business operations, and we are also 
negotiating with the company that sold the business about co-operation in the 
United States. 
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4.2.2 Less Successful Outcome Narratives  
Narrative 5: New Product Development 
Abstract: A less successful example is a prior project for the development of a 
celiac test where FinnBiotech worked with an Italian company, but just did not 
manage to develop the desired product. 
Orientation: The Italian company had a celiac test in ELISA format and 
wanted to develop a rapid test version of this test. We (FinnBiotech) started 
developing a celiac test for them in 2001. It was a product development project 
that the Italian company paid for; there was a down payment and then 
payments according to progress. We agreed on the development and also 
about things after it, like production, sales, and so on.  
Complicating action: We basically cooperated so that the Italian company 
sent us material about their test, but their idea did not work when we tried it. 
We worked on the project for about three years and the money we received 
was spent many times over. We made a prototype but the Italian company did 
not approve it because the test was not sensitive enough. We tried to solve 
things through cooperation, which was very close and involved highly trained 
product development scientists from the Italian company, and we worked 
together with them to try to solve things. 
Evaluation: The cooperation worked, they constantly gave us new ideas and 
lots of know-how that had been generated when they developed the ELISA 
test. It felt like they were really open in their communication, but things just 
did not work out. So the communication and cooperation were good, but the 
outcome was not. The cooperation worked, we were constantly in touch, it 
wasn’t because of that. They gave everything they could give and thought about 
things at their end, it wasn’t that. It just didn’t work. 
Resolution: We just did not get the product to work at acceptable sensitivity 
levels and abandoned the project.  
Coda: So, despite good communication and cooperation, we were not able to 
develop the desired project. Instead, we lost money on research and 
development. But now we have the celiac disease rapid test that we developed 
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with the Finnish and Hungarian scientists, so we were able to get a celiac test 
into our product portfolio in the end. 
Narrative 6: New Product Development 
Abstract: Some product development projects have started with an idea or 
inspiration received from a contact. There has been excitement about trying 
this new thing out, but the knowledge has been lacking to the extent that the 
project has just not worked. 
Orientation: There have been quite a few projects where an exciting idea has 
come through a fleeting contact, and we (FinnBiotech) have tried to work on it 
and develop it into a test. But in many cases where the idea just comes from 
someone with whom there is no longer-term direct contact, the knowledge has 
been so insufficient that the project just has been impossible. 
Complicating action: Ideas often come from fleeting contacts; for instance, 
scientists presenting at scientific conferences, a discussion with someone, and 
so on. They may seem exciting so we have tried to take them into account and 
develop new products based on these ideas. However, where we have not had a 
direct link, especially over a longer period of time, to the person who originally 
developed the idea, we have had no access to the original information and have 
been unable to ask the developer why initial trials failed and how to continue 
development.  
Evaluation: In these cases, we just simply have not had enough knowledge to 
develop the product. The project has been impossible from the start because of 
our insufficient knowledge, and inability to acquire it from the original 
developers of the idea. 
Resolution: Product development projects like these have simply not worked 
out because of the lack of knowledge and communication. 
Coda: It is good to have lots of contacts because we need to hear lots of ideas, 
but it can be problematic if those who should develop the product do not have 
direct contact with the idea’s original developers, but have only heard about 
the idea through someone else. 
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Narrative 7: New Product Development 
Abstract: Sometimes information could have arrived sooner, as we 
(FinnBiotech) have been caught in situations where our products have been 
outdated in the market because we had not been aware of the latest scientific 
knowledge. 
Orientation: In some cases, we have been alerted by a customer that we have 
had a product on the market that has become outdated because of new 
scientific research of which we have been unaware. Sometimes we have 
launched a new product on the market, and have then heard from a customer 
that someone has already done this thing. The scientific information had been 
available, but we had not been aware or it. 
Complicating action: In situations like these, since we had not known about 
the latest scientific research, our competitors have had an advantage because 
they have had an earlier start to developing a new product, or they have had 
better and more up-to-date products on the markets. 
Evaluation: Maybe related to such things one could think that the contacts to 
universities are too weak, that we do not have a designated person at a 
university that would constantly communicate the latest research to us. 
Resolution: So, then, we have sought out the information and we have 
developed a new product version, but a little late. 
Coda: One does hear about things, but sometimes a little late. Maybe we 
should think about having closer ties to universities, especially a “trusted man” 
who would be our constant contact to what is happening in science. 
Narrative 8: New Product Development 
Abstract: It’s great that we get new product ideas from customers, but there 
have been a few cases where we (FinnBiotech) have come to realize that the 
suggestion has come too late. 
Orientation: One of our customers suggested that we develop a certain kind 
of a rapid drug test, as the customer wanted to have such a test in its product 
portfolio. This seemed like a good opportunity, because we knew that the 
demand for drug tests was growing and that we would have a customer ready 
for our test. So we started looking into it. 
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Complicating action: However, after some research and development, we 
realized that a competitor already had a similar test in the market. The product 
was already established, and it was not worth our while developing our own 
product. 
Evaluation: Unfortunately, the idea came too late. It was a good idea, and if 
we had received it earlier, it could have made a valuable addition to our 
product portfolio and strengthened our relationship with this customer. 
Resolution: We had to tell the customer that it was not worth starting to 
develop a product for the market and we did not develop the product. 
Coda: If ideas come so late that competitors have already had similar 
products on the market for a while, the idea for a new product must be rejected 
because it is known that the market is mature and competitive and prices are 
thus low. It is just not worth starting to develop such a product.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 REFLECTIONS ON INNOVATION IN MODERN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY  
Innovation in modern biotechnology has been characterized in the literature 
as highly collaborative, taking place especially between universities, small 
dedicated biotechnology firms, and large established corporations (Dodgson, 
1993). The role of universities has been argued to be central, because 
inventions in modern biotechnology are built up over long periods of time in 
the realm of basic publicly funded science (McMillan et al., 2000; Zucker, 
Darby, & Brewer, 1998), demanding industry actors to collaborate with 
universities to gain access to information concerning the latest scientific 
developments (Rothwell & Dodgson, 1991).  
The central role of universities in modern biotechnology innovation has 
been posited to be largely the reason behind the continued importance of small 
dedicated biotechnology firms in the sector (Kenney, 1998). Small dedicated 
biotechnology firms are argued to have several competitive advantages in 
modern biotechnology innovation vis-à-vis larger firms, because they are said 
to be better than large firms in transferring information from universities 
(Dodgson, 1993). This is posited to hold because small dedicated 
biotechnology firms are typically closely attached to universities and have a 
significant emphasis on research, making it easier for them to collaborate with, 
and recruit, the best scientists from universities (Kenney, 1998). Small 
dedicated biotechnology firms are also said to enjoy a number of behavioral 
advantages over their larger counterparts in innovation, such as rapid 
response to external threats and opportunities, efficient internal 
communication, and interactive management style (Rothwell & Dodgson, 
1991). 
Small dedicated biotechnology firms have also been noted in the 
literature to suffer from a number of mainly material disadvantages, 
particularly debilitating being their lack of complementary assets necessary to 
attain full returns from innovation, such as competitive manufacturing, 
marketing and distribution networks, and ability to deal with the regulatory 
procedures in getting new products on to the market (Rothwell & Dodgson, 
1991). As a result, it is noted in the literature that small dedicated 
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biotechnology firms often collaborate with larger firms in order to gain access 
to such complementary assets (Kenney, 1998). Thus, these university–small 
dedicated biotechnology firm–large firm collaborations are posited to create 
innovation systems characterized by synergies in networks of organizations 
(Dodgson, 1991a). Finally, particularly in the United States, venture capitalists 
have played an important intermediary role, helping small dedicated 
biotechnology firms access funding and create relationships in order to access 
complementary resources for innovation (Kenney, 1998). The relative dearth 
of venture capitalists in other countries has been seen as a major challenge 
(Ward & Hodgson, 2006; Ward et al., 2005). 
The role of universities in innovation at FinnBiotech was much more 
circumscribed than may have been expected based on the literature. It is 
indisputable that FinnBiotech was created around inventions that arose from 
the public science base as a result of scientific developments over a long period 
of time. It is also indubitable that the transfer of this scientific knowledge to 
FinnBiotech was localized, taking place through the personal participation of 
FinnBiotech’s founders in a project aimed at developing inventions and 
innovations from advances in the science base. These are in line with what 
could be expected based on the literature. However, unlike in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, where the founding of small dedicated biotechnology 
firms has closely followed the location of star scientists and world-leading 
research departments (Bud, 2010; Zucker & Darby, 1995, 1996), in the results 
from FinnBiotech, the involved science base was largely transferred from 
abroad through the Finnish government’s efforts rather than pioneered on the 
spot. Certainly, the transferred scientific knowledge built on long-term 
strengths in Finnish science, which made the successful transfer possible, and 
the transferred science was developed further to create original results. 
Nonetheless, this suggests that it is possible to develop successful innovations 
in a science-based sector even when the underlying science is not pioneering in 
the specific locale, but instead largely transferred from abroad. 
While universities played a key role in the initial emergence of 
FinnBiotech and its innovations, their role deviated from what might have 
been expected as the firm matured. Simply put, universities played a much less 
significant role in innovation at FinnBiotech than may have been assumed 
based on literature. Certainly, scientific research conducted at universities was 
a sine qua non for innovation at FinnBiotech, but this only provided a generic 
background to innovation. Of course, it is worth pointing out that at times 
FinnBiotech may have been excessively nonchalant about keeping up with 
developments in science. The narratives (especially Narratives 7 and 8) 
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suggest that it was the failure to have been informed about latest advances in 
science that had at times resulted in the company having outdated products or 
being late in seizing new opportunities. Moreover, the narratives (especially 
Narrative 1) suggest that while the interviewees at FinnBiotech did not 
consider universities to have provided them with much information that could 
be used directly in product innovation, the firm had received quite a full 
package of information for one of its most successful products from a 
university. While these results may be interpreted as FinnBiotech’s 
management team members slightly underestimating the importance of 
university science to innovation at FinnBiotech, their perception that 
universities provide only a distant and general background to innovation at 
FinnBiotech cannot be ignored. The results did suggest that often the distance 
between scientific knowledge generated at universities and the creation of 
successful innovation was very long and required much additional information 
and knowledge. 
Much of the most directly relevant scientific information that fed into 
innovation at FinnBiotech came from FinnBiotech’s suppliers, not universities. 
These suppliers were most likely not the original creators of this scientific 
knowledge, but information intermediaries who performed the function of 
monitoring information generated at universities, sifting out the parts relevant 
to these particular products, and bringing the information closer to practice by 
using the latest scientific knowledge to keep their products up to date. Thus, 
FinnBiotech was able to receive from them filtered and focused information of 
latest scientific advances directly relevant to their products, and the suppliers 
had already carried out significant work in converting this scientific knowledge 
into products. Considering that the interviewees, especially the Managing 
Director and the R&D Manager, strongly emphasized that the main challenge 
faced by the firm in generating innovation was in translating scientific 
knowledge into products, this service provided by the firm’s suppliers was 
significant. In other words, the suppliers could be seen as having already 
carried out some of the translational work necessary to bridge the distance 
between science and products. 
FinnBiotech’s relationship with large firms, the other main set of 
organizations noted in the literature to be important collaborating partners to 
small dedicated biotechnology firms in addition to universities, deviated 
entirely from what might have been assumed from the literature. The 
literature suggests that small dedicated biotechnology collaborate with large 
firms in order to gain access to complementary resources, such as 
manufacturing and distribution (Dodgson, 1993; Kenney, 1998). However, 
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FinnBiotech had no such large firm collaborations. While the interviewees 
described this as a strategic decision by the firm management, it also seemed 
to have been a decision very much driven by the realities of the context, these 
being the lack of suitable partners. 
FinnBiotech had been forced to develop its own manufacturing 
competences because the manufacturing capabilities necessary to produce the 
tests created at FinnBiotech simply did not exist in the market when 
FinnBiotech began producing its tests in 1990. Neither was there a suitable 
partner that might have developed these manufacturing competences on 
FinnBiotech’s behalf. Intriguingly, it did not appear that FinnBiotech looked 
for one very intensively. This could be because FinnBiotech could develop its 
own manufacturing competences quite easily because it was able to access 
information, knowledge, and expertise necessary to do this from existing 
organizations in its home market. When FinnBiotech began its own 
manufacturing of the tests it developed in the 1990s, both the product and its 
manufacturing were pioneering enough to command prices that made 
manufacturing in Finland at a relatively small scale competitive. Having been 
forced to develop manufacturing competences in-house shaped FinnBiotech’s 
subsequent manufacturing decisions. Even when reliance on internal 
manufacturing began to present challenges in terms of production volume and 
cost, FinnBiotech chose to partner with companies in South Korea and India 
that would use FinnBiotech’s manufacturing technology and ensuing expertise 
to build factories partially owned by FinnBiotech. In this way, FinnBiotech was 
able to extract value from its manufacturing innovation, even while 
overcoming the constraints of volume and cost. 
What this suggests is that manufacturing innovation may play a larger 
role in modern biotechnology innovation than is often acknowledged. Being 
able to develop this competence internally because of lack of suitable partners 
was crucial for FinnBiotech. Moreover, even when manufacturing volumes and 
cost have required FinnBiotech to expand its production to lower-cost 
countries, this has been easier using already developed production technology 
and expertise. Furthermore, even while FinnBiotech has expanded production 
to Asia to increase volumes and drive down costs, it still maintains production 
in Finland in the same facility where its R&D is located. This co-location of 
R&D and production facilitated innovation in both products and production. 
This innovation was largely symbiotic as innovation in products would have 
had little value if it could not be adapted to mass manufacturing, and 
innovation in manufacturing needed to answer the demands of product 
innovation. Thus, although focus tends to be on product innovation in the 
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modern biotechnology sector, these results suggest that its link with 
production innovation may be stronger than suggested by the literature. Of 
course, manufacturing varies from one industrial branch of biotechnology 
application to another, but these results are intriguing. 
The results indicate that FinnBiotech suffered much from the lack of a 
partner’s marketing and distribution network. Lacking the resources to build 
its own marketing and distribution network, as well as suitable partners until 
very recently (December 2012) when it entered into a collaboration with an 
Indian medical equipment manufacturer, FinnBiotech was forced to rely on 
market-based relations for marketing and distribution. This clearly presented 
keen challenges, especially for information and knowledge acquisition. Nearly 
all of the interviewees mentioned multiple times the difficulties posed to 
innovation at FinnBiotech created by the dearth of information about end 
users, their behavior and experience of the tests, the true competitive 
positioning of the tests in markets around the world, and the pricing of the 
tests throughout the distribution network. This dearth of information was the 
result of marketing and distribution intermediaries hoarding information in 
order to gain power in contract negotiations with FinnBiotech. 
The dearth of information about end users created problems for 
FinnBiotech’s R&D because it lacked the kind of rich feedback from users that 
would have allowed it to develop its tests to best suit user behavior and 
experience. The dearth of information about prices at various points in the 
marketing and distribution network meant that FinnBiotech had a weaker 
position in contract negotiations, leaving it vulnerable to pressure exerted by 
the distribution intermediaries to keep its prices down. Indeed, the problems 
created by the lack of a marketing and distribution network were explicitly 
recognized by all of the management team members. Having a good large firm 
partner providing such a marketing and distribution network could have 
helped to alleviate this problem of information acquisition. Thus, it can be 
concluded that marketing and distribution are crucial for innovation in terms 
of acquiring information for creating innovation and for exploiting innovation, 
perhaps more so than has often been acknowledged.  
Finally, venture capitalists as significant intermediaries were 
completely missing in FinnBiotech’s development, which deviates from the 
literature based on experiences in the United States, but is in line with the 
literature documenting experiences elsewhere (Ward & Hodgson, 2006; Ward 
et al., 2005). At first, when FinnBiotech was just a fledgling startup, it did not 
have the credibility to raise venture capital internationally, and venture 
capitalists were lacking in Finland at the time. Later, when FinnBiotech 
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became more established, venture capitalists became interested in investing in 
the firm, but at that time FinnBiotech no longer needed them. While the lack 
of venture capital financing is often decried as a major limiting factor in the 
development of European small dedicated biotechnology firms (Ward & 
Hodgson, 2006; Ward et al., 2005), it seems that it is possible to develop a 
successful small dedicated biotechnology firm without venture capital 
financing. FinnBiotech did this by being able to generate income from the very 
beginning and by limiting R&D investments to what it could afford, 
supplemented to a modest extent by bank loans. Certainly, this did constrain 
FinnBiotech’s growth, but nonetheless, it was possible. 
Moreover, a somewhat speculative but interesting conclusion can be 
drawn which suggests that FinnBiotech was able to compensate for the 
important intermediary role usually played by venture capitalists: that is, 
bringing business expertise and business connections to complement the 
scientific expertise and scientific connections of small high-technology firms. 
This was because FinnBiotech’s founders, although all with scientific 
backgrounds, came from both business and scientific organizations involved in 
the government-initiated science transfer and development project from which 
FinnBiotech acquired its initial scientific and technological basis. This initial 
combination of scientific, business, and entrepreneurial experience, together 
with the wide range of previous connections this experience provided, appears 
to have been highly significant for FinnBiotech’s success. FinnBiotech was able 
to start with a knowledge base that spanned both scientific knowledge and 
knowledge of “complementary assets,” together with a network of connections 
that provided access to information across this diversity of information 
domains. This suggests that it is the combination of expertise and connections 
that is crucial for providing the foundation for innovation. The specific model 
by which this is created may be less crucial. Hence, the absence of venture 
capitalists need not be a debilitating hindrance. 
Analyses of interorganizational collaboration in biotechnology have led 
researchers to posit that the most crucial resource being shared in these 
collaborations is information, so that information acquisition is critical for 
innovation (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Powell, 1998; Powell et al., 1996). 
Moreover, the knowledge necessary for innovation in modern biotechnology is 
posited to always have considerable tacit components, thus requiring personal 
interaction for its transmission (Senker, 1993, 1995). The findings at 
FinnBiotech were closely in line with what might be expected based on the 
literature: innovation at FinnBiotech depended on multiple sources of external 
information. Moreover, the findings were in line with what might be expected 
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based on arguments that all knowledge needed for innovation in modern 
biotechnology has significant tacit components, its transmission requiring 
personal interaction with the sources of the information. The narratives 
provide support for this conclusion.  
In Narrative 1, the development of a celiac test innovation, the 
importance of personal contacts for successful information acquisition came 
through especially clearly. Comparing the two instances where FinnBiotech 
attempted to make the invention function in their own laboratory, a clear 
difference exists in the extent of direct personal contact by FinnBiotech's R&D 
employees with the developers of the invention. In the first instance, 
FinnBiotech had received documented information through the technology 
transfer office of the University of Tampere, where the scientists had 
developed the invention. FinnBiotech's R&D employees were also in direct 
contact with the scientists, but the extent of this was limited, and 
FinnBiotech’s attempt to make the invention function in its own laboratory in 
Vantaa failed. However, the key turning point in the narrative came as a result 
of FinnBiotech’s R&D employees significantly increasing the extent of their 
contact with the University of Tampere scientists. This made it possible for 
FinnBiotech’s R&D Manager to obtain information directly from the scientists, 
revealing a misunderstanding that had led to an internal error at FinnBiotech’s 
laboratory in Vantaa. The increased direct personal contact between 
FinnBiotech’s R&D employees and the scientists from the University of 
Tampere made it possible to correct this error. Having overcome this hurdle, 
FinnBiotech was able to develop the invention into an innovation, which 
became the second most important product in FinnBiotech’s sales. This 
narrative may be contrasted with Narrative 6 where, when FinnBiotech’s R&D 
employees encountered a problem developing a new product in their 
laboratory, they were unable to contact the original creators of the invention to 
receive the necessary information to solve the problem. As a result, they were 
unable to proceed with development and the outcome was judged to be a 
failure. 
A third narrative, Narrative 5, provides nuance to these two events. At 
first interpretation, it appears to suggest that while direct personal contact 
may be a critical condition for successful product innovation development in 
modern biotechnology, it is not a sufficient condition. This interpretation rests 
on the emphasis in the narrative provided by the R&D Manager that in this 
attempt to develop a product innovation consisting of a rapid test version of a 
laboratory test for celiac disease developed by an Italian company, there had 
been direct personal information sharing between FinnBiotech’s R&D 
 138 
 
employees and those of the Italian company in a manner that FinnBiotech’s 
R&D Manager characterized as open, active, and frequent, with neither side 
holding information back. This perception gains support from the fact that 
FinnBiotech and the Italian company shared the goal of successfully 
developing this rapid test for celiac disease. Thus, each had the incentive to 
wish to ensure the other’s success. However, it would seem that such direct 
personal information sharing was not sufficient for a successful production 
innovation. There is a small detail in this narrative which suggests that it does 
not deviate entirely from the conclusion about the importance of direct 
personal contact for sharing also the tacit components of information: while 
the information sharing took place openly in direct personal contact, most of 
this contact was not face-to-face but through digital communications.  
This brings the discussion to the importance of local agglomeration of 
innovation activities in modern biotechnology. Here the findings deviate quite 
strongly from the existing literature, which argues that the need for tacit 
knowledge to be shared face-to-face leads to strong tendencies of local 
agglomeration of small dedicated biotechnology firms (Cooke, 2002a, 2002b). 
While the previous discussion indicates that direct personal contact is crucial 
for sharing the tacit components of information, and hence for successful 
innovation, most personal information sources for FinnBiotech’s innovation 
were not local. Indeed, local information sources were crucial only at the time 
of FinnBiotech’s founding. Ever since then, its information sources for 
innovation were global. Moreover, there is the added twist—that FinnBiotech’s 
founding was enabled by international transfer of scientific knowledge.  
FinnBiotech acquired information about science, product development, 
customers and markets, as well as quality, regulation, and patenting from 
around the globe. The only exception was information about production 
technology, but this was because FinnBiotech had been forced to develop its 
production technology in-house, so that it did not acquire much information 
externally. In short, FinnBiotech needed and sought information that was 
most relevant to its innovation, regardless of where this information was 
located in the world. Most of the information that proved to be relevant for 
innovation was abroad. This is in line with literature on information 
acquisition in by Swedish biotechnology firms (Dahlander & McKelvey, 2005; 
McKelvey et al., 2003; Waxell & Malmberg, 2007). This suggests that a small 
biotechnology company such as FinnBiotech, located in a small country like 
Finland, may be disadvantaged because it needs to go to the extra trouble of 
acquiring information internationally. If we wish to understand innovation in 
firms in these kinds of contexts, it is important to appreciate that the 
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information acquisition tactics they need to resort to are likely to require the 
extra effort of conducting these activities internationally. 
However, an interesting observation from the results is that acquiring 
information, even that which could be classified as complex and high in tacit 
components, was possible to do internationally. As long as there was direct 
personal contact, and at least same face-to-face communication, it was 
possible to acquire information successfully for innovation, especially product 
innovation. Although much of this information was high in tacit components, 
its acquisition did not require permanent (or even long-term) co-location of 
the individuals communicating it. Permanent co-location of the individuals 
with the relevant information would have made such communication easier, as 
the individuals acquiring information at FinnBiotech needed to travel 
frequently in different parts of the world, spending much time and money on 
air travel. However, it was not a necessity, contrary to arguments (Tallman & 
Chacar, 2011). 
The other argument put forth in much of the literature emphasizing the 
importance of co-location is that permanent physical co-location of individuals 
gives rise to social networks that develop over long periods of time and are 
difficult for outsiders to enter (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Owen-Smith & 
Powell, 2004; Powell, 1998; Powell et al., 2005). This did not appear to hold 
true for FinnBiotech, where social network connections were created to link 
distant individuals in order to exchange information. At international industry 
fairs, social network connections between individuals from various different 
countries were forged and maintained. Interviewees spoke of arranging 
meetings from one industry fair to another in order to explore new mutual 
interests and to foster existing business relationships. Although the concrete 
purpose of these meetings was to create sales from one company to another, 
nearly all of the interviewees emphasized the importance of meetings at 
industry fairs for the acquisition of information. Some of this was planned, 
some not. It would have been impossible to plan or contrive the chain of events 
described in Narrative 2. The individuals came together quite serendipitously. 
Permanent co-location, argued in much of the literature to be 
necessary for the formation of the social networks that permit information 
acquisition (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Powell, 1998; Powell et al., 2005), 
has not been necessary for FinnBiotech. It was not necessary for individuals to 
have a long shared past during which trust and understanding had been built 
up. Relevance appeared to outweigh convenience. It may have been easier to 
connect with individuals who were familiar and were physically co-located, but 
if they were not relevant for business or innovation purposes, this convenience 
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was of little value. This is not to say that individuals connected with each other 
completely randomly. The Russian man who came to visit FinnBiotech’s office 
unannounced did so knowing about FinnBiotech: his sister had worked in the 
diagnostics industry in Finland and informed her brother about FinnBiotech. 
Certainly, FinnBiotech’s Managing Director made a snap judgment to trust the 
Russian man with a batch of tests. At the same time, he could be seen taking a 
limited risk at first, his relationship with the Russian man building gradually 
as each found the other to be trustworthy and to share interests. Similarly, the 
creation of the connection between FinnBiotech’s Managing Director and 
South Korean individuals through the Russian man was serendipitous, but 
there was a shared background between the South Koreans and the Russian 
man, all having worked at the National Institutes of Health in the United 
States. Furthermore, after the initial South Korean connections were made by 
FinnBiotech’s Managing Director, the resulting connections in South Korea 
were based on family relationships.  
Many of the new relationships that FinnBiotech was able to create at 
industry fairs were driven by its growing reputation in its industry, which 
helped to attract attention and trust. The social relationship building took 
place in a community of its own, that of the diagnostics industry, and even 
more specifically, that of the point-of-care and rapid test industry. This 
community was not physically co-located, but exhibited many of the social 
network dynamics posited to exist in physically co-located clusters, such as 
gradual relationship building over often long periods of time, reputation-based 
trust generated and communicated largely by word-of-mouth, and face-to-face 
communication at the industry fairs. Intriguingly, all this happened in a 
physically dispersed community rather than the local community emphasized 
in the literature. 
These findings thus diverge from the consensus in the literature on 
some important points, notably the relative unimportance of university 
research, the greatest information acquisition challenges being related to 
customers and markets, and the important factor supporting information 
acquisition being shared experience in the international diagnostics industry. 
It is possible that the findings are the result of this company being a special 
case, but it is also possible that they relate to the sector in which this company 
is located, the biotechnology equipment and supplies sector. Indeed, prior 
evidence demonstrates that biotechnology innovation dynamics vary between 
industries (Senker, van Zwanenberg, Caloghirou, Zambarloukos, Kolisis, 
Enzing, et al., 2001). The available literature on innovation in biotechnology 
mainly focuses on the pharmaceuticals industry, and it is possible that the 
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biotechnology innovation dynamics described in this literature are peculiar to 
the pharmaceuticals industry. As the data in this study was gathered from a 
firm in the biotechnology equipment and supplies industry, it may be that 
where the results in this study diverge from the literature, this reflects 
different biotechnology innovation dynamics in industries other than 
pharmaceuticals. However, the question of whether these findings reflect a 
special case or innovation dynamics particular to the biotechnology equipment 
and supplies sector can only be answered by further research on information 
acquisition for innovation by small companies in other sectors. 
5.2 REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION 
ACQUISITION 
Four perspectives with which to viw information acquisition were identified in 
the international business literature. These were labeled as approaching 
information acquisition in international business primarily in terms of: 
1) information transactions 
2) experiential and network learning 
3) tacit information transmission and conversion 
4) social learning in communities and networks of practice 
The first perspective focuses on difficulties affecting information transactions 
resulting primarily from information asymmetry and opportunism and 
amenable to resolution by internalizing transactions (Buckley & Casson, 1976, 
1986; Hennart, 1977, 1982, 2003). The second perspective emphasizes the 
importance of experiential knowledge, distinguished from objective 
knowledge, and the consequent gradual nature of experiential learning 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990, 2009). The third perspective argues for the 
importance of tacit knowledge and postulates that its transmission requires 
shared codes provided by a community (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995), and asserts that multinational companies constitute such communities 
(Kogut & Zander, 1993). The fourth perspective proclaims that all knowledge 
has tacit components and is therefore embedded in local intra-organizational 
communities of practice and local interorganizational networks of practice, 
which the multinational company must tap into in order to acquire 
information internationally (Tallman & Chacar, 2011). The first, second, and 
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fourth perspectives resonated somewhat with the results, but none of them 
completely. 
The first perspective, which emphasizes difficulties of information 
transactions (Buckley & Casson, 1976, 1986; Hennart, 1977, 1982, 2003) 
echoed with the results in that the information that was most challenging for 
FinnBiotech to acquire was information about end users and prices at various 
points on the distribution chain. None of this information could really be 
characterized as complex or as having significant tacit components. Instead, 
this information was difficult to acquire because FinnBiotech had to rely on 
market-based relationships in its marketing and distribution network, which 
resulted in each actor (i.e., firm in this discussion) aiming to optimize its own 
gain at the expense of others. As a result, each market actor hoarded 
information that could increase the power it wielded in contract negotiations 
with the other actors. Hence, the market actors could be seen as trying to bring 
about, and maintain, information asymmetry among themselves. Thus, while 
this economics-based perspective to understanding information in 
international business has somewhat fallen out of fashion, the results suggest 
that it can be an important tool to understanding information acquisition in 
international business. 
 The second perspective, which emphasizes the importance of 
experience and argues that it is gained only gradually (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977, 1990, 2009) echoed somewhat with the results. Continued experiential 
learning, for instance about ways to act in international industry fairs, 
provided a gradually improving basis for acquiring information necessary for 
innovation. However, the dichotomy posited between experiential and 
objective information in this perspective was problematic. While it is quite 
impossible to argue against the importance of experience, the way experiential 
information is conceptualized in this perspective did not readily lend itself to a 
logical interpretation of the results. Neither did the concept of relationship-
specific information. FinnBiotech was juggling so many partners that it could 
not be said to have committed to learning deeply about any specific partners. 
Indeed, to do so might have been detrimental to innovation, as it is often noted 
in the innovation literature that a wide and diverse information base helps 
foster innovation.  
The third perspective, which emphasizes the difficulties of transmitting 
tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) and maintains that 
the multinational corporation exists as a community of shared codes to do this 
(Kogut & Zander, 1993), appeared quite problematic when trying to use it to 
interpret the results. The most problematic aspect could be said to be its sharp, 
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even dichotomous distinction between explicit information and tacit 
knowledge, similar to the dichotomous distinction between objective 
knowledge and experiential knowledge in the second perspective. Certainly, 
some variations of the argument in this perspective assert that knowledge 
differs in the extent of its tacit components, rather than positing that explicit 
and tacit knowledge constitute two distinct and dichotomous knowledge types 
(Kogut & Zander, 1993). However, even while appreciating this subtlety, this 
theoretical perspective still did not resonate with the results. The literature 
holds that information that is highest in tacit components is the most difficult 
to transmit. This was not the case here. The information that was the most 
difficult to acquire involved end users and prices and much of it was quite 
simple and explicit. Moreover, it is argued in this perspective that information 
high in tacit components can be transmitted only in communities that share 
the same codes, rules, and routines, and that multinational companies are the 
pre-eminent international communities able to do this. However, it emerged 
in the results that shared codes, rules, and routines could be sustained in 
international communities beyond firms, such as the one maintained by 
international industry fairs in the international diagnostics industry.   
The fourth perspective, which emphasizes joint participation in an 
activity as a way to learn architectural knowledge that helps the sharing of 
component knowledge (Tallman & Chacar, 2011), resonated with the identified 
facilitating factors in information acquisition in this study—similar work 
practices/activities and educational/professional backgrounds. However, this 
perspective emphasizes physical co-location. The results strongly deviated 
from this, as information acquisition was not local but global. Furthermore, 
the foremost community constructed by joint participation in an activity was 
the physically dispersed international community of the diagnostics industry. 
This international community of practice dominantly provided shared 
understandings and facilitated information acquisition.  
5.3 FURTHER THOUGHTS FOR RESEARCH 
There were important themes that emerged from the empirical study that 
could not be accommodated within the literature. These themes are reviewed 
here, noting points of convergence with other existing theoretical discussions 
that may be identified as not having been fully used in conjunction with the 
topic of information acquisition for innovation in international business. It is 
suggested that examining these themes in further research would be important 
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and intriguing, and that theoretical streams exist already which can be drawn 
upon in such research.  
5.3.1 Importance of “Right Information” 
Throughout the dissertation, the terms “information” and “knowledge” have 
been used in combination, sometimes roughly synonymously. This was a 
choice made on the basis of the literature review, in which both terms are used 
and are often not distinguished. The same partial confluence of terms could be 
noted in the results because of the difficulties posed by translating from 
Finnish, where only a single term exists for both “information” and 
“knowledge.” However, it was clear from the results that information and 
knowledge need to be distinguished. The interviewees repeatedly talked about 
the importance of “right information” and about the criticality of processing it 
in a way that may be interpreted as referring to the processing of information 
in order to convert it into knowledge. In turn, it was crucial to be able to act on 
this knowledge, but action could only ensue on the basis of knowledge as 
processed information, not on information per se. Indeed, the interviewees 
were insistent that information in itself was not valuable—only “right 
information” was valuable, and even then, it needed to be processed into 
knowledge that provided a basis for actions. 
The interviewees talked throughout the interviews about “right 
information,” stating that information in itself was neither valuable nor 
difficult to acquire, but “right information” was. It was this “right information” 
that was valuable and which was experienced at times as challenging to 
acquire. The interviewees also defined, unprompted, this right information in 
very similar ways: as information that was necessary and relevant to their 
work activities and FinnBiotech in general, sufficiently focused and specific, 
and—this being particularly significant—reliable. The importance of reliability 
of information was emphasized as a key factor in what made information 
valuable. This was because, for a small firm like FinnBiotech, unreliable and 
incorrect information was highly dangerous, possibly leading to mistakes that 
could be fatal for a small firm. 
The interviewees all emphasized a point that also came out indirectly in 
the interviews, that “right information” was only a small part of all information 
that is available. Indeed, the voluminous amounts of information available 
were often hindrances in the quest to acquire “right information,” as this 
required expending considerable resources sifting through mountains of 
information. In the vernacular, one might describe “right information” as 
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being akin to a needle in a haystack. Thus, the ability to identify, select, and 
evaluate information in order to be able to consider it “right information” was 
critical. Interviewees made judgments concerning what could be considered 
“right information” by transposing reasoning processes from their scientific 
training. They checked information from several independent sources and 
evaluated the quality of the methods used in obtaining the conclusions. Such 
reasoning processes were applied to all types of information all the way 
through to market gossip. 
It is intriguing that the distinction between information per se, and 
information that may be considered “right information” has not been made in 
the international business literature. The literature tends to consider 
information and knowledge as good and valuable per se. Thus, the concept of 
knowledge easily becomes excessively vague, readily applied to anything and 
everything. As Alvesson (2004) notes, discussion has often fallen into what he 
calls a “knowledge is just good” trap: 
Since everything can be seen as knowledge in one way or another, 
the term easily leads to rather vague and all-embracing 
statements. It is odd to read texts that avoid defining what 
knowledge actually refers to but still confidently claim that this 
unknown quality or ill-defined phenomenon accomplishes all sorts 
of good things. … Knowledge too easily leads to efforts to cover 
broad terrain. (Alvesson 2004: 229 - 230) 
In some other bodies of literature, especially that dealing with 
competitive intelligence and innovation, the problem of abundance of external 
information for innovation has been noted (Macdonald, 2006). Here, the 
question has been raised of how an organization is able to find the information 
it needs from this abundance of external information. It is argued in this 
literature that what is “right information” is information that is found and 
assessed by an expert using his/her knowledge to find and assess bits of new 
information that can increase his/her knowledge. Only the expert is able to tell 
what information is new, relevant, valuable, and reliable. 
The interviewees were able to carry out the critical functions of 
identifying “right information” from the excess of all information. They had 
the requisite expertise to be able to evaluate the information at hand. In other 
words, at one extreme, when they were dealing with scientific knowledge in 
their own field, they found it very easy to evaluate the profusion of 
information, select the necessary bits, evaluate them for relevance and 
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reliability, and combine them with other pieces of information. However, 
when the interviewees were faced with a new type of situation, such as that of 
the patenting dispute where the U.S. company was using patenting as a hostile 
competitive strategy, they were not able “sniff out” the “right information” they 
would have needed to expertly deal with this problem. They had no expertise 
in the area, no knowledge. Were such a situation to arise again, they would be 
better equipped to deal with it, as the Managing Director actually described 
this incident as an example of “very expensive learning.” 
5.3.2 Importance of Converting Information into Knowledge 
Although the interviewees did not distinguish between information and 
knowledge, largely because of the constraints of the Finnish language in which 
the interviews were conducted, many of their descriptions of what they did 
with the “right information” could be interpreted as descriptions of converting 
information into knowledge. Having selected and evaluated information to 
draw the conclusion that it could be considered “right knowledge,” the 
interviewees repeatedly described analyzing and interpreting this information 
as well as combining it with other information. These activities could be 
interpreted as the conversion of information into knowledge. Converting 
information into knowledge required similar types of expertise to those 
involved in finding “right information”: using their expertise, the interviewees 
were able to analyze, interpret, and combine information into knowledge. 
Thus, the resources needed were specifically human capabilities—humans 
being active and using their minds and existing knowledge and skills to seek 
out, select, and evaluate “right information,” then to analyze and interpret it 
for use, and combine it with other pieces of “right information.” As the 
narratives pointed out, clues and ideas were actively sought and creatively 
combined in order to reach conclusions that would not have been available 
otherwise. The interviewees described asking for hints, or being alert to little 
snippets of information “falling out” accidentally in informal conversations; by 
being alert to these pieces of information and creatively combining them, they 
could construct findings. 
Thus, to arrive at “right information” and knowledge involved activity 
throughout, from evaluating and interpreting available information, actively 
seeking new bits of information to complement existing information, and 
actively creating new knowledge from little bits and pieces. In other words, 
acquiring knowledge was not so much about straightforward sharing or not 
sharing of information between market participants, but about the active use 
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of the human mind to arrive first at “right information” and to then convert it 
into knowledge. Through mental activity, individuals could surmise much 
more than was directly communicated, creating new knowledge rather than 
passively expecting to receive it as a ready-made entity. Knowing where to 
search for information, being able to recognize what was useful, and being able 
to analyze, evaluate, interpret, and combine it was vital.  
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to delve into the complex 
discussions of what knowledge is. However, it is noted that the classical 
philosophical definition of knowledge as justified true belief could be seen to 
fit the results. Nonaka et al. are perhaps the most influential detractors from 
the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief. Although in most 
of the publications, Nonaka et al. claim to have adopted the definition of 
knowledge as justified true belief, they do state that they have actually 
modified this definition considerably, mostly considering knowledge to be 
personal belief and emphasizing its justification, largely dismissing the need 
for truthfulness (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). This is said to be because the 
dynamism of the business environment means that individuals acting in this 
context do not have the luxury of arriving at justified true belief, needing to 
use justified belief instead in order to function in their fast-paced world. 
However, the results here point to the opposite: individuals acting in this 
business world could not act on justified belief. They needed to ascertain that 
these beliefs were also true. In other words, as FinnBiotech’s Managing 
Director emphasized, acting on knowledge which turned out to be incorrect 
could lead to mistakes that might be fatal to such a small company. A large 
company is much more likely to have the resources to be able to absorb 
mistakes without foundering. Nonetheless, one can speculate that incorrect 
knowledge would be harmful also to larger companies. The argument is 
intriguing: knowledge must be true if it is to form a sound basis for action.    
The claim attached to the communities-of-practice concept that 
knowledge inheres in social relations rather than in individual minds insists 
that the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief is outmoded. 
However, the results here accommodate both a definition of knowledge as 
justified true belief and the importance of social relations for knowledge. 
Moreover, this argument is also made in contemporary philosophy: Longino 
(2002) argues that social relations and individual human reason are not in 
opposition. Moreover, the definition of knowledge as justified true belief is 
often dismissed on the grounds that it leads to a positivist philosophy. It does 
not. This classical philosophical definition of knowledge is commensurate with 
nearly all strands of philosophy, as different streams simply define the 
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conditions under which belief is considered to be justified and true differently 
(Moser & vander Nat, 2003). Furthermore, claiming that it is important to pay 
attention to converting information into knowledge does not necessarily mean 
the adoption of an information-processing approach (Crowther-Heyck, 2005; 
Richards, 2003), contrary to arguments by Nonaka et al. (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Nonaka, Umemoto, & Senoo, 1996). Instead, this claim logically leads to 
examinations of how individuals determine what constitutes truth and 
justification in different situations, in other words, how knowledge is 
manufactured in various contexts. This notion is similar to Knorr-Cetina’s 
work on epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina, 1999). 
The conclusion here is that it is important to distinguish between 
information and knowledge, and here the classical definition of knowledge as 
justified true belief helps shed light on what needs to be done to information in 
order to arrive at considering it knowledge: it needs to be judged to be 
justifiably true. This is important for individuals making decisions in a small 
firm. Were they to act solely on justified beliefs, especially of the kind Nonaka 
describes as justified by prior strategic decisions, this would constrain their 
ability to innovate. Moreover, theoretical arguments can be found in 
contemporary philosophy that provide support for the conclusion that 
highlighting the definition of knowledge as justified true belief need to neither 
exclude social aspects of knowing nor lead to positivist philosophy. Indeed, it 
can be claimed that emphasizing the importance of justification and truth, 
arrived at through individual interpretation, is in accordance with Polanyi’s 
original argument that knowledge can never be entirely separated from 
individuals (Polanyi, [1966] 1983). Hence, it becomes questionable whether 
knowledge can ever be acquired, or whether an individual always acquires 
information that can be converted into knowledge only through that 
individual’s active interpretation. 
5.3.3 Importance of Ability to Act on Knowledge 
Information, even if it is “right information” and is processed into knowledge, 
is not valuable if it cannot be used. Hence, it is emphasized in the results of the 
present study that knowledge needed to be very specific and close to actual 
activities: no matter how well selected, evaluated, analyzed, interpreted, and 
combined, if the knowledge could not be used it was of no value. However, the 
challenge of using knowledge was oriented more towards the capabilities of the 
individuals using it than the content and characteristics of knowledge. In other 
words, here again the individuals needed to have the expertise required to be 
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able to use knowledge in actual activities. This is in line with sociology of 
knowledge literature. For example, in discussing economically and societally 
productive knowledge, Stehr (2001) argues that the utility of knowledge does 
not intrinsically reside in knowledge: rather, it is a capacity for action that 
needs to be used for knowledge to be productive. 
5.3.4 International Communities and Networks of Practice 
The main community that facilitated information acquisition in international 
business was the diagnostics industry, largely maintained by international 
industry fairs. This contrasts with arguments in international business studies 
of the pre-eminence of nations, multinational corporations, and local 
communities and networks of practice as providing the primary social 
institutions within which information can be communicated. This study finds 
that information for innovation could be acquired successfully across national 
borders, organizational boundaries, and over long distances as long as there 
was direct personal contact and some face-to-face communication. Rather 
than shared nationality, shared organizational membership, or permanent 
physical co-location, what enabled information acquisition, and the 
construction of social networks to help ease access, was shared educational 
background, shared industry experience, and shared goals and interests. 
None of the theoretical perspectives in the literature review could help 
to interpret this existence of an international, inter-organizational industry 
community that was the pre-eminent facilitator of international information 
acquisition for innovation. However, these results are in accordance with 
literature within the so-called practice-theoretic perspective (Schatzki, 2002; 
Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & von Savigny, 2001). A core argument in this 
literature is that knowledge always has tacit components and is, therefore, 
always embedded in, and constituted by, socio-cultural practices where 
knowing is inherently connected with doing (Gherardi, 2000; Gherardi & 
Nicolini, 2001, 2005; Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003). This is the same 
core argument as in the perspective in international business studies which 
approaches international information acquisition as social learning in 
communities and networks of practice (Tallman & Chacar, 2011). However, as 
communities-of-practice theorizing (Brown & Duguid, [1991] 2000; Cox, 
2005; Kimble, 2006) has inspired this perspective, it emphasizes physical co-
location of these communities and networks of practice. However, some 
practice-based knowledge researchers specifically argue that groups can 
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sustain common knowledge practices even without physical co-location 
(Yanow, 2003).  
Therefore, it is possible to view the existence of the international 
diagnostics industry through this theoretical lens, classifying it as a 
conglomeration of international—as opposed to local—communities and 
networks of practice, where practices are defined as structured human 
traditions for interaction around specific tasks and goals (Hedegaard, 
Chaiklin, & Jensen, 1999). Applying this to the results, these human traditions 
for interaction could be seen to generate an international diagnostics industry 
community around the shared tasks and goals of developing, selling, and using 
diagnostic tests and other equipment and services related to them. 
Acknowledging that the notion of practice as an analytical tool is theoretically 
unsaturated (Engeström & Miettinen, 1999; Hedegaard et al., 1999) provides 
further support that it is possible to consider practices to be constituted 
internationally as well as locally. In other words, the notion of practice is not 
exclusive tied to the concept of communities of practice with its emphasis on 
physical co-location. Actor-network theory (Latour, 2005) and activity theory 
(Chaiklin, Hedegaard, & Jensen, 1999; Engeström, Miettinen, & Punamäki, 
1999; Hedegaard et al., 1999; Wertsch, 1985) within this perspective accord 
with this conclusion drawn from the results, as they both emphasize the role of 
intermediaries in practices. These intermediaries range from ideas to 
documents to physical tools, and they may be seen to enable the construction 
and maintenance of an international community, such as the diagnostics 
industry community, which is physically distributed, whose members are 
restricted to intermittent face-to-face contact, and hail from different national 
cultures and organizations.  
This interpretation can be taken a step further when extending it to 
how the dynamics of the different information domains are examined. It 
appeared in the results that each of the information domains—revolving 
around the subjects of science, product development, production and 
production equipment, markets and customers, and quality, regulation, and 
patenting—had its own dynamics. If each of these domains is seen as 
constituted by practices in the actor-network and activity theoretic senses, 
they can be seen as structured human traditions for interaction around specific 
tasks and goals that rely on the use of intermediaries (Chaiklin et al., 1999; 
Engeström et al., 1999; Hedegaard et al., 1999; Latour, 2005). Viewing them in 
this way makes it possible to see that the expertise that was emphasized as 
making it possible to acquire “right information,” convert it into knowledge, 
and act upon it is somewhat different in each of these information domains. 
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Indeed, the more knowledgeable and experienced the interviewees at 
FinnBiotech were about each of these information domains, the better they 
were able to navigate within its structured human traditions in order to 
acquire information successfully. By contrast, when they were inexperienced 
in a certain information domain, such as the use of patenting as an aggressive 
strategic competition tactic, they were not able to act in ways that could bring 
about such success. The greatest innovation success could come about when 
the interviewees had knowledge and expertise across all of the necessary 
information domains, and were able to acquire the necessary “right 
information” in each domain, convert it into knowledge, and act upon it to 
develop and exploit innovations internationally. 
 
 152 
 
REFERENCES 
Abir-Am, P. (1987). The Biotheoretical Gathering, Trans-disciplinary Authority and the 
Incipient Legitimation of Molecular Biology in the 1930s: New Perspective in the 
Historical Sociology of Science. History of Science, 25(1987), 1-70.  
Academy of Finland. (2002). Biotechnology in Finland. Impact of Public Research Funding 
and Strategies for the Future. Evaluation Report. Helsinki: Academy of Finland. 
Almeida, P., & Kogut, B. (1997). The Exploration of Technological Diversity and the 
Geographical Localization of Innovation. Small Business Economics, 9(1), 21-31.  
Alvesson, M. (2004). Knowledge Work  and Knowledge-Intensive Firms. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Andersen, B., & Rossi, F. (2011). UK Universities Look Beyond the Patent Policy Discourse 
in Their Intellectual Property Strategies. Science and Public Policy, 38(4), 254-268.  
Anderson, D. R. (1987). Creativity and the Philosophy of C.S.Peirce. Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff. 
Arora, A., & Gambardella, A. (1990). Complementarity and External Linkages: The Strategies 
of the Large Firms in Biotechnology. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 38(4), 
361-379.  
Arrow, K. (1962). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. In K. 
Arrow (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (pp. 609-625). Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Arrow, K. (1984). Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Volume 4: The Economics of 
Information. New York, NY: Belknap Press. 
Arrow, K. (1996). Technical Information and Industrial Structure. Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 5(2), 645-652.  
Arrow, K. (1999). Information and the Organization of Industry. In G. Chichilnisky (Ed.), 
Markets, Information and Uncertainty: Essays in Economic Theory in Honor of 
Kenneth J. Arrow (pp. 19-25). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Arrow, K. (2001). Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care (American 
Economic Review, 1963). Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 26(5), 851-883.  
Audretsch, D. (2001). The Role of Small Firms in U.S. Biotechnology Clusters. Small Business 
Economics, 17(1), 3-15.  
Audretsch, D. (2002). The Dynamic Role of Small Firms: Evidence from the U.S. Small 
Business Economics, 18(1-3), 13-40.  
Audretsch, D. (2009). The Entrepreneurial Society. Journal of Technology Transfer, 34, 245-
254.  
Audretsch, D., & Feldman, M. (1996). Innovative Clusters and the Industry Life Cycle. Review 
of Industrial Organization, 11(2), 253-273.  
Audretsch, D., & Stephan, P. (1996). Company-Scientist Locational Links: The Case of 
Biotechnology. American Economic Review, 86(2), 641-652.  
 153 
 
Audretsch, D., & Thurik, A. (2000). Capitalism and Democracy in the 21st Century: From the 
Managed to the Entrepreneurial Economy. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 10(1-
2), 17-34.  
Autio, E. (2005). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 2005 Global Report on High-
Expectation Entrepreneurship. London: Babson College, London Business School, 
and Global Entrepreneurship Research Consortium (GERA). 
Autio, E. (2007). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 2007 Global Report on High-
Growth Entrepreneurship London: Babson College, London Business School, and 
Global Entrepreneurship Research Consortium (GERA). 
Autio, E., & Hoeltzl, W. (2008). Europe INNOVA Gazelles Panel Summary Report. In Innova 
(Ed.), Europe INNOVA Panel Reports. Brussels: EU DG Innovation. 
Axley, S. R. (1984). Managerial and Organizational Communication in Terms of the Conduit 
Metaphor. Academy of Management Review, 9(3), 428-437.  
Bar-Hillel, Y., & Carnap, R. (1953). Semantic Information. The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 4(14), 147-157.  
Barnum, S. (2005). Biotechnology. An Introduction (2nd. ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson 
Brooks/Cole. 
Bauer, M., Durant, J., & Gaskell, G. (1998). Biotechnology in the Public Sphere: A 
Comparative View. In J. Durant, M. Bauer & G. Gaskell (Eds.), Biotechnology in the 
Public Sphere: A European Sourcebook. London: Science Museum Press. 
Bell, G., & Zaheer, A. (2007). Geography, Networks, and Knowledge Flows. Organization 
Science, 18(6), 955-972.  
Blind, K., Edler, J., Frietsch, R., & Schmoch, U. (2006). Motives to Patent: Empirical 
Evidence from Germany. Research Policy, 35(5), 655-672.  
Bogliacino, F., & Panta, M. (2010). Innovation and Employment: A Reinvestigation Using 
Revised Pavitt Classes. Research Policy, 39(6), 799-809.  
Bourgaize, D., Jewell, T., & Buiser, R. (2000). Biotechnology. Demystifying the Concepts. San 
Francisco, CA: Addison Wesley Longman. 
Breznitz, S., & Anderson, W. (2005). Boston Metropolitan Area Biotechnology Cluster. 
Canadian Journal of Regional Science, XXVIII (2), 249-264.  
Brink, J., McKelvey, M., & Smith, K. (2004). Conceptualizing and Measuring Modern 
Biotechnology. In M. McKelvey, A. Rickne & J. Laage-Hellman (Eds.), The 
Economic Dynamics of Modern Biotechnology (pp. 20-41). Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Brody, B. (2006a). Intellectual Property and Biotechnology: The U.S. Internal Experience--
Part I. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 16(1), 1-37.  
Brody, B. (2006b). Intellectual Property and Biotechnology: The U.S. Internal Experience--
Part II. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 16(2), 105-128.  
Brown, J., & Duguid, P. (1991). Organizational Learning and Communities of Practice: 
Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation. Organization Science, 
2(1), 40-57.  
 154 
 
Brown, J., & Duguid, P. (2001). Knowledge and Organization: A Social-Practice Perspective. 
Organization Science, 12(2), 198-213.  
Brown, J., & Duguid, P. ([1991] 2000). Organizational Learning and Communities-of-Practice: 
Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation. In R. L. Cross & S. 
Israelit (Eds.), Strategic Learning in a Knowledge Economy: Individual, Collective 
and Organizational Learning Processes. Woburn, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Buckley, P., & Casson, M. (1976). The Future of the Multinational Enterprise. London: 
Macmillan. 
Buckley, P., & Casson, M. (1986). The Economic Theory of the Multinational Enterprise. 
London: Macmillan. 
Buckley, P., & Hashai, N. (2004). A Global System View of Firm Boundaries. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 35, 33–45.  
Bud, R. (1991). Biotechnology in the Twentieth Century. Social Studies of Science, 21(3), 415-
457.  
Bud, R. (1992). The Zymotechnic Roots of Biotechnology. British Journal of the History of 
Science, 25, 127-144.  
Bud, R. (1993). The Uses of Life. A History of Biotechnology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bud, R. (1998). Molecular Biology and the Long-Term History of Biotechnology. In A. 
Thackray (Ed.), Private Science. Biotechnology and the Rise of the Molecular 
Sciences (pp. 3-19). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Bud, R. (2010). From Applied Microbiology to Biotechnology: Science, Medicine, and 
Industrial Renewal. Notes & Records of the Royal Society, 64, S17–S29.  
Camagni, R. (1991). 'Local Milieu,' Uncertainty and Innovation Networks: Towards a New 
Dynamic Theory of Economic Space. In R. Camagni (Ed.), Innovation Networks: 
Spatial Perspectives (pp. 121-143). London: Belhaven Press. 
Camagni, R., & Capello, R. (2000). The Role of Inter-SME Networking and Links in 
Innovative High-technology Milieux. In D. Keeble & F. Wilkinson (Eds.), High-
Technology Clusters, Networking and Collective Learning in Europe (pp. 118-155). 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Cantwell, J., & Brannen, M. (2011). Positioning JIBS as an Interdisciplinary Journal. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 42(1), 1-9.  
Capurro, R., & Hjørland, B. (2005). The Concept of Information. Annual Review of 
Information Science and Technology, 37(1), 343-411.  
Carlson, B. (2009). Are In Vitro Diagnostics Recession-Proof? BioMarket Trends, 29(10).  
Casper, S., & Kettler, H. (2001). National Institutional Frameworks and the Hybridization of 
Entrepreneurial Business Models: The German and UK Biotechnology Sectors. 
Industry and Innovation, 8(1), 5-30.  
Casson, M. (2000). The Economics of International Business: A New Research Agenda. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 155 
 
Caves, R. (2003). Research on International Business: Problems and Prospects. In T. L. 
Brewer, S. Young & S. E. Guisinger (Eds.), The New Economic Analysis of 
Multinationals (pp. 1-16). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Chaiklin, S., Hedegaard, M., & Jensen, U. J. (Eds.). (1999). Activity Theory and Social 
Practice: Cultural Historical Approaches. Århus: Århus Universitetsforlag. 
Charmaz, K. (2001). Qualitative Interviewing and Grounded Theory Analysis. In J. F. Gubrium 
& J. A. Holstein (Eds.), Handbook of Interview Research. Context & Method (pp. 
675-694). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Chiaroni, D., & Chiesa, V. (2005). Driving Forces in Cluster Creation and Development in the 
Biotech Industry: An International Comparison. International Journal of Technology 
Intelligence and Planning, 1(3), 266-288.  
Chiaroni, D., & Chiesa, V. (2006). Forms of Creation of Industrial Clusters in Biotechnology. 
Technovation, 26(9), 1064-1076.  
Child, J., & Heavens, S. J. (2001). The Social Constitution of Organizations and its 
Implications for Organizational Learning. In M. Dierkes, A. B. Antal, J. Child & I. 
Nonaka (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (pp. 308-326). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cooke, P. (2000). Learning Commercialisation of Science: Biotechnology and the New 
Economy Innovation System. Paper presented at the DRUID Summer 2000 
Conference, Aalborg. 
Cooke, P. (2002a). Biotechnology Clusters as Regional, Sectoral Innovation Systems. 
International Regional Science Review, 25(1), 8-37.  
Cooke, P. (2002b). Regional Innovation Systems: General Findings and Some New Evidence 
from Biotechnology Clusters. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 27(1).  
Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (1990). Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and 
Evaluative Criteria. Qualitative Sociology, 13(1), 3-21.  
Coriat, B., Orsland, F., & Weinstein, O. (2003). Does Biotech Reflect a New Science-Based 
Innovation Regime? Industry and Innovation, 10(3), 231-253.  
Cortright, J., & Mayer, H. (2002). Signs of Life: The Growth of Biotechnology Centers in the 
U.S. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan 
Policy. 
Cox, A. (2005). What are Communities of Practice? A Comparative Review of Four Seminal 
Works. Journal of Information Science, 31(6), 527-540.  
Crowther-Heyck, H. (2005). Herbert A. Simon: The Bounds of Reason in Modern America. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Cyert, R., & March, J. ([1963] 1992). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Business. 
Dahlander, L., & McKelvey, M. (2005). The Occurrence and Spatial Distribution of 
Collaboration: Biotech Firms in Gothenburg, Sweden. Technology Analysis and 
Strategic Management, 17(4), 409-431.  
Davies, K. (2001). Cracking the Genome. Inside the Race to Unlock Human DNA. Baltimore, 
MD: The Johnks Hopkins University Press. 
 156 
 
Day, R. E. (2000). The Conduit Metaphor and the Nature and Politics of Information Studies. 
Journal of the American Society for Information Science, 51(9), 805-811.  
De Chadarevian, S. (2011). The Making of an Entrepreneurial Science: Biotechnology in 
Britain, 1975-1995. Isis, 102(4), 601-633.  
de Chadarevian, S., & Kamminga, H. (1998). Molecularizing Biology and Medicine: New 
Practices and Alliances 1910s-1970s. Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach Science 
Publishers. 
Dimand, R. (2004). Neoclassical Theory of International Trade. London: Routledge. 
Dodgson, M. (1991a). The Management of Technological Learning: Lessons from a 
Biotechnology Company. Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter. 
Dodgson, M. (1991b). Technology Learning, Technology Strategy and Competitive Pressures. 
British Journal of Management, 2(3), 133-149.  
Dodgson, M. (1993). Collaboration and Innovation - the Case of Biotechnology. In M. 
Dodgson (Ed.), Technological Collaboration in Industry. Strategy, Policy and 
Internationalization in Innovation (pp. 57-70). London: Routledge. 
Dosi, G., Llerena, P., & Sylos Labini, M. (2006). Science-Technology-Industry Links and the 
'European Paradox': Some Notes on the Dynamics of Scientific and Technological 
Research in Europe. In E. Lorenz & B. Lundvall (Eds.), How Europe's Economies 
Learn - Coordinating Competing Models (pp. 203-234). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
DuBois, F., & Reeb, D. (2000). Ranking the International Business Journals. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 31(4), 689-704.  
Dunning, J. (2003). The Key Literature on IB Activities: 1960-2000. In A. Rugman & T. L. 
Brewer (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Business (pp. 39-71). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Dunning, J., & Rugman, A. (1985). The Influence of Hymer's Dissertation on the Theory of 
Foreign Direct Investment. The American Economic Review, 75(2), 228-232.  
Eisenberg, R. (2006). The Story of Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Technological Change and the 
Subject Matter Boundaries of the Patent System. In J. C. Ginsburg & R. C. Dreyfuss 
(Eds.), Intellectual Property Stories (pp. 327-357). New York, NY: Foundation Press. 
Engeström, Y., & Miettinen, R. (1999). Introduction. In Y. Engeström, R. Miettinen & R.-L. 
Punamäki (Eds.), Perspectives on Activity Theory (Learning in Doing: Social, 
Cognitive and Computational Perspectives) (pp. 19-38). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Engeström, Y., Miettinen, R., & Punamäki, R.-L. (Eds.). (1999). Perspectives on Activity 
Theory (Learning in Doing: Social, Cognitive and Computational Perspectives). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Enzing, C. T. G. (2011). Sectoral Innovation Watch. Biotechnology Sector. Final Report. 
Consortium Europe INNOVA Sectoral Innovation Watch. Brussels: EC European 
Commission Enterprise and Industry. 
Erden, Z., von Krogh, G., & Nonaka, I. (2008). The Quality of Group Tacit Knowledge. 
Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 17(1), 4-18.  
 157 
 
Ernst & Young. (2012). Beyond Borders. Global Biotechnology Report 2012. London: Ernst & 
Young. 
European Commission. (1995). Green Paper on Innovation. Luxembourg: European 
Commission. 
European Commission. (2002). Life Sciences and Biotechnology - A Strategy for Europe. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Fagerberg, J. (2005). Innovation: A Guide to the Literature. In J. Fagerberg, D. C. Mowery & 
R. R. Nelson (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (pp. 1-26). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Fári, M., & Kralovánszky, U. (2006). The Founding Father of Biotechnology: Károly (Karl) 
Ereky. International Journal of Horticultural Science, 12(1), 9-12.  
Faulconbridge, J. (2008). Exploring the Role of Professional Associations in Collective 
Learning in London and New York's Advertising and Law Professional Service Firm 
Clusters. Environment and Planning, 39, 965-984.  
Feldman, M. (1994). The Geography of Innovation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
Fletcher, M., & Harris, S. (2012). Knowledge Acquisition for the Internationalization of the 
Smaller Firm: Content and Sources. International Business Review, 21(4), 631–647.  
Flick, U. (1997). The Episodic Interview. LSE Methodology Institute Discussion Paper. 
London. 
Flick, U. (2000). Episodic Interviewing. In M. Bauer & G. Gaskell (Eds.), Qualitative 
Researching with Text, Image and Sound (pp. 75-92). London: Sage. 
Flick, U. (2006). An Introduction to Qualitative Research (3rd ed.). London: Sage. 
Florida, R. (1995). Toward the Learning Region. Futures, 27, 527-536.  
Forsgren, M. (2001). The Concept of Learning in the Uppsala Internationalization Process 
Model: A Critical Review. Företagsekonomiska Institutionen Uppsala Universitet 
Department of Business Studies Uppsala University Occasional Paper, 1.  
Freeman, C. (1982). The Economics of Industrial Innovation (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Frost, T., & Zhou, C. (2005). R&D Co-practice and 'Reverse' Knowledge Integration in 
Multinational Firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 36, 676-687.  
Galunic, C., & Rodan, S. (1998). Resource Recombinations in the Firm: Knowledge Structures 
and the Potential for Schumpeterian Innovation. Strategic Management Journal, 
19(12), 1193-1201.  
George, G., Zahra, S., & Wood, D. (2002). The Effects of Business–University Alliances on 
Innovative Output and Financial Performance: A Study of Publicly Traded 
Biotechnology Companies. Journal of Business Venturing, 17(6), 577-609.  
Gherardi, S. (2000). Practice-Based Theorizing on Learning and Knowing in Organizations. 
Organization, 7(2), 211-233.  
 158 
 
Gherardi, S., & Nicolini, D. (2001). The Sociological Foundations of Organizational Learning. 
In M. Dierkes, A. Berthoin Antal, J. Child & I. Nonaka (Eds.), Handbook of 
Organizational Learning and Knowledge (pp. 35-60). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gherardi, S., & Nicolini, D. (2005). Organizational Knowledge: The Texture of Workplace 
Learning. London: Blackwell Publishing Professional. 
Gierer, A. (2002). Holistic Biology - Back on Stage? Some Remarks on Post-Genomics in 
Historical Perspective. Max-Planck-Institut Preprint 162. Philosophia naturalis, 
39(1).  
Glick, B., & Pasternak, J. (2003). Molecular Biotechnology: Principles and Applications of 
Recombinant DNA (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: ASM Press. 
Godin, B. (2006). The Linear Model of Innovation. The Historical Construction of an 
Analytical Framework. Science, Technology & Human Values, 31(6), 639-667.  
Gottweis, H. (1998). The Political Economy of British Biotechnology. In A. Thackray (Ed.), 
Private Science. Biotechnology and the Rise of Molecular Sciences (pp. 105-130). 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Goujon, P. (2001). From Biotechnology to Genomes. The Meaning of the Double Helix. 
Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. 
Grandori, A. (2001). Neither Hierarchy nor Identity: Knowledge-Governance Mechanisms and 
the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Management and Governance, 5, 381-399.  
Hambrick, D., Finkelstein, S., & Mooney, A. C. (2005). Executive Job Demands: New Insights 
for Explaining Strategic Decisions and Leader Behaviors. Academy of Management 
Review, 30(3), 472-491.  
Hargadon, A. (2003). How Breakthroughs Happen: The Surprising Truth About How 
Companies Innovate Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Hedegaard, M., Chaiklin, S., & Jensen, U. J. (1999). Activity Theory and Social Practice: An 
Introduction. In S. Chaiklin, M. Hedegaard & U. J. Jensen (Eds.), Activity Theory and 
Social Practice: Cultural-Historical Approaches (pp. 12-30). Aarhus: Aarhus 
University Press. 
Heller, M., & Eisenberg, R. (1998). Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biotechnological Research. Science, 280(5364), 698-701.  
Henderson, R., & Clark, K. (1990). Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing 
Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 35, 9-30.  
Hendry, C., & Brown, J. (2006). Organizational Networking in UK Biotechnology Clusters. 
British Journal of Management, 17, 55-73.  
Hennart, J.-F. (1977). A Theory of Foreign Direct Investment. (Ph.D. dissertation), University 
of Maryland.    
Hennart, J.-F. (1982). A Theory of Multinational Enterprise. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Hennart, J.-F. (2003). Theories of the Multinational Enterprise. In A. Rugman & T. L. Brewer 
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Business (pp. 127-149). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 159 
 
Hermans, R., & Kulvik, M. (2004). Projected Growth Effects of the Biotechnology Industry - 
The Fourth Pillar of the Finnish Economy? Etla Keskusteluaiheita/Discussion Papers. 
Helsinki: Etla (Elinkeinoelämän tutkimuslaitos/The Research Institute of the Finnish 
Economy). 
Hermans, R., & Kulvik, M. (2005). Projected Growth Effects of the Biotechnology Industry in 
Finland: The Fourth Pillar of the Economy? International Journal of Biotechnology, 
7(4), 269-287.  
Hermans, R., Kulvik, M., & Tahvanainen, A.-J. (2005). ETLA 2004 Survey on the Finnish 
Biotechnology Industry - Background and Descriptive Statistics Etla 
Keskusteluaiheita/Discussion Papers. Helsinki: Etla (Elinkeinoelämän 
tutkimuslaitos/The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy). 
HGP. (2012). Human Genome Project Information (http://genomics.energy.gov). Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy. 
Hopkins, M., Martin, P., Nightingale, P., Kraft, A., & Mahdia, S. (2007). The Myth of the 
Biotech Revolution: An Assessment of Technological, Clinical and Organisational 
Change. Research Policy, 36(4), 566-589.  
Hughes, S. (2011). Genentech. The Beginnings of Biotech. Chicago, IL: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Hymer, S. (1960). The International Operations of National Firms. (Ph.D. dissertation), The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.    
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.-E. (1977). The Internationalization Process of the Firm - A Model of 
Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Market Commitments. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 8(1), 23-32.  
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.-E. (1990). The Mechanisms of Internationalization. International 
Marketing Review, 7(4), 11-24.  
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.-E. (2009). The Uppsala Internationalization Process Model 
Revisited: From Liability of Foreignness to Liability of Outsidership. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 40(9), 1411-1431.  
Jones, M., Coviello, N., & Tang, Y. (2011). International Entrepreneurship Research (1989–
2009): A Domain Ontology and Thematic Analysis. Journal of Business Venturing, 
26(6), 632-659.  
Katila, R. (2002). New Product Search Over Time: Past Ideas in Their Prime? Academy of 
Management Journal, 45(5), 995-1010  
Katila, R., & Ahuja, G. (2002). Something Old, Something New: A Longitudinal Study of 
Search Behavior and New Product Introduction. Academy of Management Journal, 
45(6), 1183-1194.  
Keeble, D. (2000). Collective Learning Processes in European High-technology Milieux. In D. 
Keeble & F. Wilkinson (Eds.), High-Technology Clusters, Networking and Collective 
Learning in Europe (pp. 199-229). Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Kelle, U. (2005). 'Emergence' vs. 'Forcing' of Empirical Data? A Crucial Problem of 'Grounded 
Theory' Reconsidered. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative 
Social Research [On-line Journal], 6(2).  
Kenney, M. (1986). Biotechnology: The University-Industry Complex. New Haven: CT: Yale 
University Press. 
 160 
 
Kenney, M. (1998). Biotechnology and the Creation of a New Economic Space. In A. 
Thackray (Ed.), Private Science. Biotechnology and the Rise of the Molecular 
Sciences (pp. 131-143). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Kevles, D. (1998). Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Beyond: The Political Economy of Patenting 
Life. In A. Thackray (Ed.), Private Science. Biotechnology and the Rise of the 
Molecular Sciences (pp. 65-79). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Kimble, C. (2006). Never Knowingly Undersold: The Uses and Abuses of the Term 
Communities of Practice (Keynote Speech). Paper presented at the 1st International 
Workshop on Building Technology Enhanced Learning Solutions for Communities of 
Practice in conjunction with 1st European Conference on Technology Enhanced 
Learning, Crete, Greece. 
Kindleberger, C. (1969). American Business Abroad. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Knickerbocker, F. (1973). Oligopolistic Reaction and Multinational Enterprise. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Knight, G., & Cavusgil, S. T. (2004). Innovation, Organizational Capabilities, and the Born 
Global Firm. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(2), 124-141.  
Knorr-Cetina, K. (1999). Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Cambridge: 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Kogut, B. (2007). Country Capabilities and the Permeability of Borders. Strategic Management 
Journal, 12(S1), 33-47.  
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the 
Replication of Technology. Organization Science, 3(Focused Issue: Management of 
Technology), 383-397.  
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1993). Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary Theory of the 
Multinational Corporation. Journal of International Business Studies, 34, 625-645.  
Kääriäinen, L. (2000). Molekyylibiologia. In P. Tommila & A. Tiitta (Eds.), Suomen Tieteen 
Historia 3. Luonnontieteet, Lääketieteet ja Tekniset Tieteet (pp. 610-621). Helsinki: 
Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. 
Laage-Hellman, J., McKelvey, M., & Rickne, A. (2004). Introduction. In M. McKelvey, A. 
Rickne & J. Laage-Hellman (Eds.), The Economic Dynamics of Modern 
Biotechnology (pp. 3-19). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Labov, W. (1972). Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Labov, W. (1981). Speech Actions and Reactions in Personal Narrative. In D. Tannen (Ed.), 
Analyzing Discourse: Text and Talk (pp. 217-247). Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press. 
Labov, W. (1997). Some Further Steps in Narrative Analysis. Journal of Narrative and Life 
History, 7(1-4), 395-415.  
Labov, W. (2001). Uncovering the Event Structure of Narrative. In D. Tannen & J. Alatis 
(Eds.), Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics (GURT) 
2001. Linguistics, Language, and the Real World: Discourse and Beyond (pp. 63-83). 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
 161 
 
Labov, W., & Waletzky, J. ([1967] 1997). Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal 
Experience. Journal of Narrative & Life History, 7(1-4), 3-38.  
Lacasa, I. (2007). BioPolis - Inventory and Analysis of National Public Policies that Stimulate 
Research in Biotechnology, its Exploitation and Commercialisation by Industry in 
Europe in the Period 2002–2005. National Report of Finland. Karlsruhe: Fraunhofer 
Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (Fraunhofer ISI). 
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lave, J. (1988). Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics and Culture in Everyday Life 
(Learning in Doing). Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lawton Smith, H., & Bagchi-Sen, S. (2006). University–Industry Interactions: The Case of the 
UK Biotech Industry. Industry and Innovation, 13(4), 371-392.  
Legrain, P., Aebersold, R., Archakov, A., Bairoch, A., Balam, K., Beretta, L., Bergeron, J., 
Borchers, C., Corthals, G., Costelllo, C., Deutsch, E., Domon, B., Hancock, W., Lee, 
F., Hochstrasser, D., Marko-Vargag, G., Salekdeh, G., Sechi, S., Snyder, M., 
Srivastava, S., Uhlen, M., Wum, C., Yamamoto, T., Paiko, Y., & Omenn, G. (2011). 
The Human Proteome Project: Current State and Future Direction. Molecular & 
Cellular Proteomics, 10, 1-5.  
Lemarie, S., Mangematin, V., & Torre, A. (2001). Is the Creation and Development of Biotech 
SMEs Localised? Conclusions Drawn from the French Case. Small Business 
Economics, 17(1-2).  
Lemola, T. (2002). Convergence of National Science and Technology Policies: The Case of 
Finland. Research Policy, 31(8-9), 1481-1490.  
Liebeskind, J., Oliver, A., Zucker, L., & Brewer, M. (1996). Social Networks, Learning, and 
Flexibility: Sourcing Scientific Knowledge in New Biotechnology Firms. 
Organization Science, 3, 783-831.  
Lindstrand, A., Melen, S., & Nordman, E. (2011). Turning Social Capital into Business: A 
Study of the Internationalization of Biotech SMEs. International Business Review, 
20(2), 194-212.  
Link, A. (2006). Biotechnology Centers and Technology-based Economic Development. 
Oklahoma, KA: The University of Kansas School of Business. 
Longino, H. E. (2002). The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
Luukkonen, T. (2005). Variability in Organisational Forms of Biotechnology Firms. Research 
Policy, 34(4), 555-570.  
Macdonald, S. (2006). Loyalty or Betrayal? Information for Innovation in the Organisation 
International Journal of Technology Intelligence and Planning, 2(1), 22-32.  
Macdonald, S. (2011). Seducing the Goose. A Review of Patenting by UK Universities. 
Intellectual Property Quarterly, 4, 323-344.  
 162 
 
MacKenzie, M., Keating, P., & Cambrosio, A. (1990). Patents and Free Scientific Information 
in Biotechnology: Making Monoclonal Antibodies Proprietary. Science Technology 
Human Values, 15(1), 65-83.  
Marceau, J. (1994). Clusters, Chains and Complexes: Three Approaches to Innovation with a 
Public Policy Perspective. In R. Rothwell & M. Dodgson (Eds.), The Handbook of 
Industrial Innovation (pp. 3-12). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Marinova, D., & Phillimore, J. (2003). Models of Innovation. In L. Shavinina (Ed.), The 
International Handbook of Innovation (pp. 44-54). Oxford: Elsevier. 
Martinez, C., & Guellec, D. (2004). Overview of Recent Changes and Comparison of Patent 
Regimes in the United States, Japan and Europe. Paris: OECD. 
Matusik, S., & Hill, C. (1998). The Utilization of Contingent Work, Knowledge Creation and 
Competitive Advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23, 680-697.  
Mcdermid, D. (2006). The Varieties of Pragmatism: Truth, Realism, and Knowledge from 
James to Rorty. London and New York, NY: Continuum International. 
McDougall, P. P., & Oviatt, B. M. (1999). A Framework for Understanding Accelerated 
International Entrepreneurship. Research in Global Strategic Management, 7, 23-40.  
McDougall, P. P., & Oviatt, B. M. (2000). International Entrepreneurship: The Intersection of 
Two Research Paths. Academy of Management Journal, 43(5), 902-906.  
McKelvey, M., Alm, H., & Riccaboni, M. (2003). Does Co-location Matter for Formal 
Knowledge Collaboration in the Swedish Biotechnology–Pharmaceutical Sector? 
Research Policy, 32(3), 483-501.  
McMillan, S., Narin, F., & Deeds, D. (2000). An Analysis of the Critical Role of Public 
Science in Innovation: The Case of Biotechnology. Research Policy, 29(1), 1-8.  
Moodysson, J., & Jonsson, O. (2007). Knowledge Collaboration and Proximity. The Spatial 
Organization of Biotech Innovation Projects. European Urban and Regional Studies, 
14(2), 115-131.  
Moser, P. K., & vander Nat, A. (Eds.). (2003). Human Knowledge. Classical and 
Contemporary Approaches (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mowery, D. C., & Sampat, B. (2005). The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University–Industry 
Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments? Journal of 
Technology Transfer, 30(1/2), 115-127.  
Murray, F., & Stern, S. (2007). Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of 
Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-commons Hypothesis. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 63(4), 648-687.  
Nesta, L., Patel, P., & Arundel, A. (2003). 2002 European Innovation Scoreboard Technical 
Paper 7. Biotechnology Innovation Scoreboard. Brussels: European Commission / 
Enterprise Directorate-General. 
Nicolini, D., Gherardi, S., & Yanow, D. (2003). Introduction: Toward a Practice-Based View 
of Knowing and Learning in Organizations. In D. Nicolini, S. Gherardi & D. Yanow 
(Eds.), Knowing in Organizations. A Practice-Based Approach (pp. 3-31). Armonk, 
NY and London: M.E. Sharpe. 
Nightingale, P., & Martin, P. (2004). The Myth of the Biotech Revolution. Trends in 
Biotechnology, 22(11), 564.  
 163 
 
Nonaka, I. (1994). A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation. Organization 
Science, 5, 14-37.  
Nonaka, I., & Konno, N. (1998). The Concept of ‘Ba’: Building a Foundation for Knowledge 
Creation. California Management Review, 40, 40-55.  
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The Knowledge-Creating Company. How Japanese 
Companies Create the Dynamics of Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nonaka, I., & Toyama, R. (2003). The Knowledge-Creating Theory Revisited: Knowledge 
Creation as a Synthesizing Process. Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 
1(1), 2-10.  
Nonaka, I., Toyama, R., & Byosière, P. (2001). A Theory of Organizational Knowledge 
Creation: Understanding the Dynamic Process of Creating Knowledge. In M. Dierkes, 
A. Berthoin Antal, J. Child & I. Nonaka (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational Learning 
& Knowledge (pp. 491-517). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nonaka, I., Toyama, R., & Konno, N. (2000). SECI, Ba and Leadership: A Unified Model of 
Dynamic Knowledge Creation. Long Range Planning, 33, 5-34.  
Nonaka, I., Umemoto, K., & Senoo, D. (1996). From Information Processing to Knowledge 
Creation: A Paradigm Shift in Business Management. Technology in Society, 18(2).  
Nonaka, I., von Krogh, G., & Voelpel, S. (2006). Organizational Knowledge Creation Theory: 
Evolutionary Paths and Future Advances. Organization Studies, 27(8), 1179-1208.  
Oakey, R., Faulkner, W., Cooper, C., & Walsh, V. (1990). New Firms in the Biotechnology 
Industry: Their Contribution to Innovation and Growth. London: Pinter. 
OECD. (1999). Managing National Innovation Systems. Paris: OECD. 
OECD. (2005a). Innovation Policy and Performance. A Cross-Country Comparison. Paris: 
OECD. 
OECD. (2005b). Statistical Definition of Biotechnology (Updated in 2005)   
Olby, R. (1990). The Molecular Revolution in Biology. In R. Olby, G. Cantor, J. Christie & M. 
Hidge (Eds.), A Companion to History of Science (pp. 503-520). London and New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Olby, R. (1994). The Path to the Double Helix: The Discovery of DNA (Reprint ed.). Mineola, 
NY: Dover Publications. 
Ouchi, W. (1980). A Framework for Understanding Organizational Failure. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 25, 129-141.  
Owen-Smith, J., & Powell, W. (2004). Knowledge Networks as Channels and Conduits: The 
Effects of Spillovers in the Boston Biotechnology Community. Organization Science, 
15(1), 5-21.  
Oviatt, B. M., & McDougall, P. P. (1994). Toward a Theory of International New Ventures. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 25(1), 45-64.  
Oviatt, B. M., & McDougall, P. P. (2005). Defining International Entrepreneurship and 
Modeling the Speed of Internationalization. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
29(5), 537-554.  
 164 
 
Paavola, S. (2004). Abduction as a Logic and Methodology of Discovery: The Importance of 
Strategies. Foundations of Science, 9(3), 267-283.  
Pavitt, K. (1984). Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: Towards a Taxonomy and a Theory. 
Research Policy, 13(6), 343–373.  
Pavitt, K. (2005). Innovation Processes. In J. Fagerberg, D. C. Mowery & R. R. Nelson (Eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (pp. 86-114). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pedersen, T., Petersen, B., & Sharma, D. (2003). Knowledge Transfer of Multinational 
Companies. Management International Review, 43, 69-90.  
Penrose, E. ([1959] 1995). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Pila, J. (2003). Bound Futures: Patent Law and Modern Biotechnology. Boston University 
Journal of Science and Technology Law, 9(2), 326-354.  
Pisano, G. (2006). Science Business: The Promise, the Reality, and the Future of Biotech. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Plein, L. C. (1991). Popularizing Biotechnology: The Influence of Issue Definition. Science, 
Technology, & Human Values, 16(4), 474-490.  
Polanyi, M. ([1966] 1983). The Tacit Dimension (1983 Reprint ed.). London: Routledge. 
Porter, M. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York, NY: The Free Press. 
Potters, G. (2010). How the Human Genome Project Opened up the World of Microbes. 
Nature Education, 3(9), 34.  
Powell, W. (1996). Inter-organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry. Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152(1), 197-215.  
Powell, W. (1998). Learning from Collaboration: Knowledge and Networks in the 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industries. California Management Review, 40(3), 
228-240.  
Powell, W. (1999). The Social Construction of an Organisational Field: The Case of 
Biotechnology International Journal of Biotechnology, 1(1), 42-66.  
Powell, W., Koput, K., Bowie, J., & Smith-Doerr, L. (2002). The Spatial Clustering of Science 
and Capital: Accounting for Biotech Firm-Venture Capital Relationships. Regional 
Studies, 36(3), 291-305.  
Powell, W., Koput, K., & Smith-Doerr, L. (1996). Interorganizational Collaboration and the 
Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 41, 116-145.  
Powell, W., Koput, K., Smith-Doerr, L., & Owen-Smith, J. (1999). Network Position and Firm 
Performance: Organizational Returns to Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry. 
Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 16(1), 129-159.  
Powell, W., White, D. R., Koput, K. W., & Owen-Smith, J. (2005). Network Dynamics and 
Field Evolution: The Growth of Inter-organizational Collaboration in the Life 
Sciences. American Journal of Sociology, 110(4), 1132-1205.  
 165 
 
Presutti, M., Boari, C., & Fratocchi, L. (2007). Knowledge Acquisition and the Foreign 
Development of High-tech Start-ups: A Social Capital Approach. International 
Business Review, 16(1), 23-46.  
Prevezer, M. (1996). The Dynamics of Industrial Clustering in Biotechnology. Small Business 
Economics, 8, 1-17.  
Prevezer, M. (2001). Ingredients in the Early Development of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry. 
Small Business Economics, 17(1-2).  
Rabino, I. (1994). How European and US Genetic Engineering Scientists View the Impact of 
Public Attention on Their Field: A Comparison. Science, Technology, & Human 
Values, 19(1), 23-46.  
Rai, A., & Eisenberg, R. (2003). Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine. Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 66, 289-295.  
Ratledge, C., & Kristiansen, B. (Eds.). (2001). Basic Biotechnology (2nd ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Reddy, M. J. ([1979] 2002). The Conduit Metaphor: A Case of Frame Conflict in Our 
Language about Language. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and Thought (2nd ed.). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Reiss, T., Hinze, S., & Lacasa, I. (2004). Performance of European Member States in 
Biotechnology. Science and Public Policy, 31(5), 344-358.  
Reiss, T., Hinze, S., Lacasa, I., Mangematin, V., Enzing, C., Vander Giessen, A., Kern, S., 
Senker, J., Calvert, J., Nesta, L., & Patel, P. (2003). Efficiency of Innovation Policies 
in High Technology Sectors in Europe Final Report. Luxembourg: European 
Commission. 
Reiss, T., Lacasa, I., Mangematin, V., Corolleur, F., Enzing, C., Giessen, v. d., Senker, J., & 
Nesta, L. (2005). Benchmarking of Public Biotechnology Policy. Final Report. 
Brussels: European Commission Enterprise Directorate General. 
Rhodes, C. (2010). International Governance of Biotechnology: Needs, Problems and 
Potential London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Richards, G. (2003). Putting Psychology in its Place: A Critical Historical Introduction (2nd 
ed.). Sussex and New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Rodan, S., & Galunic, C. (2004). More than Network Structure: How Knowledge 
Heterogeneity Influences Managerial Performance and Innovativeness. Strategic 
Management Journal, 25(6), 541-562.  
Rosen, S. (2011). IVD Sector Gathering Steam in BRIC Nations. BioMarket Trends, 31(14).  
Rosenkopf, L., & Almeida, P. (2003). Overcoming Local Search through Alliances and 
Mobility. Management Science, 49, 751-766.  
Rothwell, R. (1992). Developments Towards the Fifth Generation Model of Innovation. 
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 4(1), 73-75.  
Rothwell, R., & Dodgson, M. (1991). External Linkages and Innovation in Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises. R&D Management, 21(2), 125-138.  
Rothwell, R., & Zegveld, W. (1985). Reindustrialisation and Technology. London: Longman. 
 166 
 
Sako, M. (1992). Prices, Quality and Trust: Inter-firm Relations in Britain and Japan. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schaechter, M. (2003). Integrative Microbiology – the Third Golden Age. Journal of 
Biosciences, 28(2), 149-154.  
Schatzki, T. R. (2002). The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of 
Social Life. Phildelphia: PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Schatzki, T. R., Knorr-Cetina, K., & von Savigny, E. (Eds.). (2001). The Practice Turn in 
Contemporary Theory. London and New York, NY. 
Schienstock, G., & Tulkki, P. (2001). The Fourth Pillar? An Assessment of the Situation of the 
Finnish Biotechnology. Small Business Economics, 17(1-2).  
Senker, J. (1993). The Contribution of Tacit Knowledge to Innovation. AI & Society, 7, 208-
224.  
Senker, J. (1995). Tacit Knowledge and Models of Innovation. Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 4(2), 425-447.  
Senker, J. (1996). National Systems of Innovation, Organizational Learning and Industrial 
Biotechnology. Technovation, 16(5), 219-229.  
Senker, J. (1998). Biotechnology: The External Environment. In J. Senker (Ed.), Biotechnology 
and Competitive Advantage. Europe's Firms and the US Challenge (pp. 6-18). 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Senker, J., Reiss, T., Mangematin, V., & Enzing, C. (2007). The Effects of National Policy on 
Biotechnology Development: The Need for a Broad Policy Approach. International 
Journal of Biotechnology, 9(1), 20–38.  
Senker, J., van Zwanenberg, P., Caloghirou, Y., Zambarloukos, S., Kolisis, F., Enzing, C., 
Kern, S., Mangematin, V., Martinsen, R., Munoz, E., Diaz, V., Espinosa, J., O'Hara, 
S., Burke, K., Reiss, T., & Wörner, S. (2001). European Biotechnology Innovation 
Systems. Final Report. Luxembourg: European Commission. 
Senker, J., van Zwanenberg, P., Caloghirou, Y., Zambarloukos, S., Kolisis, F., Mangematin, 
V., Martinsen, R., Muñoz, E., Diaz, V., Espinosa de los Monteros, J., O'Hara, S., 
Burke, K., Reiss, T., & Wörner, S. (2001). Final Report. European Biotechnology 
Innovation Systems. Brussels: European Commission. 
Shane, S. (2004). Encouraging University Entrepreneurship? The Effect of the Bayh-Dole Act 
on University Patenting in the United States. Journal of Business Venturing, 19(1), 
127-151.  
Shannon, C. ([1948] 1993). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. In A. D. Wyner & N. 
Sloane (Eds.), Claude E. Shannon: Collected Papers (pp. 5-83). Piscataway, NJ: 
Wiley-IEEE Press. 
Shannon, C., & Weaver, W. (1949). A Mathematical Model of Communication. Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Sharp, M. (1996). The Science of Nations: European Multinationals and American 
Biotechnology STEEP Discussion Paper No 28. Brighton: Science Policy Research 
Unit, University of Sussex. 
 167 
 
Sharp, M., & Senker, J. (1999). European Biotechnology: Learning and Catching Up. In A. 
Gambardella & F. Malerba (Eds.), The Organization of Economic Innovation in 
Europe (pp. 269-302). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, J. E. (2004). Biotechnology (4th ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Solow, R. (1957). Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 39(3), 312-320.  
Stehr, N. (2001). The Grammar of Productive Knowledge. In J. de la Mothe & D. Foray (Eds.), 
Knowledge Management in the Innovation Process. Economics of Science, 
Technology and Innovation Volume 24 (pp. 193-203). Boston, 
MA/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic. 
Stokes, D. (1997). Pasteur's Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Storper, M. (1993). Regional 'Worlds' of Production: Learning and Innovation in Technology 
Districts of France, Italy and the USA. Regional Studies, 27, 433-456.  
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures 
and Techniques (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Suddaby, R. (2006). From the Editors: What Grounded Theory is Not. Academy of 
Management Journal, 49(4), 633-642.  
Sulston, J., & Ferry, G. (2002). The Common Thread: A Story of Science, Ethics and the 
Human Genome. London: Bantam. 
Szulanski, G., Jensen, R., & Lee, T. (2003). Adaptation of Know-How for Cross-Border 
Transfer. Management International Review, 43, 131-150.  
Tallman, S., & Chacar, A. (2011). Knowledge Accumulation and Dissemination in MNEs: A 
Practice-Based Framework. Journal of Management Studies, 48(2), 278-304.  
Tallman, S., & Fladmoe-Lindquist, K. (2002). Internationalization, Globalization, and 
Capability-Based Strategy. California Management Review, 45, 116-135.  
Tallman, S., Jenkins, M., Henry, N., & Pinch, S. (2004). Knowledge Clusters and Competitive 
Advantage. Academy of Management Review, 2, 258-271.  
Thumm, N. (2001). Management of Intellectual Property Rights in European Biotechnology 
Firms. Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 67(2), 259-272.  
Thumm, N. (2004). Strategic Patenting in Biotechnology. Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management, 16(4), 529-538 
Torgersen, H., Hampel, J., v. Bergmann-Winberg, M.-L., Bridgman, E., Durant, J., Einsiedel, 
E., Fjaestad, B., Gaskell, G., Grabhers, P., Hieber, P., Jelsoe, E., Lassen, J., Marouda-
Chatjoulis, A., Nielsen, T., Rusanen, T., Sakellaris, G., Seiferti, F., Smink, C., 
Twardowski, T., & Wambui-Hovmand, M. (2002). Promises, Problems and Proxies: 
Twenty-Five Years of European Biotechnology Debate and Regulation. In M. Bauer 
& G. Gaskell (Eds.), The Making of a Global Controversy (pp. 21-94). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Trott, P., & Hartmann, D. (2009). Why 'Open Innovation' is Old Wine in New Bottles. 
International Journal of Innovation Management, 13(4), 715–736.  
 168 
 
Tsoukas, H. ([2003] 2005). Do We Really Understand Tacit Knowledge? In H. Tsoukas (Ed.), 
Complex Knowledge. Studies in Organizational Epistemology (pp. 141-161). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Tushman, M. L. (1977). Special Boundary Roles in the Innovation Process. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 22(4), 587-605.  
Tushman, M. L., & Katz, R. (1980). External Communication and Project Performance: An 
Investigation into the Role of Gatekeepers. Management Science, 26(11), 1071-1085.  
Tushman, M. L., & Scanlan, T. J. (1981). Boundary Spanning Individuals: Their Role in 
Information Transfer and Their Antecedents. The Academy of Management Journal, 
24(2), 289-305.  
Walsh, V., Niosi, J., & Mustar, P. (1995). Small Firm Formation in Biotechnology: A 
Comparison of France, Britain and Canada. Technovation, 15(5), 303-327.  
Van de Ven, A., & Poole, M. S. (2002). Field Research Methods. In J. A. C. Baum (Ed.), 
Companion to Organizations (pp. 867-887). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Ward, M., & Hodgson, J. (2006). Biotechnology in Europe: 2006 Comparative Study. 
Brussels: The European Association for Bioindustries. 
Ward, M., Hodgson, J., & Binding, K. (2005). Biotechnology in Europe: 2005 Comparative 
Study. Brussels: The European Association for Bioindustries. 
Waxell, A., & Malmberg, A. (2007). What is Global and What is Local in Knowledge-
Generating Interaction? The Case of the Biotech Cluster in Uppsala, Sweden. 
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 19, 137-159.  
Vernon, R., & Wells, L. T. (1966). International Trade and International Investment in the 
Product Life Cycle. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81(2), 190-207.  
Verspagen, B. (2006). University Research, Intellectual Property Rights and European 
Innovation Systems. Journal of Economic Surveys, 20(4), 607-632.  
Wertsch, J. V. (1985). Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Westerlund, L. (2002). Biotech Patents: Equivalency and Exclusions Under European and U.S. 
Patent Law. Amsterdam: Springer. 
Viljamaa, K., Krattiger, A., Mahoney, R., Nelsen, L., Thomson, J., Bennett, A., Satyanarayana, 
K., Graff, G., Fernandez, C., & Kowalski, S. (2007). What Does It Take to Build a 
Local Biotechnology Cluster in a Small Country? The Case of Turku, Finland. In A. 
Krattiger, R. Mahoney & L. Nelsen (Eds.), Intellectual Property Management in 
Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices, Volumes 1 and 2 
(pp. 295-307). Oxford: MIHR. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, NY: The Free 
Press. 
Yager, P., Domingo, G., & Gerdes, J. (2008). Point-of-Care Diagnostics for Global Health. 
Annual Review of Biomedical Engineering, 10, 107-144.  
Yanow, D. (2003). Seeing Organizational Learning: A 'Cultural' View. In D. Nicolini, S. 
Gherardi & D. Yanow (Eds.), Knowing in Organizations. A Practice-Based Approach 
(pp. 32-52). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 169 
 
Yoxen, E. (1982). Giving Life a New Meaning: The Rise of the Molecular Biology 
Establishment. In N. Elias (Ed.), Scientific Establishments and Hierarchies. Sociology 
of Science Yearbook VI (pp. 123-143). Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Zucker, L., & Darby, M. (1995). Virtuous Circles of Productivity: Star Bioscientists and the 
Institutional Transformation of Industry. NBER Working Paper Series, No. 5342 
(November 1995).  
Zucker, L., & Darby, M. (1996). Star Scientists and Institutional Transformation: Patterns of 
Invention and Innovation in the Formation of the Biotechnology Industry Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 93(23), 12709-
12716.  
Zucker, L., Darby, M., & Armstrong, J. (1998). Geographically Localized Knowledge: 
Spillovers or Markets? Economic Inquiry, 36(1), 65-86.  
Zucker, L., Darby, M., & Armstrong, J. (2002). Commercializing Knowledge: University 
Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in Biotechnology. Management 
Science, 48(1), 138–153.  
Zucker, L., Darby, M., & Brewer, M. (1998). Intellectual Human Capital and the Birth of U.S. 
Biotechnology Enterprises. American Economic Review, 88(1), 290-306.  
 
 
%FQBSUNFOUPG.BOBHFNFOUBOE*OUFSOBUJPOBM#VTJOFTT
	( ),'.#)(ŗ+/#-#.#)(ŗ#(ŗ
	(.,(.#)(&ŗ/-#(--Ćŗ
	(()0.#)(ŗ#(ŗŗ'&&ŗ
#)."()&)!3ŗ#,'ŗ
5FFB7JMIFMNJOB.»LFM»
%0$503"-
%*44&35"5*0/4
9HSTFMG*afdcii+ 
*4#/
*4#/	QEG

*44/-
*44/
*44/	QEG


"BMUP6OJWFSTJUZ
4DIPPMPG#VTJOFTT
%FQBSUNFOUPG.BOBHFNFOUBOE*OUFSOBUJPOBM#VTJOFTT
XXXBBMUPGJ
#64*/&44
&$0/0.:

"35
%&4*(/
"3$)*5&$563&

4$*&/$&
5&$)/0-0(:

$304407&3

%0$503"-
%*44&35"5*0/4
"BMUP%
%

ŗ
#&"&'
##(ŗ
<%&<ŗ
	( ),'
.#)(ŗ
+/#-#.#)(ŗ#(ŗ	(.,(.#)(&ŗ/-#(--Ćŗ	(()0.#)(ŗ#(ŗŗ'
&&ŗ#)."()&)!3ŗ#,'
"BMUP6
OJWFSTJUZ
